Williams v. Kierney

June 19, 1866, B. N. Huntington was the owner of the premises described in the complaint, situated in,the city of Rome, and entered into a contract with one Isaac N. Williams for the sale of the premises for the sum of $906.66, to be paid within six years from the date of the contract, providing that when the payments were all made the deed was to be delivered to Williams, his heirs and assigns. At about the date of the contract Williams entered into possession of the premises, built a house thereon, surrounded it with a fence and made considerable valuable improvements thereon.

Williams made payments on the contract up to the time of his death, which occurred on the 28th of February, 1874. He left him surviving his widow, who is the plaintiff herein, and seven children, all of whom survive, except Frederick, who died when about seven years old intestate, sometime after the death of his father. All of the children were infants, under the age of twenty-one years, at the time of "their father’s death.'

, The widow and children were in possession of the premises, described in the contract, at the time of the death of Williams, and have remained in possession ever since. Williams died intestate, and on the 25th day "of March, 1874, the plaintiff and her father, H. 0. Kenyon, were duly appointed

The intestate left at the time of his death some personal property, having been engaged in the ice business, gathering and selling ice in the city of Rome, and having obtained for that business a lease of the ice house and pond where he gathered and stored ice. The lease had three years to run at the time of his death. At the expiration of it Kenyon, while acting as administrator, procured a renewal of the said lease in his own name for said ice house and pond. Adjacent to the lot in question was a low place or pond, which the deceased in his lifetime filled with earth and on which he erected a barn on the land thus made, and a fence separated it from the lot described in the contract occupied by the plaintiff and her children. The barn was used to stable teams and place tools used in the ice business, and it was used for a like purpose after the death of Williams by his sons and Kenyon carrying on and continuing the ice business.

Kenyon, after his appointment as administrator aforesaid took possession of the personal estate of the deceased, and had the sole management of the estate as such administrator. He caused an inventory to be made of the personal assets of the deceased, exclusive of the lease for the ice house and pond, of which no inventory was taken. The lease was used and treated as a part of the estate of the deceased. The property inventoried amounted to about $900. '

The ice business was continued by Kenyon, with the aid of the sons of the deceased, in the same way and manner that the deceased had carried it on in his lifetime, and the personal assets of the estate, including the ice then gathered, and in the ice house, valued at about $700, were managed and controlled by the administrator, together with about $4,370 contributed by one of the . sons of the deceased, the administrator mingling the same, and using it with his own property, so that it could not be ascertained how much, or what part of it, was used for any specific purpose or object, or how much of it came from the increase of the ice business, or from other sources.

Out of this mixed fund Kenyon, the administrator, paid debts of the deceased, amounting to about $1,500, and paid Huntington- “ on said land contract the sum of $662, and supported plaintiff and her children out of the same, with what was done to aid in that respect by the sons of the plaintiff,” and also supported his own family, paying his own debts, taxes and insurance “out of the general mixed fund.” Kenyon, as administrator, never accounted to the estate, and never had any accounting or settlement of or concerning the property of the estate of the deceased.

The referee also found that the intestate paid on the land contract to Huntington divers sums of money, and that several of the payments were made after the time for the payment of the whole purchase price, by the terms of said contract, had become due, and that Kenyon paid out of the “mixed fund” the sum of $662 to Huntington, on said contract, and which said Huntington received as payment thereon. The last payment having been made November 1, 1875, and which was long after the whole purchase price on said contract, for said premises, had become due.

The referee has also found; viz: “That on the third day of November, 1875, said Huntington prepared a notice and intrusted the same to the said Kenyon, to serve on the plaintiff and her said children, declaring that he elected to terminate said contract, stating therein that he should proceed to take possession of said premises; that said Kenyon testified, on the trial hereof, that he did not serve the said notices on. the plaintiff and her children, and the plaintiff and several of the children also testifying that such notice was not served on them. * -* * That said notice was not served on said plaintiff and her said children.” i

The referee also found that on the 27th of November,' 1875, an agent of Huntington, together with an attorney of Huntington, and at his request, entered the house of plaintiff on said premises, in said contract described, and in the presence of the plaintiff and some of her children, but not all of them (nor does it appear how many, or which of the children were present) made a formal declaration that they took possession of the house and premises' in behalf of said Huntington, stating that they did so under and in pursuance of a forfeiture of said contract; and stating that the premises thereafter would belong to said Huntington, and that he should contract the same to H. 0. Kenyon; that no proceedings were ever taken to dispossess the plaintiff or her said children of said premises.

