employment of agents, etc. These acts the court below has declined to interfere with. In order to determine whether the decision is correct, it is necessary to decide whether the plaintiffs have lost the exclusive right to the business built up by themselves by noncompliance with their contract. That the plaintiffs did, in fact, break their contract by a wrongful refusal to receive and pay for the metal they had agreed to purchase, is now conceded. It is said, however, that the defendant did not elect to rescind the contract when the breach occurred, but, on the contrary, chose to keep it alive. That seems to be true. The action of the ■defendant in retaining the $36,000 of advances, which it had received under the contract, but for which it had given no ■equivalent, is not consistent with an intention to disaffirm. If the. defendant did not intend to furnish the rest of the metal, it had no right to keep this sum, which was part of the purchase price thereof. It is probable, therefore, that the plaintiffs would have been, but for their own action, in a position to claim their rights under the contract—at least, their right to the business built up by them—as long as the defendant retained the advance payments. But they destroyed this right Avlien they assigned to Latvlor their claim to the $36,000. That Avas a binding election to regard the contract as rescind. This money belonged to the plaintiff only in the eArent of the contract being AA’holly terminated, .so that nothing more Avas to be done under it. If the contract Avas to be carried out further, and the remaining shipments made, then the money did not belong to the plaintiffs, and the defendant Avas entitled to its possession eA'en before the rest of the metal should be shipped. The plaintiffs Avere to become entitled to the English business only by paying for the Avhole 3,000,000 pounds of metal. So far from doing this, they have sought to recover, or at least have transferred to another all their right to recover, part of the very money Avhich the contract provided as a consideration for the acquisition of that business. It is plain that they thereby made a binding election, which deprived them of their right to the same.
It is claimed that the plaintiffs offered unconditionally to peiform the contract before February 28, 1896, and at a date prior, so far as the record sIioaa’S, to the assignment to Laivlor. In fact, however, there is no prior offer Avhich can be regarded as an unconditional tender of performance. But, if it were otherwise, the LaAvlor suit operated as a withdinwal of any such offer, and pledged the plaintiffs to a different line of conduct, denning for them, as it did, a different attitude.
The order should be affirmed with costs.