Majority
Headnote
Corporations—Insolvency.Prior to June, 1884, the Bankers’ and Merchants’ Telegraph Company was engaged' in business in the construction and operation of certain telegraph lines. On or about said month, an application was made to the Third Rational Bank, by one of the officers of that company, for a loan of $50,000, for the purpose, according to his .statement, of meeting current supplies, contract payments, etc. It was' also stated that the company was in great straits for want of the amount thus requested, but that with the aid of such advance the company could meet its pressing liabilities of the description thus stated, and would also be able to pay its coupons on its first mortgage bonds, which would
“ It is stipulated that in case the petitioner shall establish, on a reference to the order herein, that it is entitled to share in the proceeds of the sale in preference to the bondholders, then the petitioner shall be paid the amount that it may be itself entitled to receive out of such proceeds before the distribution of the proceeds, and that, in case the proceeds are distributed before the decision on any such reference, the petitioner shall be givep, before such distribution, a bond in the penal sum of $25,000, with satisfactory sureties, contingent for such payment as aforesaid.”
On the 31st of July, 1885, the property of the Bankers’ & Merchants’ Telegraph Company was sold under the judgment of foreclosure. On the 16th of September the bank obtained an order of reference under and by virtue of the stipulation aforesaid. On the 23d of January, 1886, the bank filed a petition to set aside the injunction that had been granted on the 12th of June, 1885, and for leave to go on with its attachment suits in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. On the 18th of February, 1886, an order to show cause was obtained, requiring the Third National Bank to show cause why the said bank should not withdraw, cancel, and
The foundation of the claim of the appellant rests upon the doctrine of subrogation ; and we are called upon to extend a preference to its claims, as though it held receivers’ certificates (these certificates having been invented for the purpose of giving a preference to unsecured claims over liens acquired by express contract, a recognition of which invention by our courts has brought such discredit upon all classes of our securities in the eyes of the commercial world) for borrowed money, for which collateral security was taken at the time, but which subsequently turned out not to be quite as valuable as was imagined, upon the ground that the money borrowed had been partially expended by the borrower for purposes for which the receivers might have asked the court to borrow money upon receivers’ certificates. We have examined the interesting brief of the learned counsel for the appellant to ascertain whether contractual rights had been, to this degree, set aside by the courts, but have been unable to find that, with all their liberality towards the payment of unsecured claims in the case of insolvent corporations, they have yet taken this step. It is apparent, upon reading the stipulation to which attention has been called, that the Third National Bank released its claims under the attachments, if any it had, and elected to base its claims upon a right of payment in preference to the bondholders, and that it was only in case (upon this reference so ordered) such right was established that such bank was to be entitled to participate in the distribution of the amount realized upon the foreclosure sale. There seems to be no other interpretation to be given to this stipulation, and, it having so elected, it cannot now be permitted to establish a claim by reason of the attachment, if any it may have had. We are of opinion, therefore, that the order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Parker, J., concurs; O’Brien, J., concurs in result.