Campbell v. Jimenes — 52 N.Y. St. Rep. 495

Majority

p. 495

Bernard J. Campbell, Resp't, v. Juan Y. Jimenes et al., App'lts.^[1]

(New York Common Pleas, General Term,

Filed May 10, 1893.)

Headnote

1. Contkact—Evidence .

If the intention of the parties to a written contract be intelligible upon the face of the instrument, extrinsic proof of its meaning is inadmissible; and its construction is for the court alone.

2. Same.

But if its terms be so obscure or ambiguous as not to be understood without the aid of adventitious light, then evidence, not only of the surrounding circumstances, but of the acts and conversations of the parties, is competent to illustrate their intention; and upon such evidence the meaning of the instrument is for determination by the jury.

Appeal from judgment of the general term of the city court, affirming judgment on verdict of jury.

Action for damages from breach of a contract of employment

The contract is as follows: “I, Bernard Campbell, chief engineer, hereby ágree to render myself to the orders of Captain Compton for service on steamer he may assign, and for service in the West Indies, not to extend six months, receiving wages at the rate of two hundred and fifty dollars Amer. gold or equivalent per

p. 496

month, one month to be paid in advance on leaving, and free passage out and home. New York, 8th, 1889.”

(Signed by the parties.)

Frank H. Platt, for app’lts; William F. Randell, for resp’t.

The judgment recovered by the plaintiff represents damages from the breach of a contract for a six months employment. If, in fact, he was hired for a shorter term, the judgment is necessarily erroneous. Or, were the contract for no definite duration of service, either party might terminate it, certainly at .the end of any month. De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal., 450 ; Howard v. East Term., etc., Co., 8 Southern Rep., 868; Clark v. Ryan, 11 id., 22; Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb., 419 . And, when the hiring is for a period “ not exceeding ” a named term, its duration is indefinite. Harper v. Hassard, 113 Mass., 187 ; Peacock v. Cummings, 46 Pa. St., 434 ; Coffin v. Landis, id., 426.

“ Either party may put an end to the contract at any time, if the term is indefinite ; as if A. employs B. to serve him at a certain sum a month, for a period not exceeding three years.” Wood on Master & S. (2d ed.), § 133.

If such was the agreement in question, it is clearly incapable of sustaining the action.

To the support of the judgment, therefore, it is indispensable that the contract on which it rests should stipulate for a service of six months.

Assuming to himself the interpretation of the written agreement, the learned trial judge held it to be for six months. But, upon the face of the instrument, the construction is incorrect. Substituting for “extend” the word “exceed,” as probably intended by the parties, Lapeer Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 30 Mich., 159 ; Morrell v. Frith, 3 M. & W., 402, the term of plaintiff’s service was indefinite, and so terminable at pleasure. Authorities supra.

The case, however, is not so bad for the plaintiff as the position of the trial judge would imply; namety, that the court should construe the contract, and without the aid of extraneous evidence.

If the intention of the parties to a written contract be intelligible upon the face of the instrument, extrinsic proof of its meaning is inadmissible ; and its construction is for the court alone. Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N. Y., 153 , 156; Glacius v. Black, 67 id., 563, 567. But if 'its terms be so obscure or ambiguous as not to be understood without the aid of adventitious light, then evidence, not only of the surrounding circumstances, but of the acts and conversations of the parties, is competent to illustrate their intention; and upon such evidence the meaning of the instrument is for determination by the jury. Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y., 147 , 155; 5 St. Rep., 569 ; Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass., 56 , 59; Almgren v. Dutilh, 5 N. Y., 28 ; Goodrich v. Stevens, 5 Lans., 230 ; Walrath v. Thompson, 4 Hill, 200 ; Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall., 1 ; First Nat. Bank v. Dana, 79 N. Y., 108 ; Fagin v. Connoly, 69 Am. Dec., 456 , note; Keller v. Webb, 28 Am., 210, note; Browne on Parol Evidence, 190 et sequ.

p. 497

Upon the face of the agreement between the parties to this action, it is uncertain for what period the service was to continue, and on what “ steamer ” the plaintiff was to be employed. Wherefore, parol evidence of the circumstances of the transaction and of the conversations of the parties was admissible in elucidation of the obscurities and ambiguities apparent on the face of the paper; and upon such proof the meaning of the contract was for solution by the jury.

It follows that the j udgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

Bookstaver and Bischoee, JJ., concur.