torney in fact, and that, in addition to said employment as attorney in fact, said plaintiff did emploj7, engage, and retain defendant as his attorney and counselor at law, to conduct and manage all of plaintiff’s business and affairs in the state of New York. That said relation of attorney and client existed between defendant and plaintiff from the 1st day of May, 1891, up to and until the 16th day of April, 1892; that on or about the 16th day of April, 1892, the plaintiff, through Andrew Wesléy Kent, his attorney in fact, appointed by said plaintiff in relation to said real estate, did demand an accounting of defendant; that in compliance with said demand the defendant on or about the 28th day of May, 1892, made .and rendered to said plaintiff, through his attorney in fact, a complete and full statement and account of defendant’s management of plaintiff’s business and affairs from, the 1st day of May, 1891, up to the 16th day of April, 1892, a copy of which statement and account is hereto annexed, marked" “Exhibit A," and is referred to as and made a part of this answer; that by said .statement and account so rendered and stated by defendant to plaintiff it appears that defendant did receive for said plaintiff while acting as his attorney the sum of $7,682.50, and during said period this defendant did pay out, disburse, and account for to said plaintiff the sum of $7,992.50, leaving a balance due and owing to said defendant from said plaintiff of the sum of $310 ; that said sum ,of $310 is due and owing from plaintiff to defendant; and-that no part thereof has ever been paid. Wherefore, defendant demands that said plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed, and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff on said counterclaim for the sum of $310, with interest from the 16th day of April, 1892, besides the costs of this action.
Foley & Powell, for app’lt; A. W. Kent, for resp’t.
Under the decisions in Moffatt v. Fulton, 132 N. Y. 507 ; 44 St. Rep. 653 , and Davis v. Aikin, 85 Hun, 554 ; 66 St. Rep. 706 , particularly the former, the action, notwithstanding the omission of the allegation that the moneys were received by the defendant in “a fiduciary capacity,’’ was in form ex delicto, and. the counterclaims arising'on contract not connected with the subject of the action were properly disallowed tiy the referee. The referee, however, properly allowed the defendant credit for matters pleaded by way of counterclaim which pertained to the real estate from which the collections- were made, since these were connected with the subject of the action. We find no error in the rulings, and the judgment must be afifimed, with costs.