_ By the evidence, it appears that the steps taken by Huntington were with the knowledge and apparently by the procurement of Kenyon, who was thus contriving to get the “legal title to the premises covered by the contract.”

The referee also found, viz.: “That on the 29th day of November, 1875, the said Huntington and his wife deeded the premises described in said contract to said H. 0. Kenyon, which deed was duly recorded in the county clerk’s office of the county of Oneida, in which county the prem

It also appears by the findings of the referee that at the same time that Huntington executed the deed to Kenyon, Kenyon executed and delivered to the Rome Savings Bank a mortgage on the same premises “for §700,” that being the sum then due on said contract at that date as balance of the purchase price of the premises, and which sum was paid to said Huntington therefor; which mortgage was soon thereafter duly recorded in the county clerk’s office of Oneida county.

In this action no question is made in regard to the validity of the mortgage to the savings bank, as the money received upon it was applied in discharge of Huntington’s lien on the real estate covered by the contract.

The referee has also found: “That on the 29th day of December, 1883, the said Kenyon executed and delivered to the defendants herein the mortgage described in the complaint herein, covering the same premises, for $1,500, to indemnify them for indorsing for him two several promissory notes for $443 each, payable at some of the banks in Rome, N. Y., in three months from date, and all renewals of said notes were to be also secured by such mortgage; and thereupon said defendants indorsed other notes for said Kenyon, which said mortgage was also intended to secure.”

That mortgage was recorded on the 15th of December, 1883, and’he has also found that the notes so indorsed were for Kenyon’s benefit, the defendants being accommodation indorsers. That Kenyon is insolvent and unable to pay the notes; that before the defendants took the mortgage from Kenyon they obtained a search from the clerk’s office, and “found thereby that the title to the premises described in said mortgage was in said Kenyon by deed from said Huntington, and that they relied expressly on said search in reference to the title of said premises. ”

The referee, also found “that the defendants knew said I. N. Williams, in his life-time, and the said premises occupied by him up to the time of his death; that they knew of the death of said I. N. Williams, at the time it occurred, and that he left a widow and children him surviving; but they did not know that said H. 0. Kenyon was one of the administrators, or was acting as such, of the estate of said

The evidence given upon the trial indicates that the plaintiff and her children were in the open, visible and exclusive possession of the premises described in the contract. The attempt to show that Kenyon was in possession in conjunction with her children of the premises in question was a failure. All that he could have said to have been in possession of, was the barn, which by the evidence upon the trial, as well as by the referee’s findings, appears not to have been situated upon the premises described in the contract, but adjacent thereto, upon the earth which had been filled in, and upon which the barn was situated, adjacent to and near the premises covered by the contract. The possession by plaintiff and her children, under the contract, of the premises described in it, was open, notorious, visible and sufficient to give notice t.o the defendants of the rights and interest of the plaintiff and the children in the premises, or to put the defendants upon inquiry which would have yielded information of the plaintiff’s and the children’s rights and interest in the premises. Brown v. Volkening, 64 N. Y., 82 .

The case before us upon the facts which we have already stated, distinguish it from Pope v. Allen ( 90 N. Y., 302 ). In that case the occupation was equivocal “ since Pope was also in possession, and there was nothing to indicate that defendants possession was not subordinate to his, or suggested hostility to the record title. ” Defendants were ‘ ‘ put upon inquiry ” and omitted to pursue the proper investigation with due diligence. Brumfield v. Boutall, 24 Hun, 456 .

At the death of Williams, his equitable interest as a purchaser under the executory contract for the premises in question was in equity real estate, and descended to his heirs-at-law, and the unpaid purchase money was payable out of the personal assets of the intestate. Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch., 398 ; Griffith v. Beecher, 10 Barb., 432 .

