In re Annon

The defendants were arrested for violation of chapter 581 of the Laws of 1888, the first section of which reads as follows:

“ Section 1. The maximum charge for elevating, receiving, weighing and discharging grain by means of floating and stationary elevators and warehouses, in this State shall not exceed the following rates, namely: For elevating, receiving, weighing and discharging grain, five-eighths of one cent a bushel. In the process of handling grain by means of floating and stationary elevators, the lake vessels or propellers, the ocean vessels or steamships, and canal-boats, shall only be required to pay the actual cost of trimming or shoimling to the leg of the elevator when unloading, and trimming cargo when loading.”

The defendant Annan was part owner and one of the agents for a floating elevator engaged in business in and about the harbor of New York; and the defendant Pinto is one of the firm of F. E. Pinto & Sons, engaged in business as warehousemen in the city of Brooklyn. The complaint against the defendants is that on the twenty-first day of June last they each charged the complainants for elevating, receiving, weighing and discharging grain more than five-eighths of one cent a bushel. Upon an examination held before a magistrate, the defendants were committed to jail in default of bail, pending their trial, and have instituted these proceedings for the purpose of procuring their discharge upon the ground that the act of the legislature, aforesaid, under which they were arrested, violates that provision of the State Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

This power is usually denominated the police power of the State. Its exact boundaries and limitations have never been judicially established by any general rule, and probably never will be. Each case, as it arises, must be determined upon its own facts. While it may be difficult in many cases to reconcile the conclusions of different courts upon similar facts, all agree upon a few general rules that must control in determining the validity of the law. Courts are confined to the single question whether the act in question exceeds the utmost limits of legislative power. If it does not, if it can stand when brought to the test of the Constitution, the question of its validity is at an end, and the judicial department of the government cannot refuse to recognize and enforce it. It may be opposed to our opinion of natural justice, or its operation may appear to be inequitable towards a large class of citizens; but if it is a valid exercise of legislative power, we cannot judicially con demn it. It was said by Chief Justice Waite, in Munn v. Illinois ( 94 U. S., 132 ): “For us the question is one of power, not of expediency. If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such a statute, then we may declare this one void, because in excess of the legislative power of the State. But if it could, we must presume it did.

In People v. Marx, Rapallo, J., states the question as follows: “ Conceding that the only limits upon the legislative power of the State are those imposed by the State Constitution, and that of the United States, we are called upon to determine whether or not these limits are transgi’essed by an enactment of this description.” * * * And Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations ([5th ed.], pp. 222, 223, m. p. 186,187), says: “Whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a question of power. * * * In any case in which this question is answered in the affirmative, the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the proper exercise of the power. * * * If evidence was required it must be supposed that it was before the legislature when the act was passed ; and if awg special funding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act, it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held equivalent to such finding I

We have, therefore, blit a single question in the case, viz.: Has the legislature the right to regulate the use of property of the character specified in the act in question at all? This question must receive an affirmative answer. The power has been exercised as to various classes of property since the formation of the State, and the reports are full of decisions upholding the authority of the State to regulate the use and enjoyment of property, and the control of private business in many ways; and in'the case of grain elevating business we have the case of Munn v. Illinois, as a distinct adjudication in favor of the validity of such a law as the one in question.

The citations I have made are a sufficient answer to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, that this case can be distinguished from the Munn case, on the ground that the validity of the Illinois statute was placed on the fact that the Chicago ware-housemen had a virtual monopoly of the elevator business, and that the facts here show that no monopoly could exist. How can this court say that no monopoly exists, or may hot exist, in some or all

I fail to see how we can give any effect to the evidence taken before the magistrate on the question of.the law’s constitutionality. The act is not made applicable to persons who possess a virtual monopoly of the business of elevating grain, but to certain political divisions of the State, and within those divisions is, applicable to every individual. It cannot be a valid law as to Mr. Annon and an invalid one as to Mr. Pinto, and yet if the court is to determine in every case that arises under the 'law, whether or not a monopoly exists, we might reach different conclusions in different cases. It would certainly be a strange system of practice, assuming the court could review the decision of the legislature upon questions within the scope of legislative power, that it should do so without having before it the evidence on which the legislative decision was based. But such is not the law.

