Majority
Headnote
Insurance policy — proofs of loss — when held to he sufficient.But a single question is presented for our consideration on this appeal. The only claim made by the appellant is, that the plaintiff failed to produce a proper certificate of the magistrate, notary public or commissioner of deeds nearest the place of the fire, as required by the policy upon which this action is brought; that the production of such a certificate was a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s right of recovery, and that the trial court erred in not so holding and in refusing to nonsuit the plaintiff upon that ground.
The plaintiff made and delivered to the defendant an account of his loss, in which he claimed that the amount of such loss was $2,200, and with this account he produced to the defendant the certificate of the nearest magistrate that he was acquainted with the character and circumstances of the assured, and having made diligent inquiry into the facts set forth in the foregoing statement, he believed and was satisfied that the assured had, without fraud, sustained by said described fire loss on the property insured to the amount of dollars, the sum stated in his affidcmit of loss. While this certificate did not, perhaps, strictly comply with the provision of the policy, it was a substantial compliance with it, and sufficient. The only specific objection made to the proofs of loss furnished was, that they did not contain a particular account of such loss. This account of loss and certificate were retained by the defendant. Subsequently the plaintiff furnished an additional account of loss, which contained a detailed statement of the property destroyed, and in which he also claimed that the amount of his loss was $2,200. With that account another certificate by the same magistrate was produced, by which he certified that he had examined the circumstances attending the fire, or damage alleged, and that he was well acquainted with the character and circumstances of the assured, and verily believed that he had by misfortune, without fraud or evil practice on his part, sustained loss and damage on the property insured, amount unknown to him. The last certificate, if considered alone, was not strictly such as was required by the provisions of the policy. If the first certificate produced by the plaintiff was superseded by the last, so that the first must be wholly disregarded, and not treated as a part of the proofs of loss furnished by the plaintiff in pursuance of the
By an examination of the provision of the policy under consideration, it will be seen that the certificate of the magistrate does not. necessarily form any part of the account of loss required. It, at. most, need only refer to the amount claimed by the assured; it is a. portion of the plaintiff’s required proofs of loss, but may, and we think does, exist independent of the account of loss. The first certificate was received by the defendant and retained by it without objection. It sufficiently certified as to plaintiff’s loss to the amount claimed by him. The amount claimed was not changed by the additional account furnished by the plaintiff. We are of the opinion that when the plaintiff produced to the defendant the first certificate of the magistrate, it was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the policy, and that the production of a second certificate, if defective, did not render the first unavailing. Moreover, we are of the opinion that as the defendant retained the account of loss and certificate first delivered, and required an additional and more particular account of loss, which was furnished, that both of the accounts of loss and both of the certificates furnished should be taken together, and be regarded as together constituting the proofs of loss furnished by the plaintiff, and that the last proofs furnished did not, in any manner, supersede or nullify the first. When considered together we think the magistrate’s certificates must be regarded as a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the policy, and that the court properly so held.
If correct in these conclusions, it follows that the judgment should be affirmed.
Hardin, P. J., concurred; Merwin, J., not sitting.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs