Majority
Headnote
Negligence in not inspecting oil pipes used for the transportation of oil — such pipes a/re not, per se, a nuisance.The defendant is engaged in the manufacture 'of oils from crude petroleum. In the process there is produced a fluid substance called “naphtha,” which, at the low temperature of thirteen degrees Fahrenheit, gives off vapor or gas which is inflammable and explosive when confined. Its explosive power is estimated to be equal to 140 pounds to the square inch.
The defendant’s works are mcatea m the city of Bochester on or near the bank of the abandoned Genesee canal. The Municipal Gas Company is engaged in the manufacture and distribution for consumption of illuminating gas consumed in the city of Bochester. Its works are also situated on the banks of said canal, nearly a mile and a half north of the defendant’s works. The latter company use naphtha in the manufacture of gas, consuming each month about 30,000 gallons, and the defendant supplies the same. Each company
Naphtha was delivered to the gas company for the purposes mentioned every two weeks, and from twelve to fifteen thousand gallons at .each delivery, taking from three to four hours to pump that quantity through the pipe. During the intervening time the pipe was filled with naphtha, the quantity being about 2,000 gallons. The defendant had acquired the consent of the parties owning the bed of the canal to lay the pipe therein for the uses and purposes for which it was intended. A steam railroad track was also laid along the bed of the canal, and the pipe in question was laid by the side of, and, in some places, under the said track.
No time will betaken to prove that the business of transporting naphtha by the means adopted, from and to the place mentioned, and on the line adopted, was a lawful business, for that proposition cannot be reasonably disputed. The means adopted to transport this substance from one point to another is practically the same as the system in use for distributing illuminating gas, produced from coal, in all cities where it is used, and the danger to . life and property in the aggregate are no greater, if they cannot be said to be less. The legislature lias authorized the formation of corporations for “ the purpose of constructing and operating, for the public use, lines of pipe for the conveying or transporting therein petroleum, gas, liquids, or any products or property ” (chap. 203 of 1878), and such corporations may lay pipes across and along public streets and highways, and institute proceedings to condemn lands and acquire the right to lay and construct lines of pipe when they are unable to negotiate
The real question presented is, was the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge imputing negligence to the defendant, in the mode and manner of laying the pipe, or in neglecting to inspect the same to see if it remained in a safe and secure condition, or in failing to detect that it was broken and unfit for use, on the day the accident occurred, in time to have prevented the escape of naphtha in such quantities as to become dangerous to life or property ? The pipe was constructed from prime material, by an approved process, by manufacturers of experience, and had sufficient strength for the transportation of naphtha, and was well adapted for that use, between the places mentioned, under the pressure applied for pumping, and was well laid and properly covered with earth. It had been in .use several years, and there is no evidence that its original strength had been wasted in any perceptible degree by use. The test which was made, after the accident, of the section of the pipe which was broken fully sustains this statement. The last time the pipe was used before the accident was on the Ith day of December 1881, on which day about twelve thousand gallons of naphtha were successfully pumped through the pipe without any indication that the same was not in perfect order. There is no serious claim made by the plaintiff that the pipe was not in good order, and safe for use on that day.
The question of the defendant’s negligence is to be determined mainly by what occurred after the day named, in connection with the charge made by the plaintiff, that the defendant’s agents and servants in charge of the line failed, by reason of their carelessness and indifference,under the circumstances, to discover that the line was broken, so that all the oil pumped was discharged and wasted. On and prior to the said seventh day of December the city was constructing a sewer in Atkinson street, which was intended to connect with the then existing sewer, which passed under the bridge, which earned Atkinson street over the canal. The contractors constructing the
On the day of the accident the defendant had an order from the gas company to deliver to it 15,000 gallons of naphtha. Wilson and Sweeny, two of the defendant’s servants, who had charge of the pumps and the pipe line, undertook to make the delivery. As it was customary with them they agreed upon the precise time when the pumps should be started, which on this occasion was ten minutes past twelve, m., and time enough was allowed to permit Sweeny to go from the defendant’s works to the gas company’s tank and measure the quantity of naphtha which was then stored therein, and to oj)en the stop-cocks before the time for starting the pumps should arrive, as agreed upon. Sweeny did reach the receiving tank and opened the stop-cocks before Wilson started the pumps, which he did at the time agreed upon, and he continued to operate the same until he had pumped into the pipe 12,000 gallons, which took about two hours and a half before he was notified that the pipe was broken, and none of the oil reached the receiving tank. Sweeny remained at the receiving tank for two hours and twenty minutes watching all the time to see if the naphtha came, and as none was received he then notified an officer of the gas company, who immediately, by telephone, notified the defend
It does not distinctly appear how soon after the pumping commenced that the naphtha reached the sewer, but gas was emitted, from naphtha running into the sewer, as early as one o’clock, and the several-explosions which took place, including the one in the building where the deceased lost his life, as early as about three o’clock thirty minutes in the afternoon.
