Majority
Headnote
Negligence—Question of fact.—This action is brought for the recovery of damages for the death of Margaret Pitts, the wife of the plaintiff, Charles A. Pitts, at a collision between a passenger train of defendant and the carriage in which the deceased was riding, at about 11 o’clock in the evening of November 30, 1892. at the railroad crossing on Pennsylvania avenue, in the city of Elmira. The claim of the plaintiff is that the collision and death were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in the management of its train. The evidence is, we think, sufficient to support the conclusion of the jury in this respect.
The main question here is whether the evidence justified the submission to the jury of the question of contributory negligence. The deceased lived, with her husband, a short distance outside of the city; and upon the evening in question they, with some of their friends, had been in attendance at a play at the opera "house in the city. Shortly after 11 o’clock they started forborne. One William Conklin, who was a nephew of the deceased, asked her to ride with him, and she did so, her husband riding with another party. Conklin had an ordinary platform spring wagon, with two seats, and drawn by one horse. There were five in his party. Conklin was the driver, and he, with another man, occupied the front seat; and the deceased, with two other ladies,
The absence of contributory negligence may be shown from circumstances. Hoag v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 111 N. Y. 199 ; 19 St. Rep. 80 ; Chisholm v. State, 141 N. Y. 249 ; 56 St. Rep. 81 ; Johnson v. Hudson R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 65 . The fact that no one can testify that he saw the deceased look both ways and listen does not necessarily show that she did not do her duty in
The distance at which the deceased or the driver could see the headlight of an approaching engine, under the circumstances then existing, was indefinite. There were other lights in the vicinity." If no signals were heard or given, and the wind blew briskly from the other direction, and the train came so silently, so far as they were concerned, at 40 miles an hour, it should not be said, as matter of law, that they could have seen it when they stopped, or should have seen it in time to have avoided the collision. In the Massoth Case it is said that: “It does not necessarily follow from the fact that a skilled engineer can demonstrate that, from a given point in a highway, the track of a railroad is visible from any distance, that an individual in charge of a team approaching the track is negligent because, from the point specified, he does not see a train approaching at great speed in time to avoid a collision.”
See, also, Puff v. Lehigh V. Railroad Co., 72 Hun, 577 ; 55 St. Rep. 91 ; Parsons v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Railroad Co., 113 N. Y. 364 ; 22 St. Rep. 697 .
We think that the question of contributory negligence was properly left to the jury. It follows that the judgment should be affirmed. All concur.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- Hoag v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 111 N. Y. 199 p. 560
- Johnson v. Hudson River Railroad 20 N. Y. 65 p. 560
- Massoth v. President of Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. 64 N. Y. 524 p. 561
- Sherry v. New York Centrall & Hudson River Railroad 104 N. Y. 652 p. 561
- Tolman v. Syracuse, Binghamton & New York Railroad 98 N. Y. 198 p. 561
- Greany v. Long Island Railroad 101 N. Y. 419 at 427 p. 561