Majority
Headnote
1. Master and servant—Save place—Appliance.In moving for a nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant’s' counsel insisted, as he does now, that there was a total failure upon the part of the plaintiff to prove the absence of contributory negligence, and that this, of itself, afforded sufficient reason for granting the motion. It is apparent, however, that this contention very properly received little or no consideration from the trial court; for it seems quite clear that the question of the plaintiff's own negligence was one for the jury to consider, whatever view may be taken respecting the real ground upon which the decision of the motion was made to rest. In reviewing this decision, therefore, the controversy is confined to the single inquiry of whether or not, upon the undisputed facts furnished by the record, it can fairly be said that the case is so barren of any evidence of negligence upon the part of the defendant as to justify the court in withholding that question from the consideration of the jury. .
In entering upon a brief consideration of these facts, it will be well, perhaps, to bear in mind certain principles of law, .which may be regarded as fundamental in this as well as in all similar cases. The relation of master and servant existed between these parties, and this relationship imposed upon the defendant the duty of exercising a proper degree of care, in order that the plaintiff should be furnished a reasonably safe place in which, and reasonably safe machinery with which, to render the service required of him; and, unless the evidence is such that a jury might properly draw therefrom the inference that the defendant had, in one or the other of these particulars, been remiss in the duty which he owed to the plaintiff, the latter can, of course, have no standing in court. And in this connection it may also be advisable to advert to another well settled rule which is applicable to this case, and that is that where two or more causes operate to produce the injury complained of, for one or more of which the defendant was not responsible, the plaintiff must establish, by affirmative proof, that his injury was wholly or partially the result of a cause for which the defendant was responsible. Searles v. Railway Co., 101 N. Y. 661 ; Grant v. Canal Co., 133 id. 657; 45 St. Rep. 305 .
How, it may be safely assumed that the accident which deprived the plaintiff of the use of his hand was either an unavoidable one, or else it was caused by a defect in the appliances and machinery furnished by the defendant, or by some negligent act of a co-em
The witness Sullivan, who was at work for the defendant at the time of the accident, tells us that he saw this hammer when it was new and in good condition, and that it then worked constantly and evenly, but that, at the time of the accident, it leaked steam and made a squeaking noise when he raised it, so that it could be heard all over the shop; that the ram would occasionally stick at the bottom and also at the top of the machine, so that steam pressure would not move it, and it had to be started by a blow from a sledgehammer; that this condition of things existed for two or three months prior to the accident; and that he saw McDougall, the superintendent,.present at different times when the hammer was not working properly. The witness Eobinson testified that he heai-d the peculiar noise' that Sullivan speaks of, and saw the ram stick; that, when it was started by a blow, it would fly up suddenly; and that he also discovered there was a little lost motion to the hammer. Several of the witnesses say that the space
It is insisted, however, that, giving to these various facts all that can possibly be claimed for them, the precise cause of the accident still remains unexplained, and that the only effect of sending the case to the jury would have been to permit them to render a verdict with no more substantial foundation upon which to rest it than the merest conjecture; but this, we think, is a con- - ■elusion which the circumstances of the case will hardly warrant.And, in saying this, it may be conceded that there is an element -of uncertainty in these circumstances which would quite possibly -deprive any conclusion reached by finite minds of that absolute verity which the veidict of a jury is supposed to represent; but, -nevertheless, we have here presented certain effects, and, with certain causes therefor excluded from our consideration, and all the material facts pointing in one direction it does not become altogether a mere matter of speculation to determine of what such -effects are the probable resultant. At all events, this case, with its attendant circumstances, can very properly be classified as one -of those in which the presumption of negligence arises from the fact, that the accident would-not, in the ordinary course of affairs, have happened, but for the omission of reasonable care upon the part of the person charged with its exercise; and, consequently, in the absence of any explanation by the defendant, it is one in which the jury would have been warranted in reaching the conclusion that the defendant had been negligent, in that he had failed in his duty to furnish the plaintiff with machinery and appliances which were reasonably safe, and that the latter’s injury was wholly or partially the result of such failure. Breen v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Railroad Co., 109 N. Y. 297 ; 14 St. Rep. 835 ;
Motion for a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
All concur.
Cases cited
- Searles v. Manhattan Railway Co. 101 N. Y. 661 p. 549
- Breen v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 109 N. Y. 297 p. 551
- Mullen v. St. John 57 N. Y. 567 p. 552
- Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 47 N. Y. 282 p. 552