Majority
Headnote
Building loan associations—Dividends—Premiums on loans.The plaintiff became a member of the defendant association and a subscriber for sixty-four shares of its capital stock. Upon these shares the defendant loaned or advanced $6,720, and to secure its repayment the plaintiff on the 23d day of February, 1887, executed her bond and a mortgage upon premises then owned by her in fee. They were conditioned, so far as is now material, for the payment of sixteen dollars principal and six dollars and forty cents interest each week from the
The complaint shows that prior to the 25th day of February, 1893, the plaintiff so far complied with that condition as to pay, first, the interest as it became due; second, $5,098 of the principal in money, and third, $1,158.40 by dividends declared from time to time by the defendant’s directors and credited to her, so that there remained unpaid only $463.60 of the mortgage debt. She tendered payment of that sum, gave notice of the withdrawal of her shares and demanded a discharge of the mortgage; it was. refused, and this action was brought to enforce her demand.
The facts stated in the complaint are not denied, and the only inquiry made necessary by the defendant’s answer is as to the competency of its directors to declare and credit those dividends in reduction of the plaintiff’s indebtedness, or, stated more specifically, the substantial question raised is whether certain premiums offered by members of the association for an award of loans, and paid by reserving the amount offered from the loan awarded and made, fall within the description of earnings contemplated by the statute under which the defendant was incorporated, Law's 1851, chapter 122, as amended in 1875, chapter'564, and in 1878, chapter 96; if they do, then may they properly be treated, first, as a present profit, or second, must their application be postponed until the mortgage is paid, or third, applied periodically in such proportions^ the past time of the loan bears to its unexpired time, or as the instalments of principal paid bear to those yet to mature.
The statute referred to makes provision for two classes of members in such associations as come within its terms; one, investors who desire the accumulation of a fund to be returned to them, and another borrowers, who would desire advances or loans. It also assumes that for the advantage of both classes entrance and other fees, fines and penalties will be imposed and interest on loans exacted, and declares that neither of those things nor the making of any monthly payment required by the articles of association, or of any premium for loans macfe to members, shall be deemed a violation of any statute against usury. Section 7, act - of 1851, supra. The same section prescribed a time for the termination of such corporation and prohibited “ any dividend ” of principal or of profits until such termination, or “ until its debts had been paid or otherwise sufficiently provided for.” Under that act it is plain the questions now presented could not have arisen. In 1875, however, the section referred to was so amended, chap. 564, Laws 1875, as to permit the “trustees of such company to declare dividends from time to time from its earnings, payable in such manner as may be provided in its articles.”
It is not contended that the constitution or articles of association of the defendant contravene the laws of the state or contain provisions other than those necessary for the convenient and effective conduct of the business which it might within the purview of the statute fairly transact. By those articles its capital stock is divided into shares of $105 each, payable in weekly instalments, and va
Another rule of the defendant (article 15) declares that 11 the board of directors shall at each quarterly meeting ascertain the net profits of the association for the previous quarter, from which
It appears that under this rule the directors have determined the amount of profits by including membership or entrance fees, fines, transfer membership fees, surplus profits from the previous quarter and premiums received during the then current quarter.
The argument of the defendant proceeds upon the assumption that these premiums are not in fact received, but enter into the bond and mortgage and are paid from time to time as the instalments called for by the instruments mature. If that be so, there would be abundant reason for calling the premiums to some extent unearned. It appears, however, the association before paying over the amount of the loan deducted the premium from the sum awarded, and delivered to the borrower, the residue. It actually had the premium in hand.
The contract on the part of each was to pay money. The bidder to pay the premium, the lender to pay or to advance the full amount of the loan awarded to the borrower. Either party could have insisted on such performance of the contract Had they done so, no one, I suppose, would deny that the premium, the whole of it, could be accounted as so much money gained or earned. Its payment would have formed no part of the mortgage obligation. The parties were not bound to insist upon this method. The course they did adopt led to the same result. There was reason and natural equity in that mode of proceeding. It was a simple matter of compensation and avoided the circuit of two actual payments. Both were implied and it was not necessary that they be formally made. A similar transaction, although raising a different question, was interpreted by the court of appeals in the case of the Concordia Savings & Aid Association v. Read, 93 N. Y., 474 , a body incorporated under the statute above referred to. There was an auction sale and “ a highest bidder,” a loan made according to the award. The premium was deducted from the sum loaned and the balance only was actually paid to the borrower, but “say the learned court ” the whole sum was loaned or advanced and out of it he paid the premium which went into the treasury of the association for the 'benefit of all the stockholders. Such was the case here. See also, 62 Ind., 275 .
The directors- of the association do not seem to have exceeded their authority in the declaration of dividends, and the plaintiff is, I think, entitled to the relief demanded, with costs.