People ex rel. Carlin v. Board of Supervisors — 6 N.Y. St. Rep. 28

Majority

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People ex rel. Patrick Carlin, App’lt, v. The Board of Supervisors of Kings County, Resp’t.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,

Filed December 14, 1886.)

Headnote

Supervisors—Board of Kings county—Laws 1884, chap. 280—Right to REJECT BIDS.

Under Laws 1884, chapter 230, the ho rd of supervisors advertised for sealed proposals, and reserved the right to reject any and all bids. Held, that a party having given his assent to such right of rejection by laying proposals before the board in answer to the advertisement, could not challenge this power to exercise the right.

Appeal from the relator from an order entered in Kings ' county denying a motion for a peremptory mandamus.

The relator claimed to be entitled to the relief demanded by virtue of the provisions of section 3, chapter 230, of Laws of 1884, providing for the purchase of a county farm and the erection of buildings thereon by the supervisors of Kings county.

The section is as follows:

1 ‘ Section 3. Whenever any such plan or plans and specifications shall be approved by the said Board of Supervisors, it shall advertise as now provided by law for proposals for the erection of the buildings and improvements thereby contemplated to be erected and made, and shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder or bidders. But the work so to be done may be let in one or more contracts as to the said Board of Supervisors shall seem for the best interest of the county. The' buildings aforesaid when erected shall be used for the care, custody, relief and support of the poor persons who are or shall hereafter become a charge upon the county of Kings, and of the persons committed or who may hereafter be committed to the asylum for the insane in said county.”

M. F McGoldrick, for app’lt; J. B. Meyenborg, for resp’t.

The relator moved for a peremptory mandamus to compel the respondents to contract with him for sixteen cottages, two boilers and a donkey engine.

Under chapter 230 of the Laws of 1884, the board of supervisors advertised for sealed proposals, and reserved the right to reject any and all bids. The relator and a number of others submitted proposals for separate portions of the work and a portion of the work was awarded to the relator, but a number of his bids were rejected.

It is claimed by the relator that the board of supervisors had no power under the statute to annex the conditions to their advertisement of reserving the right to reject any bid, but having once advertised for proposals were bound to award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder.

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It is not necessary to decide whether the respondents had that power or not, the fact is that they did it, and the relator having made his bids under such advertisements, he cannot complain that they exercised the right he so conceded to them.

It was the plain condition of his bid that the board might reject it, and having given his assent to such rejection, he cannot challenge their power to exercise the right.

The plain object of the statute was to prevent the supervisors from arbitrarily awarding a contract to any one except the lowest responsible bidder.

There is no restriction as to the form or the number of times of advertising, but the statute contemplated that there should be competition, and that the contract should, in the end, be awarded to the lowest bidder.

The statute was intended to be beneficial to the county, and if such a construction can be spelled out of its terms, it is the duty of the court to be sedulous in giving it such an interpretation.

If the respondents had the power only to make one advertisement and were bound to award a contract if there was only one bid, the county might be subjected to the most glaring fraud. By using the terms the ‘ ‘ lowest bidder,” the intent of the statute that there should be competition is manifest.

If there is no bid with which a comparison, can be made, how can it be said that a bid is the lowest, and if there is no lowest, how can the contract be awarded ?

The return shows that the relator was the only bidder upon portions of the work where his bid was rejected, he was therefore, not the lowest bidder, within the meaning of the statute. He might be called the highest bidder as well as the lowest bidder. It seems to be a fair interpretation of the act that when the contract is awarded, it shall be to the lowest bidder.

It does not seem possible that the legislature intended to take from the local law making power, is, the board of supervisors, all discretion as to the making of contracts for the people of the county. Suppose, from accident or design, it should happen that there was but one bid and that was for grossly exorbitant prices, could it be claimed that the board of supervisors must nevertheless award the contract ? Such a construction would turn a statute intended for the protection of the public into an instrument of fraud and robbery.

Under the facts disclosed, we think the respondents had the power and did right in rejecting the relator’s proposals, and the order is accordingly affirmed with costs and disbursements.