Majority
Headnote
Trust,—Powers of trustee—sale of trust property.This action was brought to have declared void and set aside a deed of real estate executed by Robert Miller, as sole executor and trustee under the last will, etc., off Emily M. Miller, deceased, to his son, George A. Miller, and also to have set aside and declared void a mortgage upon said real estate executed by said George to said Robert, as trustee, as aforesaid, to secure the consideration or purchase money of said property. Emily M. Miller was the wife of said Robei-t Miller, and the mother of the plaintiff and said George. She died in September, 1887, seised of the property in question, and leaving a will, whereby she devised substantially all her estate to her executors in trust, to manage the same as her said husband should direct, but for the best interests of her estate. The income therefrom was to be paid to her husband during his life, and upon his death the principal was devised and bequeathed to the plaintiff. By the express terms of the trust, the executors were authorized to sell any or all of the real estate, and invest the proceeds of the sale in bond and mortgage or in other good securities. Robert Miller died on April 23, 1895. IThree days prior to, his death, to wit, on April 20th, he executed the deed in question, and received from his son a mortgage upon the real estate for $8,000, payable May 1, 1900, with interest half yearly. The consideration expressed in the deed was $12,000. Tho property was, however, incumbered by a mortgage of $4,000, and the mortgage executed by George Miller to his father was given to secure all the purchase money which his father would have
We are of the opinion that the deed and mortgage should be set aside- They do not represent the fair judgment of the trustee, and the transaction is not entitled to be treated as such a sale of the property as was intended and contemplated by Mrs. Miller, the testatrix. She created the trust for the benefit of her husband and the plaintiff, and the provision that the power of sale was to be executed for the best interests of her estate referred to -those two beneficiaries. The sale made was not for the benefit of Mr. Miller, as there is no reasonable doubt but that, when he executed the deed, he was aware that he would live .but a very short time. It was not for the benefit of the plaintiff, as it imposes upon her the risk of impairment, of the security, arising from depreciation in the value of the-land, and deprives her of any benefit that might arise from an enhancement -of value. There is great doubt, we think, upon the evidence whether there was a delivery of the deed prior to Mr. Miller’s death; but, -assuming that the deed was delivered, we think -that -a transfer-of the property made under such -circumstances .-as wer® shown iby the testimony should be set aside.
The judgment must ibe reversed, .and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the ©vent,
All concur.