Majority
Headnote
1. State—Appropriation of land.I think that the board of claims has erred in its award in this case. The facts set forth in the above statement seem to me to show beyond controversy that the state never intended to, and, in fact, never has appropriated and taken possession as owner of all the waters of Skaneateles lake, as against all the riparian owners, below the dam down the Seneca river. The state, prior to 1843, had been frequently guilty of acts of trespass as against the owners of the dam and the lands immediately sur? rounding it and the mills immediately below it. The state’s agents had, upon occasion, gone upon the lands of these private individuals' and without right opened the gates of the dam and taken the waters from the lake in larger quantities than the proper use thereof by the owners themselves would have required for the running of their mills and their machinery dependent upon that water power, and by taking this excess of water they reduced the head and thus impaired the power and prevented the owners from exercising the rights which they had at the dam and in the use of the waters above it. Although the state was thus a wrongdoer, and though by reason of the wrong it had injured the owners of the water rights immediately below the dam, yet it had thereby
I have found in the record here no actual decision of the canal commissioners, pursuant to § 17 of the above statute, that, in their opinion, it was necessary or expedient to open a new feeder for the canal at this point, nor is there anything showing that they had caused to be made the necessary surveys and levels, and accurate drafts, plans and models or maps of the contemplated work necessary in opening such new feeder, or showing that any estimate in minute detail of the probable expense to be incurred, had been made, except such proof as may be inferred from the recitals which precede the resolution adopted by the canal board in June, 1843. We may assume, however, that the canal commissioners had done all that was requisite in order to comply with § 17 above cited, and that the canal board had the necessary plan, map, levels, etc., before it at the time when it passed that resolution. There is no
We do not think that by the action of the canal board or the canal commissioners, or their combined action, these rights of the -owners upon the stream below were included in the words of appropriation in the resolution of the canal board. Therefore, neither they nor their predecessors had any ground to base an appearance upon before the canal appraisers and attempt to prove any permanent damage to their rights by virtue of the- resolution of appropriation. The appropriation did not touch them or their rights. Mere words of appropriation, unaccompanied by any act on the part of the officers of the state towards carrying such appropriation into execution and taking possesion of or controling in some form the property which is to be appropriated, cannot amount to an actual and complete appropriation, and when we have, as we have-in this case, ample scope for the application of these words of appropriation to those owners .only, who were included in the engineer’s report and plan and map. and in respect to vvhom actual possession was taken, -they will not be extended so as to include those who beyond all question were not within the contemplation of the board which, with the plan and map before it, passed the resolution.
This policy on the part of the state not to then take the rights of the riparian owners farther down the stream was- not unwise at the time. For more than twenty years after the appropriation as stated, there was no trouble with these owners, and the state had all the water it required. And for more than twenty years in addition the occasions have been few for withholding the water to the damage of the owners. It would probably have been quite expensive to extinguish those rights at that time, and the necessity for doing so was not present. The state continued on, therefore, and when the necessity arose for temporarily withholding water it was done, its liability for the damage it thus caused was acknowledged, and it was paid under legislative sanction. It is conceded that the state has never in fact paid for the permanent appropriation of these rights, and we find no hardship in making it liable for causing them temporary damage since the Iqst payment on that account.
There is nothing in the case of Sweet v. City of Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 316 ; 38 St. Rep. 933 , which is inconsistent with the view
I recognize the importance of the principles which might be deduced ¡from the decision of this case in some of its possible aspects. We do not, however, intend to decide what generally it may be necessary .and requisite for the state to do in order to obtain the right to the use of all the water in this or any other lake or stream, and as against the world and for the purpose of carrying on its canal system. We limit our decision to the peculiar facts in the case, and we hold that the words contained in the resolution of the canal board appropriating the waters of Skaneateles lake and the outlet of the same to the use of the public as a reservoir and feeder to the Erie canal are to be limited, by reason of the facts above detailed, to the property and rights spoken of in the report, plans and map of the engineer, which were before the canal board at the time of its adoption of the resolution, and which, when read in connection with the resolution, limit those words in the manner already indicated.
For these reasons we think the claimants made out a good cause of action against the state for damages sustained by them by the withholding of the waters in the Skaneateles creek in 1892, as described in their claims, and as all the facts have been brought out, and there is substantially no dispute in regard to them, and as they lead, as matter of law, to the conclusion that a cause of action was made out, it is proper to order judgment here for the amount of the damage that it was conceded the plaintiffs were en-
All concur, except Andrews, Ch. J., not voting, and O’Brien,. J., dissenting.
Award reversed and ordered accordingly.
Cases cited
- Sweet v. City of Syracuse 129 N. Y. 316 p. 230