Majority
Headnote
Injuries sustained by a servant —■ negligence of the master — agreement of release, void' if not given for a sufficient consideration.A careful examination of the evidence in this ease has led us to the conclusion that it was sufficient to justify the court in submit
Nor do we think it can be held, as matter of law, that the plaint-tiff: was guilty of contributory negligence. Under the evidence the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence was for the jury, and was properly submitted to it. (Thurber v. H. B., M. and F. R. R. Co., 60 N. Y. 326 ; Massoth v. D. and H. C. Co., 64 id., 529; Stackus v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R. R. Co., 79 id., 464; Halsey v. R., W. and O. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. State Rep., 319; affirmed in Court of Appeals March, 1889.)
The defendant claims that the writing or paper signed by the ■plaintiff, wherein it was stated that he agreed that the defendant should in no case be liable to him for any damage or injury to his person or property by reason of the negligence of the defendant or its employees, was a bar to the recovery in this action. This instrument was signed by the plaintiff while he was in the defendant’s employ. ITis employment pi’eceded the execution of the agreement and continued until the time of his injury. When it was signed ■there was no agreement between the parties as to any future employment of the plaintiff by the defendant. It was without any new consideration whatever. The plaintiff did not read it, nor did he know its contents. Without deciding or discussing the question as to the validity of such an agreement, when founded upon a good and sufficient consideration and fairly understood by the parties, we .are of the opinion that this agreement was without a sufficient consideration to support it, and that the trial coui’t committed no error in holding that it was not a bar to this action.
The appellant has called our attention to no errors of the court in the admission or rejection of evidence, or in its charge to the jury, and we have found none that would seem to require discussion or justify a reversal of the judgment herein, hence it follows that the judgment and order should be affirmed.
Hardin, P. J., concurred; Merwin, J., not sitting.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.