Foster v. Bookwalter

This action was brought by the plaintiffs, who were solicitors in patent cases and attorneys and counselors-at law, residing and doing business in the city of Washington, D. •0., to recover from the defendant the sum of $8,555.44 and interest, the balance alleged to be due for certain professional services which they alleged that they had rendered to the defendant relative to applications for and the obtaining of certain patents and matters relating thereto.

Annexed to the complaint was a bill of particulars setting out the services rendered and the charges made therefore in detail.

The answer of the defendant admitted the performance of certain of the professional services mentioned in the bill of particulars annexed to the complaint; and in respect to these he denied, upon information and belief, their value. The answer further alleged payment for said services and denied that any other of the-services or disbursements described in the bill of particulars annexed to the complaint were rendered to or paid for him or at his request, and also denied all liability therefor.

. An amended and supplemental answer was served by the de-' fendant, in which he repeated the allegations of his original answer, and alleged certain payments, which were in full of all services up to certain dates. The answer further admitted the rendition of certain services, and then pleaded a tender and a pay-' ment of the same into court.

The case coming up for trial at a circuit cotirt, for the city and county of New York, a motion was made upon the pleadings that the same be referred, and a reference was ordered and a trial had before the referee, who reported in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of $7,885.44 with, interest. A judgment having been entered upon said report from such judgment the present appeal is taken.

The only question which is presented upon this appeal is whether the conclusion at which the referee arrived is against the weight of evidence ? It is admitted that the tender made upon the part of the defendant was insufficient to liquidate all the claims which the plaintiffs had against the defendant; and that the referee was justified in finding that a considerable amount was due from the defendant for professional services rendered by them to him. But it is claimed upon this appeal that "there was no evidence justifying the greater part of the recovery allowed, such services having been rendered to a company who had become the assignee of the defendant in respect to the patents which formed

A record has been presented upon this appeal of over thirty-five hundred folios, and so-called briefs have been submitted, upon the part of the appellant, one hundred and nineteen pages in length, and upon the part of the respondent fifty-seven pages in length. In view of this plethoric condition of the record, it is manifest that within the limits of this opinion mere general statements only can be indulged in, tending to disclose the reasons which bring the court to the conclusion at" which it has arrived. There is, comparatively speaking, very little oral testimony contained in this record, the most of it being made up of correspondence between the defendant and the plaintiffs and the defendant’s alleged agents ; and ,the dignity of the contentions of the appellant almost necessarily depends upon the conclusions arrived at from a reading of this correspondence.

It is to be observed that the referee has without doubt based his judgment very largely upon the fact that he considered that the evidence established that W. E. Lown was the agent of and authorized to speak for the defendant, In this, we think, the referee manifestly erred. There is no evidence in this case tending to show that Lown was the agent of the defendant except the assumptions of the plaintiffs. It is undoubtedly true that the plaintiffs sent communications to Lown which they expected the defendant to see. But it is also equally true that in none 'of the correspondence, or the assertions of the" defendant as specifically testified to, is there any recognition upon the part of the defendant of the right-of Lown to bind him in any particular. Lown swears that he was not the agent of Bookwalter, the defendant; and it requires something more than the written assertions of Lown, if it is claimed that he made them, to furnish evidence that he, Lown, was the agent of the defendant. Agency cannot be proved by the declarations of an agent. And it is probable that this erroneous view of the relations which the evidence established as existing between Lown and the defendant had great weight with the referee in bringing him to the conclusion at which he arrived. And we might very well say, without considering any other question in the case, that this error having entered into the judgment must necessarily be reversed.

It may, perhaps, be not without profit that we should consider a little more in detail a few of the peculiar features of this case. It appears, as has been above stated, that the plaintiffs were co-partners, doing business as solicitors in patent cases and counselors at law in the city of Washington, and had prior to May, 1888, been employed by the defendant to secure patents for various inventors, the services being charged to him personally and paid by him; and that the transactions out of which this action grew commenced with a contract dated the 19th of March, 1888, but executed prior to that time, between the defendant Bookwalter and Lown and Morris, whereby they undertook to secure and develop certain inventions of which the defendant Bookwalter and

Following this agreement, on the 12th of March, 1888, these three gentlemen, upon the one part, made a contract with Robert and the French corporation, upon the other part, by which the latter, upon certain conditions, granted to the former the right to certain improvements for the United States in the art of making and manufacturing iron, steel, and castings, and agreed to convey to a person, to be nominated by the defendant, letters patent to be issued in the United States upon them; and the defendant, Bookwalter, agreed to grant to Robert and the French corporation the exclusive right to use in Continental Europe certain improvements in the art of making iron, steel, and castings patented by him.

