Washbon v. Cope

(2) When the will was made Nancy Cope was about forty-four years of age, having been married ten years, and was then and still is childless. It is suggested “ the words of contingency refer only to a death in the lifetime of a testator.” In the tenth clause of the will -the testator directs and authorizes his executors “to sell all the real estate ” which he had, except such as he had “given and devised * * for the benefit of my (his) heirs, at such times as said executors shall deem best ” ; and in the eighth clause he provides as follows: “ I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons, John G\, Robert and Henry R, or their heirs, share and share alike.” The language used indicates an intent on the part of the testator that the portion given to her, in the event she shall die without children, “shall be given ” either to his sons, John Gf., Robert and Henry R, “or their heirs, share and share alike; ” thus a provision is made for the giving of her share upon her death without children to his sons John, Robert and Henry, and not being content to provide for their reception of it only, he provides still further for the portion being given “to their heirs, share and share alike,” using words apt to control the • estate at a time so far in the future as might be subsequent to the death of John Gr., Robert and Henry R, or either of them.

Considering the language just referred to, as well as the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of his execution of the will, and the whole language of the instrument, and observing the rule “ that all the parts of an instrument are to be taken together in ascertaining its meaning, and that no part of it should be rejected as inoperative if the whole can reasonably stand together,” Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y., 283 , the conclusion is reached that it was the intention of the testator to provide that the portion of his estate given to Nancy, in the event of her death witiiout issue, should pass to those of the blood of the testator. And that the “ words of contingency ” used by the testator do not refer to a death in the lifetime of the testator. Executors of Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns., 12 ; Greyston v. Clark, 41 Hun, 125 ; 4 St. Rep., 4 ; Nellis v. Nellis, 99 N. Y., 513 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 id., 56; 2 St. Rep., 732 ; Buel v. Southwick, 70 N. Y., 581 ; Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S., 526 , and the opinion of Learned, P. J., in Mead v. Maben, 131 N. Y., 255 ; 43 St. Rep., 167 .

In speaking of the rule referring to death without issue to a time prior to the death of a testator, Andrews, J., in Vanderzee v. Slingerland, supra, says, “ But the rule established by the courts applies only where the context of the will is silent, and affords no indication of intention other than that disclosed by words of absolute gift, followed by a gift over in case of death, or of death

In Mullarky v. Sullivan, 49 St. Rep., 333 , O’Brien, J., in giving construction to a will, says, “ It is perfectly true that in determining what the testator meant every part of the will must be considered, and that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of a particular clause may be modified by other provisions.”

(3) As the foregoing views if adopted would lead to a reversal, it is not important to consider the effect of the surrogate’s decree declaring a construction of the will in accordance with the views already expressed. There should be a reversal and a new trial.

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

Martin, J., concurs.

(dissenting.)—Andrew Gr. Washbon died March 1, 1867, leaving a will dated January 31, 1865. In the first clause of this will he made provision for his wife in lieu of dower. In the second clause he gave and bequeathed to his executors, thereinafter named, a certain farm of about 250 acres upon which liis son John Gr. Washbon then resided, together with the farming utensils and live stock thereon belonging to him at the time of his decease, “ and also the sum of four thousand (4,000) dollars, and also the equal one-fourth part of the residue of my estate as hereinafter mentioned, and also any other’s share or interest which may be hereinafter devised or given to them as trustees, in trust to receive the income, rents, interests and profits thereof, and to apply the same to the use of my said son, John Gr. Washbon, during his life, and, at his decease, to grant, convey, transfer and pay over the same to the descendants of my said son, John Gr. Washbon, who shall be living at his decease,” and he provided that if any deceased child of John left descendants they should take the share their parent would have taken if living. Then came the following clauses:

“Thirdly. I give and devise to my youngest son, Henry R Washbon, the farm in the town of Morris, aforesaid, on which I now live, containing one hundred and eighty-eight (188) acres, more or less, with all the farming utensils and live stock thereon, belonging to me at the time of my decease.

“ Fourthly. I give and bequeath to my daughter, Haney Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., the sum of ten thousand (10,000) dollars.

“Fifthly. I give and bequeath to my son-in-law, John Cope, Jr., the sum of two thousand (2,000) dollars.

“ Sixthly. I give and bequeath to my second son, Robert Washbon, the sum of twelve thousand (12,000) dollars.

“ Seventhly. I give and bequeath and devise all rest, residue and remainder of my property, real and personal, to my three children, Robert Washbon, Haney Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., and Henry R Washbon, to be divided equally between them.

In the ninth clause he made provision for a home and residence for his sister on the farm he had devised for the benefit of his son John. In the tenth clause lie authorized and directed his executors to sell, at such times as they deemed best, all his real estate except such as he had otherwise devised, and lastly he appointed as his executors his sons, Robert and Henry, and his son-in-law, John Cope, Jr.

His four children named in the will were his sole heirs and next of kin. The testator, at the date of the will, was in his seventy-seventh year, and his daughter, Haney, was then about forty-one years old, and had been married about eight years. She has never had any children. The will was proved, and letters issued to the executors on 12th March, 1867. During the years 1867 and 1868 the executors paid to Haney Cope in full the amount of the legacies bequeathed to her by» the terms of the will, which amounted to the sum of about $13,500, and she has ever since that time had the absolute possession and control of the same, and has always claimed full title under the will. The legacies to Robert Washbon and to Henry R. Washbon were also paid wholly, or to a large extent, about the same time. Henry R. died about 1st April, 1884, leaving children, who are parties defendant. On 9th March, 1890, John Gr. Washbon died, leaving as his only heirs at law and next of kin the plaintiffs herein.

