Davis v. Grand Rapids Fire Insurance

We have read with care the voluminous record in this case, and with interest the exhaustive discussion of the testimony in the "brief submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant; and, while we find much testimony and some basis for .suspicion respecting the entire integrity of the claim of loss and its extent, we are constrained to hold that plaintiff’s claim did not lack a sufficient support of testimony to present a question of fact for the jury to decide, upon all the essential features requisite to find the verdict in his favor. It might he of interest to the parties^ if not satisfying to each, to here set down the testimony and process of reasoning by which we reach this result, but it would prove of little value and establish no precedent.

Respecting plaintiff’s interest in the property, the complaint was sufficient. It states the issuance to plaintiff of the policy, describes the property insured in the same words as used therein, and makes the same a part of the complaint. Reference to the eleventh clause in the policy shows that its requirement was unconditional and sole ownership; and by the fifty-sixth clause the written consent of the company is required to he attached or appended to the policy in the event that interests other than those possessed by the insured exist. Referring to the language descriptive of the property and its ownership, the requirement is that it shall he his own, held in trust, but not removed. These requirements are to "be construed as forming a part of the com

' In defendant’s motion for a nonsuit, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, and more especially at the close., of the proof, it is claimed that plaintiff had failed to show compliance with the con-. ditions of the policy subsequent to the fire in several particulars. It is not denied but that notice oE the fire was immediately given at the agency rom which the policy issued, and, if we assume that this was insufficient, it appears, in fact, that this notice was brought home to the company, and that, in fact, their representative was at the scene of the fire shortly after it occurred. The proofs of loss bore date FTovember 29, 1893, and were stamped as received by the company on December 5th. The fire occurred FTovember 10th. In respect, therefore, to the notice of the fire and the time of filing proofs of loss, there was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the policy. The proofs of loss were retained by the defendant without objection, so far as the record shows, until January 2, 1894, nearly a month from time of reception, when a letter was 'written objecting to the same, and requiring further proof in that regard. It has been settled that retaining proofs of loss without objection is a waiver of any defects contained therein. Keeney v. Insurance Co., 71 N. Y. 396 . And where the company retained proofs of loss for a period of twenty-three days, and then returned them, coupled with circumstances showing want of good faith on the part of the company, it was held that the jury were authorized to find a waiver of the conditions. Paltrovitch v. Insurance Co., 143 N. Y 73 ; 60 St. Rep. 462 . The rule would therefore seem to be that where proofs of loss are retained or held for a time, and then returned, dependent somewhat upon the particular circumstances of the case, it may be made a basis for the jury to find a waiver of compliance with the conditions.

The first objection which the company made required plaintiff to make a complete inventory, stating quantity and cost of each article, and amounts claimed thereon; also cash value of each item, and amount of loss thereon; all incumbrances thereon, and any changes in the title, use, occupation, location, possession, or exposure of the property since the issuing of said policy. The plaintiff replied to the first two objections, under date of January 9th, claiming that, as the goods not specified in the proof of loss were burned, there was an impossibility of compliance in that respect, and that the parties woiild be, of necessity, relegated to

It is further claimed that plaintiff violated the provisions of the policy in selling the goods. It appeared that the goods were sold at auction on November 29th, Tuesday; that notice of the auction was published in two daily papers on the Saturday prior thereto; that the defendant was notified by telegram of the sale (at what particular time does not appear); and that there were several people at the sale. The goods which'survived the fire brought at such sale $250. Prior to this time the -inventory by defendant’s agent had been taken, and the kind, quality, and value of these goods were then known. No demand .for any other appraisement had then been made, or was there after made, and it does not appear from any witness for defendant that the goods were worth more than' the price at which they sold. Plaintiff claims they brought all they were worth. The clause in the policy provides that “it shall be optional, however, with this company, to take all, or any part, of the articles at such ascertained or appraised value, * * * within a reasonable time, on giving notice, within thirty days after the receipt of the proof herein required, of its intention so to do.” No claim is made that the option here provided for was ever exercised, or attempted to be exercised, or that any notice of such intention was ever given. The basis upon which this step could be taken existed because the value had been ascertained, the proofs of loss were served, and, if, defendant proposed to exercise its rights, it had the reserved thirty days in which to do it. The fact that plaintiff sold before the expiration of the time did not at all affect the right of the defendant to demand compliance with this condition. But, before it could put plaintiff in default of a violated condition, it must have itself taken

We have examined the other exceptions in the case, but are unable to see error therein.

The judgment and order appealed from should therefore be affirmed, with costs.