Majority
Headnote
Taxation of a fa/rm divided by a town line.Chapter 315 of the Laws of 1886 amended the Revised Statutes and provided as follows:
“ Section 4. When the line between two towns, wards or counties divides a farm or lot, the same shall be taxed, if occupied, in the town, ward or county where the occupant resides; if unoccupied, each part shall be assessed in the town, ward, village or county where the same shall lie.”
“ § 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed.”
By virtue of the provisions of the law just quoted the relator was properly assessed in the town of Harpersfield in the year 1888, if the farm of 200 acres in question was an occupied “ farm or lot.” It was conceded upon the hearing, and established by evidence, that the relator resided in the town of Harpersfield. It was also manifest upon the evidence that the line between the towns of Harpersfield and Kortright divided the farm in question. There was no person residing upon the farm in the year 1888. For many years prior to 1888 David P. Dixon, the father of the relator, had owned the farm of 200 acres and resided thereon. The house was “ an old one.” In the spring of 1887 the father, David P. Dixon, purchased a farm consisting of 298 acres, adjoining the 200 acres in question, in the town of Harpersfield, upon which 298 acres was a much better house than the one on the 200 acres, and he moved himself and his family, consisting of his wife, the relator and another son named Fred, into the house in Harpersfield. The relator was about twenty-three years of age, unmarried, and having always had his home with his father, continued to reside with him after his father moved upon the 298 acres. It appears, in the evidence, that the town of Harpersfield has a bonded indebtedness of about $30,000 ; it also appears that the town of Kortright has no bonded indebtedness. A controversy arose in 1887 in respect to which town the farm of 200 acres should be assessed in, and on the sixth of June of
After a careful perusal of the facts, we are of the opinion that the conclusion upon the evidence of the trial court is in accordance with the weight of the evidence, and should be sustained. We are of the opinion, therefore, that under the statute, which we have quoted, the relator was properly assessed by the assessors in the town of Harpersfield. We think the evidence to establish the occupation is quite as satisfactory as that which was given in Smith v. Sanger ( 3 Barb. 360 ), where the question of occupation was involved. A like observation may be made in -respect to the facts and conclusion stated in Dorn v. Backer et al. ( 61 N. Y., 262 ), which case supports the contention of the respondents. So far as Fellows v. Denniston ( 23 N. Y., 420 ) is applicable, it supports the position of the respondents. In Stewart v. Chrysler ( 100 N. Y., 382 ), the lands in question were occupied for storage of lumber ; although owned by a non-resident of the State, it was held that they were to be regarded as occupied lands. Hampton v. Hamsher ( 46 Hun, 144 ), contains nothing inconsistent with the views already expressed. The controversy arose prior to the passage of the act of 1886 ah’eady quoted; and in referring to section 4 of the Revised Statutes, the judge observes that the lands mentioned “ mean other lands in a town owned by an individual, which he occupies for the purpose of cultivation or improvement either in person or by his servant or agent, but upon which he does not live.” The history of the provisions of the act of 1886 are referred to at page 111 of the “ System of Taxation,” edited by Mr. Davies, and is very clearly presented on page 111 of that excellent work. The appellant takes exception to the findings of the trial judge, but as there was some'evidence to sustain the findings, the exceptions to the same are unavailable. (Porter v. Smith et al., 7 Civ. Pro. Rep., 195.) The appellant proposed several requests for the trial judge to find certain facts -mentioned in the requests, but we are of the opinion that as there was a conflict in the evidence in respect to the facts mentioned in the requests, the refusal to find them does not furnish a basis for a reversal of the judgment. We have looked at the other exceptions urged in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, and we are of the opinion they furnish no ground
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Martin and Merwin, JJ., concurred.
Cases cited
- Smith v. Sanger 3 Barb. 360 p. 339