Majority
Headnote
1. Benefit societies—Ancient Order United Workmen—Policy made: PAYABLE TO ONE RAVINS NO INSURABLE INTEREST.—The appellant insists that the cancellation of the first certificate which was payable to her, and the substitution of the second which was payable to the respondent, was void for two reasons.
1. That the respondent had no insurable interest in the life of John 0. Sabin.
2. That she, the wife, acquired by virtue of the first certificate and its delivery to her a vested right to the sum payable on her husband’s death of which she could not be deprived without her consent.
The statute under which the corporation was organized expressly provides that the funds “may beset apart and provided to be paid over to the families, heirs or representatives of deceased or disabled members, or to such person or persons as such deceased member may, while living, have directed." The by-laws of the corporation impose no limitation on the persons to whom certificates should be payable. It was held in Massey v. Mutual Relief Society of Rochester, 102 N. Y., 523 ; 2 St. Rep., 487 , that there being no restriction in the act under which the society was incorporated against making a certificate payable to a person in no wise related to the member, that a certificate issued to a stranger was not void as a wager policy. In that case the certificate was issued in favor of a person not related to the member, and who was nota member of the society, but in the case at bar the certificate was issued in favor of a member of the order. Under the statute and by-laws a member of this corporation can legally direct the sum to become due at his death to be paid to a stranger having no insurable interest in his life. Niblack on M. B. Societies, § 178.
Did the plaintiff by the certificate and its delivery to her acquire a vested interest in the sum payable thereunder, of which she could not be deprived without her consent ? It is to be observed that the wife never paid any part of the expenses incident to the membership of her husband in this society, nor of her membership in the society to which she belonged, and no pecuniary consideration can be raised in her favor. The statute under which the corporation was organized, its by-laws, together with the application for, and the certificate of membership constituted the contract which existed between the member and the society, which instruments construed together measure the rights of these litigants. Hellenberg v. Dist. No. 1, 94 N. Y., 580 ; Sanger v. Rothschild, 123 id., 577; 34 St. Rep., 258 ; Niblack on M.
It being settled that an appointee under such a contract has no vested interest in the sum, the position taken by the plaintiff in this case becomes utterly untenable.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Bradley, J., not sitting, and Haight, J., not voting.