Silsby Manufacturing Co. v. State

The claimant, a manufacturing corporation located at Seneca Falls, filed its claim against the defendant in substance alleging itself to be a riparian owner of land adjoining the Seneca River, on an island therein, known as Dey’s Island, and upon which it had erected valuable buildings; and that it was the owner of valuable water power and hydraulic rights, by means of a water way called Dey’s Race, and that it employed this water power as a motor to propel its machinery in its buildings.

It was further alleged that the state maintained and operated a canal known as the Cayuga and Seneca Canal, which ran through the village of Seneca Falls, and the canal was divided into various levels by means of locks, for the purpose of facilitating the passage of boats, etc.; that the state had built a wall, of the proper height to protect navigation, and.that when the locks, gates, levels and walls were in proper condition, by being tight and secure, the surplus water coming into the upper level spilled over this wall and over a dam, and a portion thereof passed- over a lower dam into Dey’s race, and became available to claimant as a motor to prqpel its machinery; that in the years 1882, 1883 and 1884, the walls, locks, gates, levels, etc., ■were not kept by the state in a proper and tight condition to prevent leakage and wastage, and that large quantities of water wasted through these locks, gates and levels, and were diverted from Dey’s Race, and the claimant was thereby compelled to use steam instead of the water which otherwise would have flowed through Dey’s Race, and would have been used by it. Damages to the extent of §3,500 per year for these years were claimed.

On the trial evidence was given tending to prove the facts

The claimant proved itself to be a riparian owner, and entitled to the use of the waters in Seneca river, as such riparian owner, in their natural flow, without any inter- 0 ference from the state except in so far as its rights had been legally altered by the action of the state. Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N. Y., 178 ; Smith v. Rochester, 92 id., 463.

The right of the state to use the waters of Seneca river for canal purposes arises from two acts of the legislature, and action taken under them.

The first act (chap. 144, Laws 1813), incorporated the Seneca Lock Navigation Company for the purpose of improving the navigation- between the Seneca and Cayuga lakes. Power was given the corporation to take lands, goods, chattels and effects, not exceeding $10,000 in value, and any land for the purposes of navigation.

The ninth section provided that: “Whenever the navigation shall be completed, any owner or occupant of any land adjoining the said outlet may use the waters for mills or other hydraulic works; but such use shall at no time impede the passage of boats or other water craft or articles, or injure or affect the navigation or canals, locks or dams or appurtenances belonging to the said corporation: Provided that nothing in this act shall authorize the said corporation to use any of the waters of said outlet for any other purposes than for the navigation aforesaid.”

Power is also given by the next section to the owners of mills to make cuts to conduct the water to their mills, so, however, as not to impede the navigation or “prevent the company from the use of as much water as at all times shall be necessary for the purposes of said navigation.”

We think the meaning of this statute, taking the two provisions together, is that the company shall not use any of the waters for any other purposes than for navigation, and only so much as shall be necessary for those purposes.

Stock was issued and the company went on and built its locks and constructed its works under this act.

In 1825 (chap. 271), an act was passed authorizing the construction of the Cayuga and Seneca canal, the first section of which contained the proviso that the canal commissioners should not proceed in their duties under the act until the state should be invested with the right and title to the stock, property and privileges of the Seneca Lock Navigation Company. Provision was made for the acquir

Upon payment as provided for in the act the state was to-“be invested with all the stock, property and privileges belonging or appertaining to the said Seneca Lock Navigation. Company.” This title and this only the state did subsequently secure.

The board of claims found that the superintendent of public works has the entire control and management of all the canals, including the one in question, and that the amount of water to be used by the state is entirely a matter of discretion with him; that he might use all the water if he deemed it necessary.

It was also found by the board that if the locks, gates, walls, etc., should be changed by the State more water might be saved, and the quantity of surplus water, over and above that necessary in the discretion of the superintendent for the use of the canals, increased, and in that event the claimant herein would be entitled to its proportion of increase.

As conclusions of law the board found that the state owed no duty to the claimant herein in the increase of surplus water, and that the board had no power to review the discretion of the superintendent of public works in the amount of water he shall use in the management of the canal. The claim was therefore dismissed. Proper exceptions were filed to the findings of fact and conclusions of law. The board was requested to find as a fact what seems to have been established by uncontradicted evidence, viz.: that if the locks, gates, etc., had been in such condition as not to leak, there would have been a saving of 5,250 cubic feet per minute, which but for such diversion would have passed into the race, and which was above the amount necessary for navigation. That the amount thus escaping, and some portion of which would have reached the flume of claimant, would produce fifty-five horse power, which cost claimant $3,000 per annum. The board refused to find these facts, and upon the finding of the board as made by it all these facts were immaterial and a refusal to find them entirely proper.

