Majority
Headnote
forgery — 2 S. 8,., 673, § 33—Counts in am, indictment—what should contain,— duplicity.The first objection raised by the demurrer presents the question whether the indictment contains a criminal offense. It is insisted that the crime of forgery cannot be predicated upon the instrument, a copy of which is set forth in each count of the indictment. The statute provides, that “ every person who, with intent to injure or defraud; shall falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit * * any instrument or writing, being’, or purporting to be, the act of another, by which any pecuniary demand or obligation shall be, or shall purport to be, created, increased, discharged or diminished * * by which false making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting, any person may be affected, bound, or in any way injured in his person or property, upon conviction thereof, shall be adjudged guilty of forgery in the third degree.”[9] By another provision it is declared that it “shall be sufficient, if such intent appear to defraud * * any county, city, town or village * * or any person whatever.”[10] We think these provisions are sufficiently comprehensive to include the instrument in question. It is a writing purporting to be the act of another, -by which a pecuniary
Section 45[10] does not limit the meaning of the provisions in the previous sections, nor was it intended as a general definition of the document described as an “ instrument or writing,” but was merely enacted to remove all doubts in regard to the special cases therein mentioned, so that “every instrument partly printed and partly written, .or wholly prihted with a written signature thereto,” should be included. Nor was it essential that a legal liability or obligation should have been created by the instrument upon which an action could be maintained. It was sufficient that it purported to create a pecuniary demand, by which another might be affected or injured. If the instrument was complete in itself, and sufficient on its face to have induced an acceptance and allowance of the account by the board of supervisors, so that it might have produced injustice if the fraud had not been detected, it was the subject of forgery under the statute,[11] Now this document purports to be a formal bill or statement of an account, on the part of a public officer, for services against the county of Saratoga, setting forth the items in detail, with an affidavit of the claimant, as required by law, constituting, apparently, a legal claim, in proper form to be audited and paid. It is clearly within the letter and spirit of the statute, and would have been sufficient as the foundation of an indictment at common law.
The next objection is of a more special character, and relates to each of the counts separately, as bad for duplicity. It is insisted, for the defense, that the bill or account, signature to the affidavit,
But it is also insisted, that the second and third counts are bad for duplicity, as well as the first, because the distinct offense of uttering the instrument is joined with the offense of forging the same. It is a sufficient answer to this objection, that if the pleader intended to charge such an offense, which is not apparent, he utterly failed. It is alleged in each of these counts, after averring the forgery of the instrument, that the defendant “ feloniously presented and caused it to be presented for audit against the county of Saratoga.” There is no allegation that he “ uttered and published it as true,” which is essential, both at common law and under the statute. ' In order to render the counts objectionable, they must describe two offenses in adequate terms. Otherwise the additional allegations will be regarded as surplusage,[10] The fourth count is clearly good within all'the authorities. An indictment which alleges that the defendant falsely made, forged, and counterfeited an instrument within the ‘ statute, with intent to defraud, setting forth the instrument m haec verba, is a sufficient description of the circumstances to constitute the offense,[11] Judgment-must
* 1 Bishop’s Crim. Proc., § 437, and cases cited.
† † 1 Bishop Crim. Proc. § 440; Dawson v. The People, 25 N. Y., 399 , 402.
‡ ‡ Holmes v. The People, 15 Abb., 154 ; People v. Rynders, 13 Wend., 435 ; People v. Clements, 26 N. Y.,193.
Present—Bookes, P. J., Countryman and Landon, JJ.
Judgment accordingly.
Footnotes
- * 2 R. S., 673, § 33.
- † † 2 R. S., 675, § 46.
- * Noakes v. The People, 25 N. Y., 380 , 384; People v. Stearns, 23 Wend., 634 , 637.
- † † 2 R. S.,675.
- ‡ ‡ People v. Stearns, 21 Wend., 409 , 414; People v. Krummer, 4 Park C. R., 217 .
- * 1 Bishop on Crim. Proc., §§ 433-439, 449 and note; Reed v. The People, 1 Park. Cr. R., 481; People v. Wright, 9 Wend., 193 ; People v. Rynders, 12 id., 426; Nelson v. The People, 23 N. Y., 293 , 397.
- † † Laws of 1847, ch. 490, § 24.
- ‡ ‡ Vincent v. The People, 11 Abb., 234 ; People v. Harrison, 8 Barb., 560 ; People v. Gallomey, 17 Wend., 540 .