Talcott v. Wabash Railroad

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, upon opinion of referee rendered upon decision of the case.

The opinion of George 0. Holt, Esq., to whom the cause was referred to hear and determine, is as follows:

When the plaintiff rested, the plaintiff’s counsel elected to suffer a nonsuit as to the third and fourth causes of action; and, upon the defendant’s motion, I dismissed the first cause of action. This left the second cause of action, being the claim for the loss of Cullom’s personal baggage, alone remaining in the case. The substantial question raised by the defendant’s testimony is whether the defendant, the Wabash Company, is responsible for the injury to Cullom’s baggage which occurred on the Grand Trunk line. This question depends upon the question whether the Wabash Company contracted to carry Cullom from Chicago to Hew York, or simply contracted to carry him over its own line from Chicago to Detroit, .and acted as agent for the Grand Trunk Company and the West Shore Company in respect to the contract which was made to carry him over these lines to Hew York.

When the case was before the general term, each of the judges wrote an opinion. Talcott v. Wabash Railroad Co., 66 Hun, 456 ; 50 St. Rep 423 . As I understand these opinions, one judge held that the Wabash Company contracted to carry Cullom to Hew York; another, that it only contracted to carry him over its own line; and the third, that the form of the ticket was not proved, and therefore the question did not arise. Hpon this trial the defendant has, in my opinion, proved that the ticket which Cullom bought was in the form of the ticket in evidence. The question, therefore, of the liability of the Wabash Company, under the contract proved upon this trial,' does not appear to have been decided by the general term.

The material facts upon this question are these: On April 27, 1889, Cullom purchased at the city office of the Wabash Company in Chicago, for twenty-five dollars, a round-trip coupon

ijpon these facts, it seems to me clear that the Wabash Company was not responsible for the loss of Cullom’s baggage, caused by the accident and fire on the Grand Trunk line, unless the Wabash Company contracted to carry Cullom from Chicago to New York. In the case of the delivery of goods to a common carrier for shipment to a point beyond its own line, the courts of different countries have differed as to the liability of the carrier accepting the goods. The English rule has always been that the carrier who accepts the goods is responsible to the shipper for their safe delivery, and this rule seems to have been followed, in Illinois and some of the other states. Hutch. Carr. § 148 and Illinois cases cited in note. But the courts of New York and of many other states and the United States supreme court hold that in the absence of proof of a special contract, if goods are delivered to a carrier to be sent to a point beyond the terminus of the carrier’s line, the carrier performs its duty if it transports the goods to the end of its line, and delivers them in safety to the connecting carrier. Condict v. Railway Co., 54 N. Y. 500 ; Rawson

The plaintiff claims that this question is to be decided by the law of Illinois, because the contract was made there. If this were a case of a shipment of goods, it would appear to be the law of Illinois, both under the decisions of its courts and the statute which has been put in evidence, that the Wabash road would be responsible. But I do not think that the decisions or statutes fixing the liability of carriers for the transportation of merchandise, under a bill of lading or receipt, necessarily govern this case. The contract to carry the baggage of a traveler is a mere incident to the contract to carry the traveler. A common carrier can, in the case of a passenger, as well as in the case of goods, make a special contract to carry beyond its own line. Quinby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306 . But the general rule is that when a railroad company, without making any special contract, issues coupon tickets entitling a passenger to a- continuous ride over the line of the company issuing the ticket and over connecting lines of other railroads, the first carrier is only responsible for the carriage of the passenger upon its own line, and acts merely as agent for each of the other lines in the sale of the coupon for each connecting line respectively. Milnor v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 363 ; Kessler v. Railroad Co., 61 id. 538: Auerbach v. Railroad Co., 89 id. 281; Isaacson v. Railroad Co., 94 id. 283; Poole v. Railroad Co., 35 Hun, 29 ; Central Trust Co. of New York v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 247 ; Hutch. Carr. § 577 et seq.

In my opinion there is nothing in the circumstances of this case to take Cullom’s case out of the general rule. He was an experienced commercial traveler. He purchased the ticket some hours before he had his baggage checked and took the train. There was nothing to prevent his reading the ticket, and nothing to prevent the general rule applying that its acceptance constituted a contract. The only facts tending to show that the Wabash Company contracted to carry Cullom to Hew York were that Cullom asked for a ticket to Hew York and return, and asked to have his baggage checked to Hew York, and paid the full amount due for the railroad ticket and for the extra weight of the baggage to Hew York. I do not think that these facts are sufficient to take the case out of the general rule. The accident occurred on the Grand Trunk road. The train was a Grand Trunk train, drawn by a Grand Trunk engine, manned by Grand Trunk employes. If the Wabash Company is responsible for the injury to Cullom’s baggage, caused by the accident on the Grand Trunk road, it would have been responsible if Cullom had been injured or killed in the accident. It seems to me that no such claim could be maintained, in view of the above authorities. My conclusion is that the defendant is entitled to judgment as to the second cause of action on the merits, with costs.