Majority
Headnote
Equitable title to real pn'operty a/l'ising out of an agreement to lire with the owner thereof— ?nay be interposed as a defense to a/n ejectment suit brought by the devisee of such owner — statute of frauds inapplicable — evidence as toa transaction with a deceased pwty.This action was ejectment. The premises involved consist of a house and lot situated in the village of Frankfort, N. Y. They were owned by Mary Piper, deceased, in her lifetime. The plaintiffs claim title as devisees under her will. The defendant claims as equitable owner. Her claim is founded upon an alleged agreement between the decedent and the defendant and George Y. Piper, whereby the decedent agreed to convey or devise the premises to them in consideration of their moving on to the premises and their taking care of her during the remainder of her life. This agreement was fully performed on their part. The defendant in her answer demanded judgment for the specific performance of their agreement.
On the trial the defendant gave evidence which tended to show that the decedent was quite earnest in her solicitations that the defendant and said George should move on to the premises and take care of her during the remainder of her life; that to induce them to do so she agreed, if they would move on the premises and thus
In Parsell v. Stryker ( 41 N. Y., 480 ) it was held that an agreement on a good consideration to devise land is valid, and will be-enforced by compelling a conveyance from the heirs of the premises- or purchasers with notice. (See, also, Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 N. Y., 321 .)
The fact that the contract in this case was an oral one does not-bar the defendant’s right to enforce a specific performance. The-statute of frauds is not applicable in such a case. (Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y., 34 ; Pomeroy on Specific Performance, 30;; Smith v. Smith, 51 Hun, 164 .) Ve think the agreement, as proved and found by the jury, constituted a defense to this action.
The defendant was called as a witness in her own behalf, and was asked: “Was there a time when you went to live with George Piper ? ” To this the plaintiffs objected upon the ground “ that it is a personal transaction.” The objection was overruled and the plaintiff excepted. We do not think the exception well taken. The plaintiffs were not the executors, administrators or survivors of George Y. Piper, nor did they derive their title, nor any interest, from, through or under him. We have examined the other exceptions in the case but have
After a full and careful examination of the evidence and proceedings in this case, we are of the opinion that the case was properly submitted to the jury, that the verdict is sustained by the evidence, and that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.
IIardin, P. J"., concurred; Merwin, J., not sitting.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.