Hyperlawhypertext legal database Banker v. Knibloe 53 N.Y. St. Rep. 289

← Cases

Banker v. Knibloe

53 N.Y. St. Rep. 289 Court N.Y. Gen. Term Decision date 1893-06-23 English

Delivered by Dwight, P. J.

Contents

Majority

p. 289
John W. Banker, Resp’t, v. William N. Knibloe, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed June 23, 1893.)

Headnote

Trial—Direction of verdict by request—New trial.
Both parties asked for a direction of verdict, which the court directed in favor of defendant, but subsequently ordered a new trial on the ground that there was a question of fact which should have been submitted to tbs jury. Held, error;_ that by the course pursued both parties waived the right to go to the jury on any question, and no error was committed in withholding any particular question from the jury.
Appeal by the defendant from an order of special term, entered in Livingston county, granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the minutes after a verdict for the defendant, by the direction of the court, at the Livingston circuit.
L. O. Reed, for app’lt; D. W. Daggett, for resp’t.

At the close of the evidence both parties asked for the direction of a verdict by the court, and neither party asked to go to the jury upon any question in the case. The court there

p. 290
upon directed a verdict for the defendant, but stayed the entry of judgment and gave time to the plaintiff to move for a new trial. The motion was afterwards heard at a special term held by the same judge, and the order for a new trial was granted solely upon, the ground, as appears from the opinion of the judge, that there was a question of fact in the case which should have been submitted to the jury.

The situation is peculiar. By the course taken by the parties on the trial, both of them waived the right to go to the jury upon any question in the case, and submitted all questions of fact as-well as of law to the decision of the court. Bank of Attica v. Pottier & Stymus Mfg. Co., 17 St. Rep., 327 , 332; Dillon v. Cock-croft, 90 N. Y. 649 ; Provost v. McEncroe, 102 id., 650 ; Reilly v. Lee, 41 St. Rep., 559 , 562.

It is plain therefore that no error was committed in withholding any particular question of fact from the jury, since all questions of fact were withdrawn from the jury by the parties themselves. In such a case the only questions reviewable on a motion for a new trial are those raised by exceptions taken on the trial, and the question whether the decision of any question of fact, necessarily involved in the direction of a verdict, was without evidence to support it. Gregory v. Mayor, 113 N. Y., 416 ; 22 St. Rep., 703 ; Kirtz v. Peck, 113 N. Y., 222 ; 22 St. Rep., 733 ; Provost v. McEncroe, supra. Manifestly in such a case it is not open to either party on appeal, or on a motion for a new trial, to complain that there was any question of fact in the case which should have been submitted to the jury.

In this case the only question of tact which was really litigated on the trial, or which is suggested by the plaintiff as an open question on this motion, is the question whether the plaintiff was a holder in good faith and for value of the promissory note in suit, and this is the question which the court at special term held should have been submitted to the jury.

For the reasons stated it is evident that the motion for a new trial should not have been granted on that ground, and we find no other ground in the case which justifies the granting of the motion.

The order must, therefore, be reversed, with costs, and judgment directed for the defendant on the verdict.

Lewis, Macomber and Haight, JJ., concur.

Cases cited