On the 23d Hovember, 1887, the plaintiffs filed in the surrogate’s court a petition asking that the executors be required to file an inventory of the estate, and an intermediate account of their proceedings as executors and trustees. Thereupon a citation was issued to the executors returnable on 16th December, 1887. Thereafter the executors filed an inventory and an account of their proceedings. Objections thereto were filed by the petitioners and evidence was taken before the surrogate and a referee, and the matter was adjourned from time to time to the 20th September, 1888, when the executors applied for a judicial settlement of their accounts. A citation was issued in the usual form, returnable on 30th October, 1888. In this citation Haney Oope was named as one of the parties in interest. A hearing was had on December 4, 1888, and by consent of parties who appeared the accounts, objections and evidence taken and filed in the prior proceeding were admitted in the latter as if originally taken and had therein. On the 26tli July, 1889, a decree was made by the surrogate which, among other things, adjudged that the bequests to Haney Oope by the fourth and seventh clauses of the will are not absolute, but her interest is reduced to a life estate by the eighth clause in the event of her dying without children, and that this contingency relates to her death without children after as well as. before the death of the testator.

_ The present action was commenced in May, 1890, and the question is whether Nancy Cope had an absolute title to the legacies which she has received. This depends upon whether the death without children referred to in the eighth clause of the will means ■only a death before the testator. If it does, then the title of Mrs. Cope is absolute. If it does not, then her title is defeasible and the plaintiffs, it may be assumed, would be entitled to some relief. The plaintiffs in support of their position claim (1) that the decree of the surrogate’s court is a binding adjudication upon the subject and, if not, (2) then that the will should in fact be so construed.

It was held at the special term that the decree of the surrogate’s court did not bind Mrs. Cope, mainly on the ground that she was not bound by the appearance of the attorney and that, therefore, the surrogate had no jurisdiction of her person, and that the will should be construed to refer only to a death before the testator. ,

The fund in controversy here was received by Mrs. Cope in 1867 and 1868. The undisputed finding of the court is that the amount she then received was in full of the legacies bequeathed to her by the terms of the will. That being so, she had no interest in fact in the accounting in 1888, as the surrogate had no power to compel her to pay back in case she had received more than she was entitled to. Matter of Underhill, 117 N. Y., 471 ; 27 St. Rep., 720 . She was entitled to nothing farther under the decree, and claimed nothing. There was, therefore, no fund then in the hands of the executors, so far as Mrs. Cope or her legacies were concerned, upon the status of which the surrogate’s court was called upon to pass or in regard to which there was any occasion to construe the clause in question. The only parties who made objections to the executor’s accounts were the plaintiffs, and in these objections no reference was made to the legacies in question, although presumptively the payments thereon entered into the accounts as filed. Indeed, upon the trial before the surrogate, no question seems to have been raised on the subject until the submission of the briefs of counsel upon the final argument. No brief was then submitted on -the part of Mrs. Cope, but on behalf of the executors upon one side and the plaintiffs upon ■other. They were in fact the litigants. There was no issue between the plaintiffs and Mrs. Cope. The latter had held the

We then cometo the question of how the will should be construed, In this state it is, I think, well settled that where there is a testamentary gift to the person absolutely and then a subsequent provision that in case of his death without children it shall ..go to other parties, the words of contingency refer only to a death in the lifetime of the testator unless there is something in the context indicating a contrary intent. Quackenbos v. Kingsland, 102 N. Y., 128 ; 1 St. Rep., 175 ; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y., 47 ; 2 St. Rep., 732 ; Mead v. Maben, 131 N. Y., 255 ; 43 St. Rep., 167 ; Black v. Williams, 51 Hun, 280 ; 21 St. Rep., 263 . The reason given in some cases is that the absolute gift, which is in the first instance made, should not be cut down or limited by .any subsequent doubtful expression, and that as the limit of death without children may refer to a death in the lifetime of the •testator, that should be the construction adopted in order to give full force to both provisions, unless a different intent appears elsewhere.

Does such an intent appear in this case ? The construction claimed by the plaintiffs would in effect give to Mrs. Cope only a life estate. The testator provides in terms a life estate for one of his children with remainder over. His failure to so provide for Mrs. Cope does not at least aid the plaintiffs’ view. Hor does the use in the second clause of the expression “ also any other’s share or interest which may be hereafter devised or given to them as trustees.” Ho such interest was in fact given to the trustees, and if the testator had then in mind the share of Mrs. Cope, his failure to follow up any idea he may then have had does not take away or affect the meaning which presumptively is to be given to his subsequent language. It is urged that on the theory of the defense the eighth clause was unnecessary, as the legacies to Mrs. Cope in case of her death before the testator would by law have passed to her brothers as intestate property. Assume this might be so, still the provision would prevent partial intestacy and the law prefers a construction which will prevent partial intestacy to one which will permit it. Thomas v. Snyder, 43 Hun, 15 ; 6 St. Rep., 592 . The same feature existed in the Quackenbos case and does not seem to have been considered of any special importance. In that case too, as here, there was one or more life estates provided for, and the failure to provide such for the share in •controversy was held to support the interpretation that the first taker, having survived the testator, took the absolute title.

I fail to find anything in the present case to overcome the pre

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to abide; event.