Majority
Headnote
1. Bonds of municipal corporation—Regularity of issue—Prima facie case.While it is true that where towns are authorized to issue bonds under special statute, to pay the expenses of improvements the holders of the bonds must show that the requirements of the law have been complied with, we think in this case that the plaintiff made a prima facie case, and as the defendant offered no evidence to show that the statute had not been complied with, we do not think the first and second points argued by the appellant’s counsel can be sustained. See Cagwin v. The Town of Hancock ( 84 N. Y., 532 ), and other cases cited as to the liabilities of towns.
The plaintiff proved the taking of the oath by the commissioners, and by McLean, one of the commissioners, that they entered upon the discharge of the duties prescribed by the act, and that the Midland avenue road was one of the roads and boulevards built by them, and that bonds were issued by the town on requisitions from the commissioners for the improvement of that avenue, and that all the commissioners acted. As has been stated, the defendant, in its answer, admits that the bonds set forth in the complaint were made, signed and countersigned, as therein mentioned
It seems to us that this admission, taken in connection with the proof by the plaintiff at the trial, in the absence of anything tending to throw suspicion upon the fairness and honesty of the transaction, makes out a prima facie case that the bonds were duly and properly issued. The criticism which is made by the appellant’s counsel, that the proof shows that the work was not wholly completed when the commission was legislated out of office, we do not regard as sound because section 19 of the act of 1869 seems to contemplate that the bonds shall be issued from time to time as the work progresses, and that the commissioners were not obligated to wait until the entire completion of the work before they could draw a requisition for the issuing of a bond by the supervisor and town clerk. McLean’s testimony establishes that those bonds were for that work, and as has been said before, in the absence of any
The decision in that case, which was subsequently affirmed in the court of appeals (90 N. Y., p. 48), is not adverse to the plaintiff’s position here. There an act of the legislature was passed for the relief of the plaintiff, which, after providing that the city of Yonkers could issue duplicate bonds, went on to provide that the city, after the delivery to the bank of the duplicate bonds therein provided for, should be discharged from all liability on the original bonds to all persons purchasing the same, after due publication of the notice prescribed by the act, and gave a right of action against the bank upon the bond of indemnity, to the lawful owner of such bonds, in place of the liability of the original obliger. See Laws of 1880, chap. 59, § 2. The court held that that provision was unconstitutional, as the effect was to destroy the negotiable quality of the bonds, and to impair the obligation of contracts, and also because it deprived a person of property without due process of law.. The case is not an authority for the position that the remedy of the plaintiff is by application to the legislature. See. opinion of Gilbert, J., 24 Hun, pp. 522 and 523.
We see no reason why a town cannot be as fully protected by a bond of indemnity as an invididual nor any reason why, if a proper case is made out, a court of equity should not exercise the powers hereinbefore referred to. See 1 R. S. (7th ed.), 840, §§ 1, 2, 3 and 8.
We do not regard the case of Lorillard v. The Town of Monroe ( 11 N. Y., 392 ), as promulgating any doctrine adverse to the views above expressed. It is claimed by the appellant’s counsel that the court would be, in effect, mak
There is one point, however, made by the appellant, which we think must be sustained. The action was brought to recover the sum of $5,000, the amount of the principal of five bonds numbered from 27 to 31 inclusive, which became due and payable on the 1st of July, 1883, with interest thereon, and, also, the interest upon the remaining forty-five bonds from the 1st day of July, 1878,
The action was commenced on or about the 13th of July, 1883, and the court awarded judgment not only for the principal of the bonds which were due on that day, but also for the principal of five other bonds, which fell due on the 1st day of July, 1885. Th complaint was not amended, and it will thus be seen that the plaintiff was allowed to recover upon a cause of action other than that stated in the complaint.
We do not understand the cases cited by the respondent as obviating this difficulty. Those cases were cases in which it was held that if a fact had been assumed on the trial it might be assumed at all future stages, of the action and that for the purpose of upholding the judgment, proof could be given on the argument of the appeal, and that the court may treat the pleadings as having been amended in conformity with the proofs, in any respect, in which the court ought clearly to allow an amendment at special term. This case does not fall, it seems to us, within that class of cases.
It was not assumed at the trial, that this action was brought to recover any other principal sum than the $5,000 due upon the bonds which became due before the com mencement of the action, and there is nothing in the admission made at folio 54 of the case upon which the plaint • iff relies, which indicates that either party supposed that the principal sum of the five bonds which became due in 1885 could be.a subject of recovery. It was agreed by the counsel on the trial: “That the numbers and description of the bonds and time of payment of principal and interest as stated in the complaint be considered as the bonds that were stolen.”
There was no agreement to amend the complaint, to the effect that the plaintiff might claim to recover the sum of
. See Barnes v. Quigley, 59 N. Y., 265 ; Reeder v Sayre, 70 id., 180, 190; Robertson v. Robertson, 9 Daly, 44 , 57; Sheldon v. Adams, 18 Abb. Pr., 405 .
The judgment below must, therefore, be reduced by deducting from the amount thereof, the principal sum of the five bonds which fell due on the 1st of July, 1885.
The amount of the bond of indemnity must also be proprotionately reduced and with such modification the judgment will be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Bartlett, J., concur.