Majority
Headnote
1. Master and servant—Duty of former.The general principles applicable to the relation of employer and employe in respect to the duties to by the former for the safety of the latter while serving in such relation are well settled. And they may be embraced in the general proposition that the master assumes to his servant the duty of using due care to provide him suitable implements for his use and a safe place in which to perform his work; and that the master is not responsible to him for the consequence of the negligence of an employe unless he with knowledge of his unfitness employs or continues him in the service. While this doctrine is recognized by the plaintiff’s counsel he contends that the defendant failed to perform the duty it owed to the plaintiff in that it did not furnish him a place of safety to perform the work in which he was engaged at the time in question; and that his injury was the con
If the placing of the plank over the hole in the floor was within the duties assumed by the defendant, the plaintiff’s case was-improperly withheld from the jury. The hole about six feet in diameter had been cut in the floor, the tank was placed there to be hoisted, dropped into the hole and upon the supporting girders below. This was the situation when the plaintiff and the other employes of the defendant proceeded to put the tank in the place so provided for it. To accomplish it a rope and tackle were brought into requisition. To draw the rope through the hole in the lower end of the tank and there fasten the end of it it was necessary for some one or more of those engaged in the work to occupy a place over the hole in the floor, and to enable that to be done the plank was picked'up and placed over it by the foreman. The plaintiff and two other workmen including him were standing upon it at work securing the end of the rope. The fourth man, Patterson, stepped upon the plank, it broke and the plaintiff with some others fell about eighteen feet to the bottom of the building and was injured.
It was a hemlock plank nine feet long, one foot wide and two inches thick. It was so smeared with dust or dirt, as to conceal its defective quality from observation. The plank was brought into requisition as an expedient for the time being in the performance of the work ®f setting the tank in its place.
There were other planks about there which the men might have used as the means of strengthening the support if they had chosen to do so. The floor was a safe place to work. The hole was-rendered dangerous only by want of care to avoid falling through it. And so far as it was necessary for the accomplishment of the work to get over it the means were in the planks lying about there to give safety and protection from danger.
In such case it would seem that the act of making use of the-the appliances for such purpose is within the details of the work and that of the coemploye rather than of the master of his representative Hogan v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 774 ; 35 St. Rep. 870 ; Oregan v. Marston , 126 N. Y. 568 ; 38 St. Rep. 428 .
The fact that the employe who placed the plank over- the hole in the floor was foreman in the work has no particular significance upon this question. Whether an act or omission having relation to the service of the employes is that with which the master is chargeable is dependent upon the nature of it, and not upon the grade in the service of the person whose act or default may come in question between the master and an employe. The relation of the foreman to the other workmen was that of coemploye except as to such acts performed by him as were embraced in the duties of the defendant, Loughlin v. State of New York, 105 N. Y. 159 ; 6 St. Rep. 826 ; Cullen v. Norton, 126 N. Y. 1 ; 36 St. Rep. 359 .
The line of distinction may seem narrow- between some cases where liability has and has not been sustained, founded upon the relation of master or coemployes to the causes which were the
In Kranz v. Long Island Ry. Co. 123 N. Y. 1 ; 33 St. Rep. 46 , the plaintiff’s intestate, an employee of the defendant, who by direction entered a trench, which had been opened, to clean out under ground water pipe, and while doing it the earth caved in causing his death. It was held that the defendant owed him the duty of providing him a reasonably safe place to perform the work he was directed to do; and that he had the right to assume that it had been made reasonably safe.
.Similar to this was the case of Wannamaker v. City of Rochester, 44 St. Rep. 45 ; 137 N. Y. 529 . In McLean v. Standard Oil Co., 50 St. Rep. 626 , the defective scaffold on which the plaintiff was at work when it fell causing his injury, was erected by carpenters in the service of defendant preparatory to the work in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time it gave way. In none of those three cases was preparation of the places for the work to be done within the details of the service in which the persons who suffered the consequences of the defective and unsafe conditions were engaged. A like principle in some phase is that upon which the other cases cited on the part of tile plaintiff were determined, Pantzar v. Tilly F. Iron Mining Co., 99 N. Y. 368 ; Bushby v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 107 id. 374 ; 12 St. Rep. 9 . The present case is distinguished from those where the master has been held liable to bis employe for not furnishing a reasonably safe place for him to work, in the fact that the plank which gave way was in the, use made of it an instrumentality employed at the time in and of the work being performed and as
In the former of these cases the plaintiff’s intestate having been directed to do so by the defendants’ superintendent went into a grain elevator to clean it out upon the assumption that the grain had been discharged from it. While he was there some of the grain which had become heated, thus rendered cohesive' and adhered to the elevator, came down upon the plaintiff’s intestate causing his death. The place in which he was directed to perform the work was for that reason unsafe; and the court held that inasmuch as by the exercise of care on the part of the defendant the condition in that respect may have been ascertained the question of its negligence was for the jury. In that respect the defendant was clearly chargeable with the direction of its superintendent to the intestate. In the Campbell Case there was a defective condition, a situation of a skid extending from the defendant’s vessel to the dock making a slide on which the plaintiff was employed and directed by the defendant’s superintendent to remove the cargo from the ship by means of a truck. In the attempt to do this the plaintiff by reason of the defective connection of the skid with the dock was injured. And it was held that the place where he was put to do the work was unsafe and the danger one which he did not assume.
It may be observed that those places were unsafe and the conditions which made fhem so where not produced in the progress of the work in which the injured employes were engaged and not a detail of their service in its performance. And although Patterson was the alter ego of the defendant in the present case in doing whatever required that relation his grade in the service of the defendant was dependent upon that in which for the time being he was engaged. When therefore he was at work with the others at the time in question he was a co-employe, and his contribution by his acts and direction in the details of the work were not those of the master or for which the latter was responsible to those who were engaged there with him in its performance. Crispin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516 ; Cullen v. Norton, 126 Id. 1; 36 St. Rep. 359 .
If there views are correct it follows that to whatever negligence
With a view as is said of showing that the foreman was incompetent for the position assigned to him a witness was by the plaintiff’s counsel asked : “ Did you observe his manner of doing work ?” The evidence was excluded and exception was taken. It may be that the ruling was made upon the ground that no such defense was alleged in the answer, as that was a specified ground of the objection, but however that may be the man Schoenfilder was in this work and at the time in question acting in the capacity of a co-employe merely, and there was no purpose indicated in the evidence offered, tó prove anything affecting his condition, character or habits which rendered him unfit for service or prejudicial to his relation as such co-employe.
It therefore seems that without reference to the question of pleadings the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the evidence.
No other question requires consideration. The order should be affirmed. • All concur. Except Haight J., not sitting.
Cases cited
- Hogan v. Smith 125 N. Y. 774 p. 280
- Cregan v. Marston 126 N. Y. 568 p. 280
- Loughlin v. State 105 N. Y. 159 p. 280
- Cullen v. Norton 126 N. Y. 1 p. 280, p. 282
- Benzing v. Steinway & Sons 101 N. Y. 547 p. 281
- Kranz v. Long Island Railway Co. 123 N. Y. 1 p. 281
- Wannamaker v. City of Rochester 137 N. Y. 529 p. 281
- Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Iron Mining Co. 99 N. Y. 368 p. 281
- Butler v. Townsend 126 N. Y. 105 p. 282
- Hussey v. Coger 112 N. Y. 614 p. 282
- McGovern v. Central Vermont Railroad 123 N. Y. 280 p. 282
- Crispin v. Babbitt 81 N. Y. 516 p. 282