On the 26th of May, 1888, the plaintiffs received a letter from Thompson & Boult, of London, with drawings, for an application for a patent in the name of Robert, and also for an .application in the names of Walrand & Delattre, with a request to get the applications on file with the least possible delay, and that Mr. Bookwalter, upon his return to the United States, would call and settle with .them directly for their fees. These instructions were confirmed by the defendant in a letter to the plaintiffs,, dated New York, June 21st, 1888, and the plaintiffs proceeded to carry them out, and rendered services in connection therewith. On the 6th of December, 1889, in pursuance of the agreement of the 12th of March, 1888, above referred to, Robert and the French corporation conveyed to the defendant Bookwalter, who -was his own nominee, the interest in Robert’s inventions described in the foregoing contract. On the 18th of December, 1888, in pursuance of the provisions of the contract of March 19th, 1888, the Bookwalter Steel and Iron Company was organized, of which the plaintiff bad notice. During all this period of time the plaintiffs had been rendering services to Bookwalter in reference to these applications for patents. On the 22d of March, 1889, Norris assigned one-tenth of his interest in the» enterprise to the plaintiffs ; and on the 9th of Aprjl all of those interested in these patents and inventions, to wit: the defendant, Bookwalter, Down, Norris, and the plaintiffs, Foster & Freeman, made a proposition to convey to the Bookwalter Steel and Iron Company their interests in the patents and inventions under the above mentioned contract in consideration of the issue of certain stock' of the corporation. This proposition was accepted by the corporation in April, 1889, and on the 7th of May the stock was issued in

It is to be observed that the assignment to the Bookwalter Ii’on and Steel Company simply covered the American patents, the foreign patents still remaining the property of the defendant Bookwalter; and it is conceded upon the part of the defendant that all services rendered by the plaintiffs in respect to those patents were properly chargeable to him. It also appeal’s from the evidence that during all this time the defendant was corresponding with the plaintiffs in respect to the question of these patents, urging dilligence on their part and substantially calling the business his own, and as late as the 4th of September, 1889, urging them to “lay aside at once all other of my matters,” and proceed with the one referred to in the letter. Prior to the 7th of October, 1889, and to the assignment of the patents to the corporation by Bookwalter, certain interferences had been declared by the Patent Office in respect to the Robert patent, and services had been rendered by the plaintiffs in relation thereto. On said last mentioned day the plaintiffs wrote a letter to W. E. Lown, inclosing a bill against Bookwalter for all these services which had been rendered up to the date of the bill in respect to those patents and intei-ferences, in which they stated; “ We presume that the charges for the interferences should be made against the company, but we have had no authority to do so Please advise us whether the company assumes the charges for the application to be made hereafter was well as for the interference business.” On the 9th of October, Bookwalter wrote to the plaintiffs: “ Mr. Lown has shown me the account you have rendered the B. S. & I. Compaxxy. How I ñnd you have my personal account mixed up with it; and I desire to keep things separate. You will please make out new accounts: one confined wholly to items concerning the B. S. & I. Company, and the other to those appertaining to my matters. In my personal account there should be included all expenses of applications for my patents in foreign countries, the chum device, the button hook, cost of- examining R. R. tie, &c. If you will send to me pei’sonally my account so made out I will remit amount due.” On the 11th of October, 1889, the plaintiffs wrote to Lown, stating among other things; “We also enclose Bookwalter’s account separated as required. As regards future charges, we are willing to make them against the company, but we must have instructions to that effect from the company itself." On the 12th of October Lown replied to this letter, stating: “I have handed Mr. B. the acccounts. The

It is claimed on the part of the defendant that Bookwalter was not responsible for any of the services rendered subsequent to the transfer of the patents on the 22d of Juqe, 1889; also, that he was not liable for any services ordered by Lown ; that he was not liable for the plaintiff’s charges in respect to the interferences; and that he certainly was not liable for any services rendered subsequent to the 9th of October, 1889, when the agency was expressly terminated by the defendant. Various other points are made which it is not necessary now to consider.

