Majority
Headnote
Horse railroads in New York city — liability of, to pay to the city a percentage of their earnings — grant of a franchise to individuals who subsequently assign the property and rights acquired, fhereund&r to a corpoi'ation — right of the legislature to impose obligations in respect to such property and rights upon such corporation.This action is brought to compel the defendant to account for the receipts by it accruing from the operation of the Bleecker Street and Fulton Ferry Railroad route. It is not brought to recover any license fees for cars run by the defendant over the original Bleecker street route described in the act of 1860.
It stands conceded, because so alleged in the complaint, and not. denied by the answer, that on the 29th day of September, 1876, the defendant, by virtue of a written agreement, entered upon and took full, sole and exclusive possession of the demised premises described in the complaint, and has ever since retained the same, and has solely and exclusively exercised and enjoyed the franchises, privileges, licenses and immunities of these and other demised premises conferred upon the said Bleecker Street and Fulton Ferry Raih’oad Company by the laws mentioned in the foregoing preliminary statement, and has solely and exclusively received, to its own use, all the receipts arising from the exercise and enjoyment of said privileges and franchise for operating the horse railroad through such streets.
It appears that the rent to be paid by the defendant for the use of this railway for its ninety-nine years lease goes not into the treasury of the Bleecker Street and Fulton Ferry Company, but is paid directly to the stockholders of that company. So that, if the obligation to pay a percentage- is personal to that company, and does not. follow the company or person who operates the road and has the benefit of the franchise, then a most clever device has been hit upon for depriving the city of New York of the compensation which the legislature said it should receive in part payment of the valuable-franchise so granted.
It is further urged that the Bleecker Street Company was not liable .to pay the percentages provided for by chapter 647 of the Laws of 1873. The argument is that the grant to Stephen R. Roe and his ^eleven associates, under the act of 1860, was not to a corporation but to individuals, and hence there is not reserved to the legislature any power to alter, amend or repeal the same. ■ This may be conceded. But Stephen R. Roe and his associates did not bestow upon the Bleecker Street and Fulton Ferry Railroad Company the right .to operate any other part of the route than that portion which is .specified in chapter 514 of the Laws of 1860. It is true, as is found by the learned trial judge, that the route of that railroad to construct, maintain and operate which said company was formed as set forth in its articles of association, is the same as that over which Stephen R. Roe and other persons named in said act were authorized and empowered to operate. But by chapter 199 of the Laws of 1873, that company was authorized and empowered to extend its railway ■.and to use the former road, in connection with the roads of other railroad companies in said city, upon such terms as might be agreed upon between the companies.
Moreover, as it seems to us, it is an erroneous proposition that the Bleecker Street and Fulton Ferry Company owes its franchise in ■any respect to the assignment made to it by Stephen R. Roe and .others. The thing which is thus assessed a percentage for the benefit of the city of New York is not the railroad and other visible property assigned by Stephen R. Roe and his copartners to the Bleecker Street and Fulton Ferry Railroad Company, nor is it that property in combination with the privilege of operating horse cars ■on that route. The legislature by the general act of 1850 permitted the corporation to be created for a particular purpose, and, by subsequent legislation placed it under certain obligations and conditions to pay a small part of its gains to the plaintiff. It said to the
It follows that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed..
Bartlett, J., concurred; Yan Brunt, P. J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.