Majority
Headnote
Gas companies — Statutes.This is an appeal by the Standard Gaslight Company, relator, from a final order, entered at special term, overruling a demurrer interposed by said relator to a return filed by the respondent to an alternative writ of mandamus. The allegations of the alternative writ of mandamus, so far as they are material to the decision below and to the present appeal, are as follows : That the respondent is commissioner of public works of this city, with the power of granting permits for opening public streets in the city of New York for the purpose of laying gas mains and conductors ; that the Standard Gaslight Company, the relator, is a corporation organized about the month of February, 1886, under the general gaslight act, passed February 16, 1848, and acts amendatory thereto, and is now engaged in the manufacture and distribution of gas to its customers; that after the incorporation of the relator there was passed- chapter 248 of the Laws of 1886, entitled “ An act to facilitate the supply of illuminating gas in the city of New York at a reasonable price,” by which,
To this alternative writ a return was duly filed, alleging, among other .things, that under the terms of chap. 37 of the Laws of 1848, the act under which relator was incorporated, all gaslight companies in the cities of this state could only lay their mains and conductors in streets and highways of said city with the consent of the municipal authorities, and under such reasonable rules and regulations as said municipal authorities should prescribe, and not otherwise; that relator has not obtained the consent of the municipal authorities of this city for the laying of the mains and conductors mentioned in the alternative writ herein, in the streets for the opening of which requests were made to respondent, as alleged in the thirteenth paragraph of the alternative writ; that chap. 248
The question presented, therefore, upon this appeal is, does the relator require the consent of the municipal authorities of this city to lay its mains, conductors, etc ? This question is to be determined by the interpretation which is to be given to chapter 566 of the Laws of 1890, as amended by chapter 617 of the Laws of 1892. It is claimed upon the part of the respondent that all the rights and privileges which were conferred upon the appellant by chapter 248 of the Laws of 1886 were repealed by the said acts of 1890 and 1892. But by | 161 of the act of 1890, which immediately follows the repealing clause contained in that act, it is provided that “ the repeal of a law, or any part of it, specified in the annexed' schedule shall not affect or impair any act done, or right accruing, accrued, or acquired, or liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred prior to May first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, under or by virtue of any law so repealed, but the same may be asserted, enforced, prosecuted or inflicted as fully and to the same extent as if such law had not been repealed.”
They, therefore, by the acts done, had acquired the right to lay these mains, under the act of 1886. It was a matter of contract between the People and this gas company; and rights thus acquired it was the evident intention of § 161 of the act of 1890 to leave unmolested. The claim that it “is perfectly possible to harmonize the repealing clause and the saving clause by holding that the intention was that no act done, right accrued, or liability incurred by the Standard Gaslight Company prior to the repeal should be affected thereby, but that since such repeal the company, in the transaction of its business, comes within the provisions of the general gaslight act as embodied in the transportation corporations law,” is certainly not saving to the appellant any right which it had secured by reason of the special privileges conferred upon it by the act of 1886, in consideration of concessions which it made in respect to the furnishing of gas to the public at large and to the municipality. It would be a curious anomaly in the law if concessions made in view of rights conferred could be insisted upon, and a large portion of the rights taken away. It seems to us, therefore, in view of the character of the legislation by which the rights enjoyed by the appellant were conferred upon it, and the express reservation of vested rights by § 161 of chapter 566 of the Laws of 1890, that there was no intention upon the part of the legisla
O’Brien and Follett, JJ., concur.