est became due, to wit, May 1, 1893; and the said attorney further represented that due notice to pay all interest would be sent said John Gr. Norris on or about the last-named date, and before he would have to pay the same.
“(3) That on the 4th day of May, 1893, the defendant and mortgagor, Norris, received a written notice from the plaintiff, mailed the day previous, that interest amounting to $1,000 was due on the mortgage, and requesting him to call and pay the same, and that on the 3d day of June, and within thirty days from the receipt of said notice, said John Gh Norris, relying upon said representations and notice, and upon the thirty-days clause contained in the mortgage, by Albert I Sire, his attorney, duly tendered to the plaintiff before suit brought the said amount, of interest due, which plaintiff refused to accept.
“(4) That on said 3d day of June, 1893, and after the said tender of interest as aforesaid, the plaintiff, without heeding the same, began the present action of foreclosure, and refused to withdraw the same, although said defendant Norris, immediately after the commencement thereof, offered again to pay said interest, together with all costs of the action ; and on the 16th day of June, 1893, duly made a retender to the plaintiff, and also to its attorney, of said interest, amounting to $1,000, and also interest on that amount, for delay, together with all costs of this action, and all of which was refused.
“ (5) And defendants further allege that they are, both in behalf of themselves and of said John Gr. Norris, mortgagor, still ready and willing to pay plaintiff all of said interests and costs, for which defendants contend that there has been no default in payment of the said interest, or any breach of the conditions of the mortgage; and they further contend that, if there has been any default or breach of such conditions, the same is wholly technical in character, not injurious to the plaintiff, and such as a court of equity ought to relieve against. Wherefore defendants pray that this action may be dismissed, with costs, and for such other relief as to the court may seem meet.”
A. I. Sire, for app’lts; Edward F. Brown, for resp’t'.
The complaint in this action is the ordinary pleading upon the part of the plaintiff for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon failure to pay interest when due. The answer alleged an agreement extending the time of payment, and also a tender to the plaintiff before suit brought of the whole amount of interest due, and a refusal dpon the part- of the plaintiff to accept. It seems to be apparent that the learned judge who heard the motion in the court below did not think the answer was frivolous, because he thought it necessary to write quite alengthy opinion for the purpose of showing that.no defense was set up by the defendant. It is also equally true that the learned counsel for the respondent does not think that the answer is frivolous, as he has submitted lengthy points upon the question as to whether any defense is set up in the answer or not. It has been too often determined to require demon.stration here that, if the question as to whether an answer sets up a