Majority
Headnote
OOBPOBATIOMS—PbEFEBENCB OF WAGES—WHO ABE HOT EMPLOYES.The appellants claim that they are within the provisions of chap. 376 of the Laws of 1885, which provides that “ When a receiver of a corporation created or organized under the laws of this state and doing business therein, other than insurance
The case of Short v. Medbury, 29 Hun, 39 , is cited as controlling in appellants’ favor. That was an action against a stockholder of the Rochester Frear Stone Company to enforce that provision of the statute. Sec. 18 of chap. 40 of the Laws of 1848, which provides that the stockholders of the corporation shall be liable “ for all debts that may be due and owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices, for services performed for such corporation.” Curtis, the assignor of the plaintiff, applied to the company for a situation, and was told that one would be given to him if he would procure a loan of $3,000 for the company. This he did, and began to work for the corporation at a salary of $1,000 a year, payable monthly or as he wanted his pay. He acted as foreman, .took part in the manual labor required to manufacture the stone, kept the time of the men, solicited orders, collected bills, and did whatever was required of him by the secretary of the company, who acted as its general superintendent. It was held that Curtis was a laborer or servant within the meaning of the act, and it was said that “he rendered manual service of the same kind as that performed by the other laborers in the employ of the company, and it seems to have been one of his principal duties and not a mere incident to his position.”
The same statute was under consideration in the case of Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y., 213 , which was decided shortly before the Short case but probably not then published, as it is not referred to in that case. In the Wakefield case it is said (p. 217-218): “ It is plain we think, that the services referred to are menial or manual services—that he who performs them must be of a class whose members usually look to the reward of a day’s labor or service, for immediate or present support, from whom the company does not expect credit, and to whom its future ability to pay is of no consequence; one who is responsible for no independent action, but who does a day’s work, or a stated job under the direction of a superior. Gordon v. Jennings, L. R., 9 Q. B. D., 45; Dean v. DeWolf, 16 Hun, 186 ; aff’d, 82 N. Y., 626 . * * * To the language of the act must be applied the rule common in the construction of statutes, that when two or more words of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense, express the same relations, and give color and expression to each other. Therefore, although the word “servant ” is general, it must be limited hy the more specific ones, “ laborer and apprentice ” with which it is associated, and be held to comprehend only persons performing the same kind of service that is due from the others.”
In People v. Remington, 45 Hun, 331 ; 10 St. Rep., 310 , which involved the consideration of the statute of 1885, it was held that the superintendent of the company employed at an annual salary,
The Bemington case was affirmed by the court of appeals upon the opinion delivered at the general term. 109 N. Y., 631 . In People ex rel. Satterlee v. Board of Police, 75 N. Y., 41 , it is said by Judge Miller that “ employes ” are usually considered as embracing laborers and servants, and those occupying inferior positions.
The case of Brown v. A. B. C. Fence Co., 52 Hun, 151 ; 23 St. Rep., 515 , is cited as sustaining the appellants’ position. There a person employed to assist the general manager of a corporation in keeping its books and to clean the office and show room of the corporation, and to assist in putting together, taking apart and shipping wire wicket fence and weaving machines, at the salary or wages of forty dollars a month, payable in four instalments of ten dollars each, was held to be an employe within the act of 1885. This does not, I think, reach the present case.
Having in view the use in the statute of the term “ wages,” and the rule of construction, indicated in the case of Wakefield v. Fargo, as to the kind of service designed to be covered by the terms “ employes, operators and laborers,” and the princijdes laid down in the Wakefield and the Bemington cases, with the apparent approval of the full court in each case, it should, I think, be here held that the claims of the appellants are not within the statute.
The appellant Little was a clerk and bookkeeper in the office of the corporation at a salary of $100 a month, payable under his contract of hiring at the end of each month. Stebbins was a draftsman employed in the office of the corporation at a salary of $125 a month, payable monthly. These are not of the grade of workmen designed to be protected by the act, and the fact that they took their orders from the officers or foreman of the corporation does not materially change the situation.
Hodgson was foreman of the boiler shop at a salary of $225 a month payable monthly. The statute does not reach this grade and kind of employment and the fact that these men sometimes performed manual labor along with the ordinary workman or alone does not change materially the situation. It is very clear that they were not hired for that purpose. The inference is plain whatever they did in that line was incidental to their general employment. In this respect the case differs from the case of Short v. Medbury, above cited.
The claim of Deming, as stated in the petition of the receivers was not at all for services but for money loaned to one Smith one of the employes of the corporation, and as such there was no basis for preference. Deming in his affidavit states that in February 1892 he purchased of Smith a claim that he had against the corporation for services in the amount of $145. He does not state that he presented this claim to the receivers. There is no affidavit of Smith on the subject. Assuming however that Deming represents the claim of Smith and that the facts as to it are as stated in the affidavit of Little, the claim for preference is not made out. Little states that on June 15, 1891, the corporation made a contract with Smith ,by which Smith was hired to go to Brazil having in charge locomotives shipped to that place; that as a part of his duties he was to assist in the mechanical work of erecting and putting in order the machinery of the locomotives on their arrival; that he was to receive for his wages five dollars a day for each day that he was absent on his trip and that there is now due and unpaid on the contract of hiring $145 for twenty-nine days’ work. The affidavit of Little is dated April 22, 1898. It does not state what time the claim accrued, nor do"es it state what the duties óf Smith were. It gives a part but whether or not this was incidental to his main duties does not appear.
The foregoing suggestions lead to an affirmance of the order.
Order affirmed.
Hardin, P. J., and Martin, J., concur.