Ulmer v. Minister — 73 N.Y. St. Rep. 260

Majority

p. 260

Justin Ulmer, App’lt, v. Leopold Minister, as President, etc., Resp’t.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

Filed February 26, 1896.)

Headnote

Benevolent associations—Constitutions.

A provision in the constitution of an unincorporated benevolent association, which is composed of the employes of a firm, that., should any member of tlie association be discharged “for any reason whatever” from the employment of the firm, his membership shall cease, is binding on all the members and will prevent a recovery by a member for sick benefits after his discharge, though he was discharged on account of liis sickness.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant. ■

Edward Mandel, for app’lt; M. B. Blumenthal, for resp’t.

It was conceded upon the trial that the plaintiff was a member in good standing of the unincorporated society known as the “L. Strauss & Sons Benevolent Association”; that lie became sick March 9, 1895, and was on that account discharged from the employment of L. Strauss & Sons on March 15, 1895. On the following day the defendant paid the plaintiff the sick benefits for the preceding week, but declined to make any further payments. The action is to recover benefits after such discharge and during liis entire illness. Section 15 of the defendant’s constitution and by-laws provides that: “Should any one, being a member of this association, be discharged from the employment of L. Strauss & Sons, for any reason whatever, or leave of his own accord, his membership shall forthwith cease.” The defendant being a voluntary, unincorporated association, composed of the employes of the firm after which it is named, and the plaintiff having subscribed to the conditions and by-laws on becoming a member, he is bound by them, however unreasonable they may seem. Elsas v. Alford, 1 City Ct. R. 123. Since the plaintiff bad ceased to be an employe of D. Strauss & Sons, and his membership in the association had thereby terminated, before the benefits for which the action was brought accrued, it follows that the defendant owed him nothing, and that the justice properly so decided. The judgment must therefore be affirmed, with costs.