Majority
Headnote
1. Insubance—Life—Pboof of death.—This action was brought by the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining the direction of the court as to the distribution of the funds in its hands between the defendants. It appears that the Mutual Relief Society of Rochester, N. Y., was a domestic corporation organized under the statute of the state, and did business as a mutual benefit association ; that on the 15th day of June, 1892, it became embarrassed, and, under an arrangement with the plaintiff, transferred its assets and business to the plaintiff, who agreed to receive payments of assessments then outstanding, and which had been issued by the Mutual Relief Society, and distribute the same to the parties entitled thereto. It further appears that on the 1st day of June, 1892, the Mutual Relief Society had issued its assessments upon its members for the payment of six death claims, among which was one on account of the death of Mary J. Carpenter, and another on account of the death of A. G. Sturtevant, upon which assessment there was received the sum of $8.636.08; that thereafter an additional assessment was made, upon which there was received the sum of $755, which sums were not sufficient to pay the claims in full. It further appears that before the commencement of this action the defendant Harriet E. Sturtevant, who is the beneficiary named in the certificate issued to A. G. Sturtevant, served a notice upon the plaintiff to the effect that she contested the right of the beneficiaries under the certificate issued to Mary J. Carpenter to' receive any of the avails of. the assessments, or of the funds in the hands of the plaintiff, and demanded that her pro rata share thereof be paid over to her. On the other hand, the defendants Jennie C. Miner and John Miner demanded that the amount derived upon the assessment on account of the claim to Mary J. Carpenter be paid over to them, they being the beneficiaries named in the certificate. It further appears that Mary J. Carpenter applied for membership in the Mutual Relief Society on the 80th day of July, 1880, and in her application therefor stated that she was born November 17, 1820 ; that she died dn the 21st day of September, 1891, and that, in the proofs of death furnished, her birth is stated to hav.e occurred on the 17th day of November, 1818 ; that, under the by-laws-of the society, persons who had passed their sixtieth birthday were ineligible to membership,77-for which it is claimed that Mary J. Carpenter, in stating in her application that she was born on the 17th day of November, 1820,—thus making herself at the time but 59 years of age,—practiced a fraud upon the association, which rendered void the certificate issued to her.
Upon the trial it appeared that the respondents, Jennie C. and John Miner, in making their proofs of death, left blank the date of birth of Mary J. Carpenter; that, some days after the same had been signed and sworn to by them, the date was filled in, without their authority or consent, by one Putnam, who had charge
It will be observed that the paper does not purport to contain original entries, for, if the events were entered thereon at the time of their occurrence, they, of necessity, would have been entered at different times, with different pens and ink. The fact that the paper appears to have been written in the same handwriting, at one time, and in the same ink, would indicate that, at most, it was but a copy. It does not appear that Mrs. Carpenter ever publicly exhibited this paper as containing her family record, or that it was made by her, or a deceased relative of hers. It does not distinctly appear that it was a paper belonging to her. The only evidence upon that subject appears in the testimony of Simpson, in which he states that it was found “ among her papers and mine.” For these reasons, we are of the opinion that it does not come within the rule making it admissible as evidence; and, without this, the appellant has failed to produce any evidence impeaching the statement by Mrs. Carpenter in her application for membership.
This view renders it unnecessary to consider the other questions discussed, or as to whether the appellant would be entitled
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs against the appellant. All concur.