In view of the danger likely to arise to life and property from the use of a broken or defective pipe, in the locality where this was laid, so that naphtha in considerable quantities might escape, a case was made for the consideration of a jury, with proper instructions as to the rules of law aj>plicable to the case. When safety of human life is in question, a very high degree of care is required in conducting a lawful business. If naphtha in large quantities should be discharged at most any point on the line of the pipe, it would be highly dangerous to property situated in close proximity thereto, and, also, to occupants of buildings in the immediate vicinity, as well as to individuals passing on the public streets. The learned trial judge instructed the jury, in substance, that the transportation of naphtha, by means of a pipe located on the line selected, was not, as matter of law, a nuisance, but it was for them to determine, from all the evidence in the case, whether it was a nuisance as a matter of fact; and if they came to the conclusion that it was a nuisance, then the defendant was liable for any damage which came from the explosion, without regard to the question whether the defendant was negligent or not. In this connection he also instructed the jury that if they came to the conclusion that it was not a nuisance, it did not necessarily follow that the plaintiff had failed' to maintain a cause of action. We are unable to discover in the facts, about which there is really no dispute, those elements of danger which justified the court in submitting the case to the jury for them to determine, whether or not, as a matter of fact, the defendant was guilty of maintaining a nuisance by transporting naphtha through the pipe, or by leaving the pipe full of the same material when the pump was not in use. The pipe was in good order, and safe for the trans
A private nuisance is defined to be anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another. (3 Blackstone’s Com., 216.) Any unwarrantable, unreasonable or unlawful use by a person of his own property, real or personal, to the injury of another, comes within the definition stated, and renders the owner, or possessor liable fbr all damages arising from such use. (Wood’s Laws of Nuisances, § 1 and authorities cited.) To constitute a nuisance for keeping in store articles in common use in a community, the substance must be of such a nature and kept in such large quantity and under such circumstances as to create real danger to life and property. This rule seems to be fairly deducible from the many decisions which have been made by the courts on this subject. The fears of mankind will not alone create a nuisance without the presence of real danger. “ The well-founded apprehension of danger, which would alarm men of steady nerves and reasonable courage passing through the streets in the locality where the business is carried on, is enough to show that something is being done which ought to be prevented by condemning it as a misdemeanor.” (Regina v. Lister, 3 Jurist [N. S.], 570; People v. Sand, 1 Johns., 78 ; Myers v. Malcom, 6 Hill, 292 ; Heeg v. Light, 80 N. Y., 579 .) In such a case the rule which exonerates a party engaged in a lawful business, when free from negligence, has no application.
These instructions were to the effect that if the defendant was maintaining a nuisance, it was not liable if the pipe was broken by the act of a wrong-doer, if the defendant was not guilty of negligence in the particulars mentioned. But it does not cure the error or leave.it to the jury for them to say whether the defendant was guilty or not of maintaining a nuisance, but for a reason which will be hereafter stated, it becomes unnecessary to consider how far the last instructions qualified those as given, relative to the defendant’s liability, if the jury found that it was maintaining a nuisance.
As an independent ground for a recovery it was submitted to the jury whether the defendant was guilty of negligence in .failing to ascertain by an actual inspection of the line of pipe, or by some other means, that it was broken and unfit for use before they commenced pumping on the twenty-first day of December, or that the defendant’s agent, Sweeny, who was stationed at the gas company’s tanks, in failing to give notice that naphtha was not passing through the pipe, in time to have prevented the escape of naphtha in sufficient quantities to be dangerous. Our comprehension of the case is that a case was made for the consideration of the jury on the question of the defendant’s negligence. Every fact and circumstance must be considered and reflected upon in determining the question submitted to the consideration of the jury. As the pipe was in a reasonably safe and secure condition up to the time it was broken by the act of a third person, the charge of negligence rests mainly, if not entirely, on the omission of the defendant’s agents and ser
The fact that the pipe crossed several streets and, for a portion of the way, was laid under 'the track of a railroad which was in constant use, was a circumstance indicating that it was an act. of prudence to make some sufficient tests to ascertain if the pipe was in a safe condition, immediately preceding the use of the same, for the transportation of a large quantity of naphtha. In face of ffil the facts and circumstances, we think the question was properly submitted to the jury for them to determine whether the defendant’s agents engaged in operating the pipe line were guilty of negligence.
The jury rendered a general verdict in the plaintiff’s favor of $5,000,’ and there was also submitted to them to answer this question: “Was the naphtha which caused the explosion on the 21st day of December, 1887, by which John Lee was killed, permitted to get into the sewer by the negligence of the defendant % ” which was
The defendant’s counsel asked the court to charge the jury, that, if at a time when Sweeny should reasonably have been required to give notice that no naphtha was coming, the discharge into the sewer was so great as to cause the disaster, this failure to report was not negligence such as to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff. If the jury could, from the evidence, have determined the quantity of naphtha which, in fact, had at that time been discharged into the sewer, there is no evidence which would enable them to say that the quantity was sufficient to have caused the explosion. It is manifest that a considerable quantity must have been discharged from the pipe at the break before any would have been discharged into the sewer by reason of the character of the earth which lay about the pipe where it was broken. It is wholly conjectural as to the precise time when naphtha was first discharged into the sewer. ~We think that the proposition, as stated, was faulty and properly rejected, for the reason that it was the duty of the jury to determine the question of negligence from all the facts and circumstances of the case, and there were others bearing upon the question besides the omission of Sweeny to give notice that naphtha was not being received at the tank.
The defendant’s counsel also asked the court to charge the jury that if they should find that the sole cause of the accident was the breaking of the pipe by blasting at Atkinson street by the interference of third persons without knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant, or any co-operating negligence on the part of the defendant, they must render a verdict for the defendant. We think it is plain that the defendant was not entitled to these instructions. It was a conceded fact in the case that the pipe became broken by
Exceptions were taken by the defendant to the reception and rejection of items of evidence which were considered by the Special Term and held not to be well taken, and we concur in this part of the written opinion of the learned judge as printed in the case.
The judgment and order should be affirmed.
Dwight, J., concurred ; JIacomber, J., not voting.
Judgment and order affirmed.