Levy v. Solomon

The record shows that the plaintiffs sued to recover personal property, and on the ninth of February procured the defendant’s arrest upon the ground that he had concealed, etc., a part of the chattels, to recover which the action was brought. On the same day the defendant gave a bond for the jail limits, and has since been confined within them. It may be inferred that the cause is at issue, but it has not been tried, nor has any judgment gone against the defendant. Upon an affidavit showing his arrest and continued imprisonment, as above stated, the defendant procured an order requiring the plaintiffs to show cause why he should not be discharged from the limits, and “from arrest herein,” and the bond given by him be canceled and annulled. The motion was granted. Upon appeal to the general term the decision was affirmed, and the plaintiffs appeal to this court.

The defendant justifies the order of the court below upon the sole ground that, under the order of arrest, his imprisonment had continued six months, and he was there fore entitled to a discharge under the provisions of section c. 672, of the laws of 1886. On the other hand, the plaintiffs contend that the statute applies to an imprisonment on final process only. We are of that opinion.

The general title of the act of 1886, supra, is “ An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure,” and the particular portion on the interpretation of which the defendant relies is the amendment of section 111 of the Code. The original section (111) relates to the “support of prisoners in Kings county.” The amendment introduces new matter, as to the meaning of which nothing can be gathered from

These sentences are, I think, to be read together, and, so read, admit of but one meaning, viz.; That no person whose condition answers the terms referrred to in the first clause shall be imprisoned, either Avithin the walls of a jail or within the jail limits, for. a time exceeding six months; and if the recovery for the enforcement of which the execution or other mandate is issued, or the amount required to be paid by the commitment, is less than $500, then his imprisonment within the prison walls shall not exceed three months. This is the only distinction applicable, under the first clause, where the debtor is in close confinement; while, under the second, when, as to the walls of the jail and within certain limits, he is at large, the amount of the recovery or sum to be paid is unimportant. The respondent concedes that, under the first sentence only a final process or mandate, after an adjudication fixing the amount due, is referred to; but argues that the change of language in the second clause or sentence indicates a change in the intention of the legislature, and a design to make it more extensive in its application than the former; that, although the first included only final process or mandate, the second is of wider signification, and includes all mandates against the person, and so includes simple orders of arrest issued at the time of the commencement of the action, and before any recovery. This would require us to hold that the legislature intended to alter the description of the process by virtue of which the imprisonment was had, rather than the description of the place of imprisonment. I find no reason for doing this. The statute, in the first place, characterizes the process as “an execution, or any other mandate, against the person, to enforce the recovery of a sum of money;” and in the next sentence, speaking of the imprisonment in a different place, repeats

According to the respondent, the first clause includes only final process or executions to enforce recoveries. It, therefore, does not include mesne process. The second, he says, includes mesne process, or orders of arrest. It would follow that a debtor arrested on such process, but unable to procure bail for the limits, could not be discharged, because confined within the walls; while one arrested in the same manner, and already outside the walls, though within the limits, could be wholly liberated. That would seem to be an absurd conclusion, and not to be adopted unless necessary to give meaning to the act. This is avoided by construing the second clause with reference to the first, and the true meaning is that which we have above ascribed to it.

The general object of the act in question (section 5, chap. 672, Laws 1886) is to limit the time of imprisonment under process issued against any person after the sum due from him had been adjudged, whether the imprisonment was within the walls of a jail, or within its liberties. If confined within the walls, the amount of the recovery, or the sum to be paid by the imprisoned person, determines whether the imprisonment shall end at the expiration of three months, or at the expiration of six months. But, if he had been admitted to the jail liberties, there is no such qualification, and the six-months period applies to all cases within the act. The defendant is not an imprisoned debtor within the act. No execution or other mandate has been issued against him to enforce the recovery of a" sum of money. No recovery has been had against him, nor has he been ordered to pay any money. ' We think, therefore, his discharge was improperly allowed. The order was appealable. It deprived plaintiffs of a remedy given by statute, which they might retain, until the prisoner was discharged according to law.

The orders of the general term and special term should therefore be reversed, and the motion to discharge the defendant, and cancel the bond given by him for the liberties of the jail, denied, with costs in all courts.

All concur.