The equitable dower of the widow in the premises was subject to the equitable lien existing in favor of Huntington, the vendor of the premises, and arose by operation of law and not as on a purchase for value. She had an

Forfeitures are not favored in law or in equity. Before Huntington could forfeit the interest of the children in the property under the contract in question he would be required to give notice of his intention and to make a demand for fulfillment of the contract within a reasonable time. In the language of the contract, we find the following, viz. : “The said party of the first part, his certain attorney, executors, administrators or assigns shall have the right to terminate this contract, and thereupon, on giving written notice to the said party of the second part, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, of having so terminated said contract, to recover by suit at law all the interest which shall have accrued upon this contract up to, the day of so terminating the same as rent for the use and occupation of said premises, to take immediate possession thereof.”

The evidence fails to show the actual resumption of possession of the property by Huntington. The evidence indicates that the effort to cut off the rights of the,,widow and children in the premises was by a concert of action between Huntington and Kenyon.

Kenyon was an administrator, charged with the duty of applying the personal assets to a satisfaction of the amount due upon the contract. Instead of performing that duty and rescuing the property for the benefit of the widow and children, he apparently entered into a collusive scheme to acquire the legal title of the premises himself, with the knowledge, assent and co-operation of Huntington. The children could not be barred of their rights “without notice requiring performance in a specified reasonable time, or in default, notice that their rights would be deemed abandoned.” In the absence of such a notice to the children, they were entitled to a specific performance of the contract as against Huntington or his grantee, with the knowledge of their equities. Myers v. De Mier, 52 N. Y., 648 ; Divine v. Divine, 58 Barb., 264 .

It seems to follow, therefore, that when Kenyon took

This action is unlike Havens v. Patterson, 43 N. Y., 218 , as in that case the sale was to tw;o parties, one of whom died, and the court remarked, viz.: “Although equitable title under the contract was held by the purchasers as tenants in common, yet the contract itself was single. As to the vendor the purchasers were one party and a notice to one being in possession and a refusal by him to perform, in the absence of collusion, or bad faith, was sufficient to affect the rights of the purchaser and the vendor under the contract to the same extent as though both had been served. Besides, in that case the vendor took possession and there were no personal assets in fact, and it appeared that the administrators consented without any fraud or collusion to abandon the contract.

Risley v. Fuller, 40 Hun, 585 , is unlike the case in hand. That was a law action where the parties sued upon their legal rights as distinguished from their equities, and it did not appear that any of the purchase money had been paid and the action rested wholly upon the legal title and the right to the possession of the premises, no equities being established sufficient to defeat the legal title.

Plaintiff, upon the facts appearing at the trial, holds three relations to the premises in question: First, as dowress; second, as grantee from Kenyon; third, as grantee from the children of her deceased husband.

It is insisted by the appellants that she is estopped from questioning the Hen of the defendant’s mortgage upon the premises.

_ It is insisted, in the defendant’s answer, that the plaintiff, by her delay and loches, is “estopped from claiming that said mortgage is not a vaHd and existing Hen on said property, and free and clear of any alleged equitable or other claim of plaintiff. The answer contains no defense setting up the statute of limitations.

If it_ be conceded that the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence were sufficient to estop the plaintiff as dowress in the premises, such estoppel would not extend to her as the grantee of the title and interest of the children. As to that title or interest she stands in the shoes of the children, and such rights as they had in the property at the time of their conveyance to her she is entitled to assert as their grantee. The effect of that estoppel on the plaintiff at most could be to bar her of the right to assert her dower in the premises as against the defendant’s mortgage

It is not difficult to see how the defendants, in virtue of their mortgage, although the plaintiff may be estopped from setting up a dower in the premises as against them, can realize all the beneficial fruits of such an estoppel. 87 N. Y., 153 .

Appellant calls our attention to Gregg v. Von Phul (1 Wallace, 274). There the doctrine of estoppel was applied to a deed which was tendered, and it was hold, “If the deed was justly liable to objections they should have been stated when the deed was tendered and the money due on the contract demanded.” And it was said that if one has a claim against an estate and does not disclose it, but stands by and suffers the estate sold and improved with the knowledge that the title has been mistaken, he will not be allowed afterwards to assert his claim to the purchaser.

However, without passing upon the question as to how much the defendants may be benefited by the application of the doctrine of estoppel insisted upon by them as against the plaintiff as equitable dowress in the premises, we may modify the judgment so that it shall not be a bar to the defendant’s rights as mortgagees as against plaintiff’s dower interest in the premises. But my brethern are of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. Such will be the judgment of the court. • ,

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Boardman and Follett, JJ., concur.