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Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club

71 N.Y. St. Rep. 75 Court N.Y.C.P. Decision date 1895-11-12 English

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p. 75
Henry C. Judson, App’lt, v. Flushing Jockey Club, Resp’t.
(New York Common Pleas, General Term,
Filed November 12, 1895.)

Headnote

1. Courts—Jurisdiction—Fictitious action.
Courts of judicature are organized only to decide real controversies between actual litigants.
2. Same.
When it appears, no matter how nor at what stage, that a pretended action is not a genuine litigation over a contested right between opposing parties, but is merely the proffer of a simulated issue by a person dominating both sides of the record, the court will decline a determination of the fabricated case so fraudulently imposed upon it.
3. Same—Objection.
The statement of reputable members of the bar that the action is a false and fictitious litigation suffices, at all events, for the postponment of the decision until the court shall be satisfied that it has to do with a legitimate forensic discussion.
4. Same—Reference.
In such case, the court may ascertain the fact either by the record, by affidavits or by reference.
Action by Henry 0. Judson against the Flushing Jockey Club to recover a sweepstake won on a horse race. A judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of defendant, on the ground that Laws 1895, chap. 570 (Percy-Gray Racing Act), under which the action was brought, was unconstitutional. On appeal to the general term, the two judges before whom the case was argued differed in their views, and each wrote an opinion. A reargument was then ordered, because of the failure of concurrence. Afterwards it was suggested that the litigation was fictitious.
J. M. Marx, for app’lt;
Benj. Steinhardt. for resp’t;
Joseph T. Auerbach, Charles J. Patterson and Delancey Nicoll, intervening for the state racing commission, the Jockey Club, the Coney Island Jockey Club, and the Westchester Racing Association.

When, on the call of the calendar, counsel for the ostensible parties to the cause answered “ Ready,” gentlemen of the bar, on behalf of interests not apparent upon the record, but involved in the decision, interposed an objection to the argument of the appeal, upon the allegation that the action is a fictitious litigation, contrived and presented to procure an adjudication of a question not actually in controversy between real contestants, but framed and pronounced by a person who, in fact, is at once plaintiff and defendant, and the issue which, according to

p. 76
the statement, is so sought to be determined, is of the utmost gravity, namely, whether a státute of the state passed with all the solemnities of regular legislative procedure be a constitutional enactment. Demarest v. Mayor, etc., 147 N. Y. 203 ; 69 St. Rep. 505 .

Courts of judicature are organized only to decide real controversies between actual litigants. When, therefore, it appears, no-matter how nor at what stage, that a pretended action is not a genuine litigation over a contested right between opposing parties, but is merely the proffer of a simulated issue by a person dominating both sides of the record, the court,- from a sense of its- ■ own dignity, as well as from regard to the public interests, will decline a determination of the fabricated case so fraudently imposed upon it. Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 255 ; Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 1 Black, 426 ; Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 333 ; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 id. 134, 135; San Mateo Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 216 U. S. 138 ; Washington Market Co. v. District of Columbia, 137 id. 62; South Spring Hill Gold Min. Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Min. Co., 145 id. 300; Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 141 id. 696, 700; California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co., 149 id. 308, 314; Hoskins v. Lord Berkeley, 4 Term R. 402; In re Elsam, 3 Barn. & C. 597; Wood v. Nesbitt, 47 St. Rep. 34 .

If we may not accept the assurance of reputable members of the bar as proof that the action is a false and fictitious litigation, their statement suffices, at all events, for a postponement of the decision until the court shall be satisfied that it has to do with a legitimate forensic discussion. According to the precedents, we-may so ascertain either by the record, by affidavits, or by a reference. The last-named expedient we adopt as the more effective-method of investigation.

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