In re O'Rourke

remains to be seen whether the common council has exercised such power of prohibition. It has passed an ordinance requiring licenses to be obtained of the major, and the question is whether such ordinance confers a discretion upon the major to refuse licenses, or vests him with no discretion, but simpij requires him to grant them in everj case. The ordinance is as follows: “The following named persons or classes of persons are herebj required to be licensed, and licenses shall be granted to them bj the major to carrj on their respective trades or occupations, to wit.: Coachmen, drivers of hacks, trucks, cabs, omnibusses, common carriers', carriers of passengers, common criers, hawkers, peddlers, pawnbrokers, auctioneers, junk dealers, keepers of intelligence offices, and slaughter houses, dealers and speculators in tickets to theatres or other places of public amusements, keepers of billard saloons, bowling allejs, shooting galleries, exhibitions of circuses, manageries and common shows, and owners or managers of theatres, opera halls, plaj houses, and all other places of public amusements, also public expressmen, public cartmen and public truckmen.” It will be observed that the language is mandatorj. The persons enumerated are “required to be licensed, and licenses shall be granted to them bj the major; ” and the next section of ordinance enacts that “ the license required, to be granted bj the foregoing section shall be issued bj the eitj clerk and signed by the major.” The legislature conferred upon the common council, as we nave seen, power to make an ordinance under which places of public amusement could, in the exercise of an absolute discretion, be prohibited. If it be assumed that the common council could delegate such power and discretion to the major, has it done so? The word “maj” is often held to mean “shall,” as under that mild form positive dutj to do a thing is some times created, The Mayor v. Furze, 3 Hill, 612 , but the word “shall” is mandatorj. It excludes the idea of discretion when addressed to a public official. In the state of Pennsjlvania a statute altogether similar to this ordinance was held to confer no discretion upon the major to refuse an application to license a theatre. Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Stokely, 12 Phila., 316 . The power having been given to the common council, to exercise or not, according to its discretion, it is not for this court bj stretching a point, or bj labored construction, to saj that it has exercised it. The legislature left it to the common council, and not to this court, to saj whether such power should be texercised. To require the major to license, as it has done, bj no means confers upon him the power to prohibit. Recurring again to the text of the ordinance, it is seen to cover manj occupations and businesses. Did the common council intend to confer upon the major absolute power to prohibit, for instance, coachmen, drivers, common carriers, junk-dealers, billard saloons, expressmen, cartmcn and truckmen ? for these are all enumerated in the ordinance. No distinction in respect of anj of them is made; jet it is, to saj the least, a question for argument whether the legislature itself could con Eer such power in the case of some of them. The power to control or interfere with lawful occupa

tions affords so easy a way to both corruption and tyranny that it ought to all times to be kept within safe limits. Tiedman on Police Power, 289. It is permitted at all only for the sake of the general welfare, and hence only to that extent; and it is noticable that when it is allowed to go beyond the strict limit, it is . often used as a cover to arbitrary power and official corruption. Under our system of government public officials may not assume a power not conferred upon them by some law. They are mere agents and servants of the people, with no power which the people have not given them, We enact laws by our representatives assembled in legislative bodies, and then elect officials to execute them, saying to them as we point to such laws: “Thus far you may go and no farther; these laws are your power of attorney.” The common council of Brooklyn, elected by the people, acting in its legislative capacity, enacted this ordinance, and the mayor may exercise no power in the premises which it does not confer upon him. If we recur to the charter provisions under which the ordinance was framed and passed, we find that the power to prohibit was in express words conferred by the legislature upon the common council only in two of the cases enumerated in the ordinance, which follows the enumeration in the charter itself; namely, places of public amusement (which we are considering), and slaughter houses (sub. 11). The express delegation of the power to prohibit in these two cases marks and emphasises the withholding of it in all. the other eases. The ordinance (art. 2) also contains a provision (sec. 1) that no person shall conduct or carry on any occupation' or business mentioned in the ordinance until he has obtained a license; and then follow various penalties, according to the occupation or business, to be imposed upon conviction in a competent court for violation of such provision. I cannot see in this any intention to vest power in the mayor to refuse licenses, and thereby prohibit, in his discretion. On the contrary, it is only the ordinary method or sanction to execute the ordinance, and compel licenses to be taken out. Nor does the provision in the ordinance that “any person licensed as aforesaid, who shall violate any regulation or provision of this ordinance, shall, upon conviction, have his license revoked by the mayor, in addition to the other penalties fixed by this ordinance,” indicate the confering of such power upon the mayor (12 Phila., supra). On the contrary, that he is not given the power to revoke a license except after conviction of the holder in a competent court, makes it plain that the common council carefully refrained from authorizing the mayor to say what persons or places were fit to hold licenses. I may not consider the question whether it might be wise for the common council to give the mayor absolute power and discretion to license or refuse to license places for public amusements, except in so far as it may bear upon the question whether the language under construction can be said to even suggest any intention or disposition of the common council to confer upon the mayor a power so great And in the same view 1 need not refrain from saying that the existence of such powers as this case has required me to consider have only too often been

used for political coercion, the extortion of money and even the levy of blackmail. Arbitrary power is abhorrent to our system of government. The evils which come from it in cases where it exists will be found in most instances graver than those which the grant of it was designed to prevent. To license this place need do no harm. The refusal is put upon the ground that before the town of Gravesend became a part of Brooklyn some prize fights were had in this building. Surely, Brooklyn has policemen enough to see that that does not occur now. The license will not be to violate the law. If in any exhibition there be any violation of law, any citizen, which includes any policeman, may summarily and without warrant arrest the offenders in the act. The laws are ample for the prevention of immorality or of illegal acts of any kind in places of public amusement. Finally, if the common council desires to confer upon the mayor the absolute power and discretion of giving or refusing licenses, it is for it to pass an ordinance to that effect. This court may not do so, but is bound to decide according to law and ordinances as-they are.

The motion is granted.