Majority
Headnote
1. Criminal law—Oleomargarine—Laws 1885, chap. 183, §7—Con-stitutional.The offense for which the appellant was indicted, and of which he was convicted, was that at, etc., he “ did unlawfully, willfully and knowingly have in his possession for sale, keep for sale, offer for sale, and cause and procure to be sold, to certain persons,” etc., “ a number of pounds of a certain article and product, made and manufactured in semblance and imitation of natural butter, that is to say, butter made and produced from pure, unadulterated milk, and cream from the same,” etc., “the same not being then and there natural butter, as he (the said Lipman Arensberg) then and there well knew—against the form of the statute,” etc.
The statute which the defendant was accused of violating was section 7, of chapter. 183, of the Laws of 1885, entitled “an act to prevent deception in the sale of dairy products,” etc. That section prohibits (1) the manufacture out of any animal fat, or animal or vegetable oils, not produced from
The indictment contained three counts, the first charging the defendant with manufacturing the prohibited article; the second, with mixing with milk, cream and butter, the prohibited substances, and the third, with selling the prohibited article. He was acquitted on the first and second counts, and convicted on the third.
The defendant contends that the provisions of the seventh section are in violation of the constitution of this state, and subversive of his constitutional rights of liberty, and the enjoyment of property, and he relies upon the decisions of this court in Re Jacobs ( 98 N. Y., 98 ), and People v. Marx (99 id., 377).
The Case of Jacobs arose under a different statute, and related to a different subject, viz., the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses. It has no bearing upon the present case, except in "so far as it declares general principles which are sought to be applied to the statute now in question. The case of People v. Marx, has a more direct application, as it arose under the act of which the one now under consideration is an amendment or supplement. The section under which the defendant in that case was indicted was section 6 of chapter 202, of the laws of 1884. That section provided as follows:
“ Section 6. No person shall manufacture, out of any oleaginous substance, or any compound of the same, other than that produced from unadulterated milk, or of cream from the same, any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from pure, unadulterated milk, or cream of the same, or shall sell or offer to sell the same as an article of food.”
That section was held to be unconstitutional, for the reason that the prohibition was not confined to unwholesome or simulated substances, but absolutely prohibited the manufacture or sale of any compound designed to be used as a substitute for butter or cheese, however wholesome or valuable, or however openly and fairly the character of the substance might be avowed and published; that the act could not, therefore, be regarded as a health law, nor as intended to prevent deception by the sale of a simulated article as genuine; and stress was laid in the opinion upon
Assuming, as is claimed, that butter made from animal fat or oil is as wholesome, nutritious and suitable for food as dairy butter; that it is composed of the same elements, and is substantially the same article, except as regards its origin; and that it is cheaper; and that it would be a violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of the people to prohibit them from manufacturing or dealing in it, for the mere purpose of protecting the producers of dairy butter against competition, yet it cannot be claimed that the producers of butter made from animal fats or oils have any constitutional right to resort to devices for the purpose of making their product resemble in appearance the more expensive article known as “dairy butter,” or that it is beyond the power of the legislature to enact such laws as they may deem necessary to prevent the simulated article being put upon the market in such a form and manner as to be calculated to deceive. If it possesses the merits which are claimed for it, and is innocuous, those making and dealing in it should be protected in the enjoyment of liberty in those respects; but they may legally be required to sell it for and as what it actually is, and upon its own merits, and are not entitled to the benefit of any additional market value which may be imparted to it by resorting to artificial means to make it resemble dairy butter in appearance. It may be butter, but it is not butter made from cream, and the difference in cost or market value, if no other, would make it a fraud to pass off one article for the other.
It is claimed on the part of the defense that the substance known as “oleomargarine” is composed of the same ingredients as dairy butter, with the exception only that the dairy butter naturally contains a small percentage (about five per cent or more) of butyrine, which is not to be found in the fats or oils used in the manufacture of oleomargarine, and has to be added by mingling some milk, cream or butter with the oils; and, when this is done, that oleomargarine and dairy butter are identical in substance, with
We do not think that this result follows. The statutory prohibition is aimed at a designed and intentional imitation of dairy butter, in manufacturing the new product, and not at a resemblance in qualities, inherent in the articles themselves, and common to both. If, in their essential ingredients or elements, the two articles were so identical that they must necessarily present the same appearance, without resort to any artificial means to produce the resemblance, it is argued on the part of the prosecution that, in that case, it would be competent for the legislature to require that some means be resorted to by the manufacturers to distinguish the new article from the old; that the legislature his attempted to do this by requiring that the packages in which oleomargarine is sold be distinctly marked, and by other means; but that, if all these precautions fail, to prevent deception of consumers, then it is lawful to require that, in the manufacture of the substance itself, some measure should be adopted to make it distinguishable in appearance from the ordinary dairy butter—such as by giving to it a different color, or some other device. We do not deem it necessary now to pass upon this point, for_in the evidence in this case there was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the oleomargarine sold by the defendant, and that which he had in his store exposed for sale, had, by artificial means—not essential or incident to the manufacture of the article, but resorted to for the mere purpose of imitation—been made to resemble dairy butter; that it was yellow in appearance and looked like butter. It was known to the defendant to be oleomargarine, and. was sold and offered for sale by him as such.
There was evidence to the effect that the natural color or dairy butter was yellow, except when made in winter, when the cows were not grazing; that then it would sometimes be white or pearly, but that was exceptional. The oleomargarine purchased of the defendant was analyzed by a chemist employed by the State Dairy Association, and he testified positively that it had a coloring substance in it, and that it was an added color; that a jar of it produced at the trial was delivered to him in June, 1885 (about eighteen months before the trial), and was then in the condition it was at the time he testified, except that it was then full of a yellow preparation, and sealed up; that the article was then a much deeper yellow than at the time of the trial;
The judge, in submitting the case to the jury on the third count, instructed them that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did sell the article called oleomargarine; that it was not made from pure unadulterated milk, or cream of the same; and they must further be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the article so sold was in imitation and semblance of butter, and calculated to deceive; and that, if they found either of these facts in the negative, it was their duty to acquit. He further charged that it was not-necessary to show that the article sold was calculated to deceive the person who bought it in this instance, but that it was in imitation and semblance of butter, and calculated to deceive any person who might buy it. Exceptions were duly taken to the charge, raising the question of the constitutionality of the act under which the defendant was indicted; and also to refusals of the court to charge, raising the points made on the part of the defense that it was necessary that the purchaser from the defendant should have been deceived; that, if the article sold was substantially identical with butter, they must acquit; and that the words “imitation or semblance ” meant a fraudulent imitation or semblance, as to which the court charged that the words meant an imitation or semblance likely to deceive. The jury having found the defendant guilty, the court sentenced him to pay a fine of $100.
We think that the evidence justified the court in submitting to the jury the question whether the article sold was an imitation calculated to deceive. It was sufficient to authorize a finding that it had been artifically colored so as to imitate the most valuable kind of dairy butter; that such coloring was not essential or necessarily incident to its manufacture; and that its only object was to make it resemble dairy butter, and increase its market value. There may have been some conflict in the evidence on
The judgment of the general term should be affirmed.
All concur, except Peckham, J., taking no part.'