Certain authorities are cited for the purpose of supporting the proposition that in consequence of the change in the relations previously existing between all the parties, by the transfer of the patents from Bookwalter to the corporation on the 22d of June, 1889, in order that Bookwalter should be held personally liable thereafter, a further retainer should have been established. We do not think, however, that the- authorities cited support the proposition contended for. They seem simply to establish the proposition that where there is a change of condition and new interests come in, the new interests cannot be charged without an express retainer; and therefore do not seem to have any relation to the question as to whether, a retainer having been once given and apparently been continued, charges for services under such retainer may not be made.

In respect to the charges for services ordered by Lown, it seems to us that they cannot be at all sustained, because, as has been already observed, there does not seem to be sufficient evidence going to show that Lown bore such relations to defendant as authorized him to bind the defendant by atiy order or contract which he might make. ' '

It is not necessary in this connection to discuss the question as to the charges for the interferences. But it is apparent that from the 9th of October, 1889, the plaintiffs bad notice from Bookwalter 'that their relations towards him in respect to those patents in which he had a personal!nterest, were different from those which existed ,iu respect to the patents which he had assigned to the company. They were distinctly notified by Bookwalter at this time that he considered those charges as against the company, although he apparently did not notice the fact that the bills were

It is urged upon the part of the plaintiffs that in the contract of the 12th of March, 1888, Mr. Bookwalter agreed to assign to the company to be formed in pursuance of that agreement all letters patent for the United States for his discoveries and inventions, together with all improvements he might thereafter make or discover ; and that he thereby undertook to assign letters patent for those improvements, and that as there was nothing to show that any other person than the defendant was to pay the expenses that necessarily preceded the granting of these letters patent, it is to be presumed that he was to pay for the same. We think this is a very forced construction of the language of the agreement. He agreed to assign the letters patent for his discoveries and invention, and also to assign all the improvements which he might thereafter make or discover. He was not interested in the question of letters patent; he agreed to make over the improvement, and although the inventor may have to make the application for the patent, yet there was no undertaking on his part that any letters patent should be procured at his expense.

And furthermore, throughout all the correspondence, even before the 9th of October, 1889, and noticeably in the letter of that date where they admit that the interference charges should be made against the company, the plaintiffs are continually referring to the company and they are corresponding with Lown, the representative of the company, in reference to the services to be performed by them; and when they want money for the purpose of prospective disbursements they apply to Lown, as the representative of the company, and they get money loaned by Bookwalter to the company and are notified by Lown that the company is short of money in consequence of the condition of the money market and that he hopes it will let up. And in the course of his examination Mr. Freeman testifies: “I said one after another, throughout a long list of items which Mr. Chappell read to me, that they were rendered at the request of Mr. Bookwalter and that the amounts were reasonable ; it was not always a separate request for every item—of course not; we never received such a request from one of our clients ; we are requested by our clients,

There are circumstances in this case which do not tend to impress the court with the entire ingenuousness of these plaintiffs. We find that for a number of services they had rendered bills for certain amounts. When they come to sue, they double each one of these items, and the referee finds that the original amount was a fair compensation for these services. Although a -party may not be bound by a bill rendered in respect to the amount of charges therein when he brings suit, yet unless it is plainly apparent that the services were worth the sum sued for in excess of that charged in the bill, it certainly shows a discreditable motive in enlarging the amount for the purposes of the suit.

But there is another feature in this case which certainly shows that but little credit is to be given to any statements 'that these plaintiffs may make in respect to their beliefs or their intentions where their interests are involved. It appears from the plaintiffs’ case that they considered themselves the personal solicitors of Bookwalter in respect to all of these patent enterprises. It also appears that they considered Mr. Lown to be Bookwalter’s agent —both, therefore, bound to look after Bookwalter’s interest in respect to these matters. Mr. Bookwalter became depressed in regard to the future of these enterprises; seemed to be anxious to dispose of his interest in the case, and then these plaintiffs proposed to Lown to take advantage of Bookwalter’s state of mind for the purpose of getting a contract out of him for the sale of his interests, in order that the plaintiffs might make one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand dollars out of it. And they went so far in the carrying out of this design that when the opinion of an expert, who had been employed in respect to one of these patents, was sent to Bookwalter, which, by the omission of a word, conveyed an exactly opposite impression from that which

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial had before another referee, to be appointed in the order to be entered thereon, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

We should not, however, dispose of this appeal without a word of commendation as to the manner in which the appellants have made up the case. They have presented to us an intelligible index—a rarity in our experience where there are any number of exhibits—and they have also indicated at the top of each page the nature of the contents thereof, thus greatly facilitating us in our examination of the testimony and exhibits, and we hope to see the good example set followed by other appellants.

Follett and Parker, JJ., concur.