People ex rel. Young v. Stout

The relator sent out a writ of habeas corpus at the general term to obtain his discharge from confinement in the Auburn state prison, and upon consideration the general term, holding that his imprisonment was illegal, made a final order that he be discharged therefrom, but suspended the proceedings upon said order for five days to enable the district attorney to appeal to the court of appeals. The time of this suspension being about to expire, the district attorney now moves for a stay of proceedings upon a final order until the hearing of the decision of the"court of appeals upon the appeal.

The only question presented is whether the court had any power to stay proceedings upon such an order. If such a power exists anywhere in the court, the fact that the order was made by the general term affords no reason why the stay should not be granted at this term. The supreme court is one court, no matter whether it be held by one judge or four, and its jurisdiction may be exercised at special or general term, unless some statute especially directs otherwise ; and the special term has jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions which can come before the court, except appeals, unless it is otherwise prescribed by law. People ex rel. Mayor v. Nichols, 79 N. Y. 582 . Matter of Canal & Walker Sts., 12 N. Y. 406 . But the power of any court to stay the action of the writ of habeas corpus, discharging one who has been illegally confined, is another matter entirely. There is no inherent power in any court to make such an order. The writ of habeas corpus would be deprived of its efficiency, if any court should undertake to continue an imprisonment once declared to be unlawful. Whether authority might be given to a court to stay proceedings in such a case, in view of the provisions of § 4 of art. 1 of the

It is said, however, that if these proceedings are not stayed the relator will be discharged from his imprisonment, and will leave the country, and therefore a reversal of the final order would be of no effect. All that may be very true, but yet there is no presumption that there will be a reversal, but the contrary; and the claim of the right to keep this man longer in imprisonment is based simply upon the contention of the district attorney that the law will be held differently by the court of appeals. But until it is so held the discharge is legal. Where, then, is the foundation of any right to hold him in custody ? The argument is simply ab inconveniente but that is never of much force, and certainly cannot safely be relied upon to defend the imprisonment of a person without warrant of law. The suggestion of that argument is fully answered in Ex parte Jilz, 64 Mo. 205 , as well as in the opinion of Allen, J., in People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559 , 575.

The great weight of authority at.common law is that there was no review of final order discharging a prisoner upon habeas corpus. Ex parte Jilz, supra; People v. Fairman, 59 Mich. 568 . In the case last cited the authorities upon the subject seem to be very fully collated. It is quite true that in Yates v. People 6 Johns. 337 , it was held by a small majority of the court of errors, against the opinion of the chancellor and all the justices of the supreme court but one, that a writ of error lay to the supreme court to review its action refusing to discharge upon habeas corpus a person who had been illegally committed. But, even in that case, Clinton, Senator, delivering the opinion of the court, says: “ If, then, the judge had jurisdiction of the cause, * * * his discharge being in favor of personal liberty, is final and conclusive. He is, in that respect, a court of dernier resort.” So even that case does not.

Application denied.