In Bertholf v. O’Reilly ( 74 N. Y., 509 ), the Court of Appeals asserted that there was no limitation upon legislative power, except the limits and restraints of the Constitution and the case of People v. Cipperly ( 101 N. Y., 634 ) on the opinion of Justice Learned, reported in 37 Hun, 324 , is a direct authority against the point so ably argued by the learned counsel for defendants, that the court will look into the evidence taken on the trial and see whether a proper case exists for legislative interference.

In considering the question whether the legislature could prohibit the sale of milk drawn from healthy cows which, in its natural state, fell below the standard fixed by the act, that learned justice says: “ Is that to be a question for the jury % If so, the court must charge a jury in each case that, if they find milk below that standard

The circumstances surrounding the business in this State are substantially the same as developed in the Munn case. The great grain-producing region of the west and north-west sending its grain by rail and water to Chicago, and making that city one of the' great markets of the world, created a demand for means to handle and store the grain, and these means were found in the elevators and warehouses. Fourteen elevators and warehouses adapted to this business in the city of Chicago, the case states, were controlled by nine business firms, by whom the prices for elevating and storing grain were fixed and regulated. In this case we know that all grain brought into the cities named in the act in question arrives in cars or boats. That whether it be stored in warehouses or be reshipped to other places, it demands stationary and floating elevators to handle it. That in the harbor of New York the evidence informs us at least five different business firms operate and control floating elevators, and that the charges are fixed by a committee of the Produce Exchange, of which body some or all of these firms are members. It is apparent, therefore, that the opportunity for a virtual monopoly is the same in each case. The element necessary to create it in each case was combination, and whether there was, or had been, or might be such a combination as to justify the interference of the legislature to regulate the use of this class of property, we must presume was a question upon which the legislature had sufficient evidence. At all events, it is impossible for me to distinguish this case from the Illinois case. That statute is a precedent for legislation of this character, and the decision of the Supreme Court of that State and of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the substantial approval it received from the Court of Appeals in Bertholf v. O’Reilly, are decisive of the constitutionality of the law.

The Slaughter-house Cases ( 16 Wall., 36 ), Mobile v. Yuille (3 Ala. [N. S.] 140), and Berthof v. O’ Reilly ( 14 N. Y., 509 ), are also distinct authorities in favor of the validity of laws of this character. In the latter case it was sought to have declared invalid

In People v. Gillson (16 N. Y., State Rep., 185), the court held that chapter 691, Laws of 1881, was in no aspect valid as a health law, nor was it a regulation of the use of property or of trade in food. Chapter 202, Laws of 1884, section 4, which was declared invalid in People v. Marx ( 99 N. Y., 377 ), absolutely prohibited the manufacture or sale as an article of food of any substitute for butter or cheese, however wholesome or however openly and fairly its character was avowed and published. Such a law has nothing in common with the law in question. The tenement-house cigar act (chap. 212, Laws of 1884), considered in Matter of Jacobs ( 98 N. Y., 98 ), was declared invalid for the reason that it was apparent on the face of the law that it was not intended to protect health nor as a regulation of the use of property Says Earl, J.: “ It does not deal with tenement-houses as such'; it does not regulate the number of persons who may live in any one of them, or be crowded into one room, nor does it deal with the mode of construction for the purpose of securing the health and safety of their occupants, or of the public generally. * * * This law was not intended to protect the health of those engaged in cigar-making, * * * (nor) to protect the health of that portion of the public not residing in the forbidden tenement-houses. * * * Nor was it intended to improve or protect the health of the occupants of tenement-houses. * * * It is plain that this is not a health law and that it has no relation whatever to the public health.” Such a law has clearly nothing to justify or support it, and was a plain invasion of the constitutional rights of the persons affected by it.

I think the law in question valid, and the proceedings must, therefore, be dismissed and the defendants remanded to the custody of the sheriff.

Barnard, P. J., and Pratt, J., concurred.

Writ dismissed.