By chapter 321 of the Laws of 1810, the state provided for a recovery of damages sustained by any individual from the canals of the state and from their use and management, provided the facts proved made out a case which would create a legal liability .against the state were the same established in evidence in a court of justice against an individual or corporation, and jurisdiction to hear sucli claim

In relation to this act, assuming liability on the part of the state, this court has said, per Ruger, Oh. J., in Sipple v. State ( 99 Ñ. Y., 284 , at 288): “The object in view was the protection of the citizen, and not the exemption from liability of the state; and it is quite evident that the state thereby intended to assume, with reference to the management of the canal, the same measure of liability incurred by individuals and corporations engaged in similar enterprises, and to afford to parties injured the same redress which they would have against individuals and corporations for similar injuries.”

Judged upon this measure of liability and by this stand- • ard, we cannot doubt that the board of claims erred in their construction of the relative rights of the parties to this controversy.

The state had a right to all these waters for no other purpose than that of navigation, and only so much as should at all times be necessary for such purpose. We do not see upon what principle it can be said that the state was to be the sole judge of that necessity and of the amount to be taken. It succeeded only to the rights of the lock company, and it has not since acquired any other or different rights. If it desired more it could easily acquire more by the exercise of its right of eminent domain, but so far its rights must be decided as they exist in its character as successor to the rights of the lock company.

We do not believe that it would ever have been contended that the company was the sole judge of the amount neces- • • sary for the purposes of navigation.

Undoubtedly the acts of the agents of the state in the use of the water would be entitled to a quite liberal construction. The question would not probably be, has the state used no more water than was absolutely necessary for the purposes of navigation, and have its gates and locks been kept up to the highest state of efficiency and in the best possible repair, and have the most effective appliances been used to guard against the leakage of water, but the inquiry would be whether, taking the whole facts into consideration, all the circumstances surrounding the case, the state had done what was fairly and reasonably incumbent upon it to do in the use of the water for navigation purposes, and in the prevention of leakage or other wastage to a more than fair and reasonable extent.

The exception of the claimant to the finding of fact, that the superintendent of public works had power to use all the water, etc., as above stated, possibly might not raise

Upon a new hearing the whole case will be open to investigation, and it will be for the board to decide, in view of all the facts, whether the state is using more water than is fairly and reasonably necessary for purposes of navigation, or is talcing fair and reasonable precautions to prevent unreasonable waste of water not for navigable purposes.

The sections of the Revised Statutes called to our attention by the attorney-general are not, in our view, relevant. They refer generally to cases where the state has obtained the right to use ah the water, unconditionally and absolutely, and lets the surplus under conditions provided for in the statute. They do not touch such a case as this, where the state has no right to the use of water for any but navigation purposes, and only for such as may be necessary for that purpose, and where the balance has never been taken from the original riparian owner.

But even the statute referred to by the attorney-general expressly reserves the right of the owner of hydraulic privileges prior to any grant from the state, unless his damages for the loss of such rights are duly assessed and paid. 1 R. S. (7th ed.), 669, § 84.

' It is not necessary that there should have been a finding of negligence on the part of any officer of the state, or a request to so find. The exception to the finding as to the absolute discretion of the superintendent of public works, taken in connection with the refusal to find facts material to the issue as to the unlawful use of the waters by the state, and the exception to such refusal, are sufficient to bring the question before the court.

And this first exception is noticed in the notice of appeal, which is broad enough to permit the question to be raised and decided here.

The defense of the Statute of Limitations is made to the whole of the claim herein set forth. It is good undoubtedly as to the claim for 1882. We think it is equally clear that it is not good for the other years, 1883,1884.

If the proper facts upon which to base an action were found, it would then appear that the state had unlawfully used a certain amount of water, to the use of which the claimant had an undoubted right, and every day such use continued a new cause of action arose therefor, in favor of the claimant. Of course when action was commenced, all

The diversion being unlawful it is not to be presumed that it will be continued; hence, no foundation is laid for a recovery of damages that might be sustained in the future. Uline v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y., 98 .

Besides, the amount of the diversion is liable to vary from day to day or hour to hour; and so wholly unstable would be the data that it would be entirely impossible to figure or reason upon the probable or possible amount of damage to accrue in the future.

As damages could not be predicated of the future, so a failure to sue for past alleged damages would have no effect upon the rights of the claimant within the period not barred, which, in this case, is by the statute stated to be two years. For the damages, if any, which claimant has sustained for. the two years prior to the commencement of this action, it is entitled to recover; the question to be determined by the rules we have laid down, and upon the facts which may then appear in proof.

To give the claimant the opportunity of proving the necessary facts, and the defendant any answer there may be to the claim upon the principles here laid down, the award must be reversed and the case sent back to the board of claims to be re-heard. Costs abide event.

All concur.