Majority
Headnote
Streets in New York city, which were highways at the time of the-Dutch occupation— rights of abutting owners therein.The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the manner in which the defendant built, constructed and operated its railway. The details given in the complaint were that the engines used constantly emitted noxious gases, odors, smoke, steam, coal-dust and cinders, which passed into and through the plaintiff’s building, to the great discomfort of the occupants; and, further, that to exclude the odors and gases mentioned and to lessen- the noises occasioned by the passage of the defendants’ engines and ears, it was necessary to keep the windows of the plaintiff’s building shut; that he had been unable to remedy the evils stated, and, in consequence, the beneficial use and enjoyment of his property had been greatly damaged and its value greatly reduced. The defendant denied that the plaintiff had any right, interest, easement, privileges or benefits in the street known as the Bowery, and in which plaintiff’s property is located,
Upon the trial the plaintiff put in evidence a warranty deed granting the locus in quo to the plaintiff, and then gave evidence tending to show that the rental value of the premises was injured by the construction and operation of the defendant’s railway in its effect upon their light, air and access to them, to the extent of $2,500 a year, and that they were thereby injured in value to the extent of $20,000, and rested.
Defendant’s counsel put in evidence act of 1866,- chapter 697. Also put in evidence articles of association of the West Side and Yonkers Patent Railway Company. Also put in evidence the following acts: Act of 1867, chapter 489, and act of 1868, chapter 855 Also put in evidence appointment of commissioners of the Croton aqueduct department by the governor, pursuant to the requirements of the aforesaid acts. Also put in evidence supplemental articles of association of the West Side and Yonkers Railway Company, changing the name of the company. Also put in evidence a mortgage given by the company and foreclosure proceedings under the mortgage given by the company, and the deeds of the property and franchises of the company to the New York Elevated Railroad Company, and the permission of the commissioners so appointed to use dummy engines. Also put in evidence approval by the commissioners of the location and the plans of the structure, stations, and so forth, of the defendant road, and the resolutions connected therewith. Also put in evidence articles of association of the New York Elevated Railroad Company, act of 1875, chapter 595; also, act of 1875, chapter 606; also, appointment of commissioners by the
Defendant’s counsel then put in evidence a stipulation as to the description of the property taken in this case, marked Exhibit No. 1.
NEW YORIv SUPREME COURT.
CHARLES S. HINE against THE NEW YORK ELEVATED RAIL- " ROAD COMPANY.
It is hereby stipulated by the parties to this action, for the purpose of any future trial of the same, that the diagram, marked A, signed by the counsel hereto, correctly represents the length and position of the boundary lines, according to survey, of the lot No. 13 Bowery, which is described in a deed made February 1, 1855, by Thomas Ward and wife to Charles S. Hine; the figures upon said, diagram correctly stating the length of the respective boundary lines in feet and inches, the distance from the north-east corner of said lot along the northerly boundary line to the easterly line of the Bowery, being, by measurement, one hundred and six feet six inches, and the distance from the south-easterly corner of said lot along the southerly boundary line to the easterly line of the Bowery, being, by measurement, one hundred and ten feet nine inches.
Dated, N. Y., March 24, 1886.
ARNOUX, RITCH & WOODFORD,
Attarneys for Plmntiff. DAVIES & RAPALLO,
Attorneys for Dqfenclcmt,
“ The deed from Isaac Stoughtenburgh, Liber 54, page 348, to John McKesson, conveys a portion of the land designated on diagram No. 14 of Hoffman (supra), as E. Bowery, No. 5, the description being “ bounded westerly by the Bowery Lane,” etc. The foregoing chain of title conveys the same property down to the plaintiff’s grantors Thomas Ward and Margaret H. his wife, except
And this “ memorandum,” so-called, was also placed before the court, as appears by the record.
■ Memorandum on treaties bearing upon the surrender of the Province of the New Netherlands to England.
The first document we meet is the articles of capitulation concluded on August 27, 1664, between the English government and Dutch authorities found in Colonial Documents 2, page 250. Article 1 provides that the States General or West India Company shall freely enjoy all farms and houses (except such as are in the forts), and that within six months they shall have full liberty to transport all arms and ammunition or else they shall be paid for them. Article- 2 provides that all public houses shall continue for the use for which they are now used. Article 3 provides that all people shall continue free denizens and enjoy their lands, houses, goods and ships wheresoever they are within this country, and dispose of them as they please. Article 4 gives liberty to the citizens to remove themselves from the country. Article 5 guarantees free transportation to England, if so desired. Article 6 and 7 provide that intercourse and emigration between Holland and the colony shall be free. Article 8 guarantees liberty of conscience. Article 9 provides against Dutchmen being pressed in any war whatever. Article 10 provides that no soldiers shall be quartered on the inhabitants without compensation. Article 11 provides that
The third section, after stating that all quarrels should be forgotten, goes on: “ In order that this peace may rest on a firm foundation, and from this day every occasion of contention be removed, it is further agreed that each of the high contracting parties shall hold and possess with full right of sovereignty, property and possession (cum plena/rio, jure summi imperii, proprietatis etpossessionis) all lands, islands, cities, forts, places and colonies which such party may have taken from the other jrarty by force and arms, or in any other way, either during the war or at any other time, in such mode and manner as it occupied -and possessed them on the 10-20 May last, none of these places being excepted.”
When, afterwards, another war broke out between England and Holland, and the colony of New Netherlands had been reconquered by the Dutch, it was stipulated by the treaty, which put an end to the war, that the colony should be surrendered to England. This was done by virtue of a general clause of the treaty of Westminster. (Dumont Corps Diplomatique, vol. 7, p. 253, 9-19 Feb., 1674.)
The seventh clause is as follows: “ It is further agreed that the treaty of Breda concluded in the year 166'T, and also all other treaties confirmed by the said treaty, be renewed and remain in full force in so far as they are not in contradiction with the present treaty.” (The only treaty referred to in the treaty of Breda was a treaty of 1662.)
Shortly after the conclusion of the treaty, the States general; on the 16th of April, 1674, passed a resolution requesting the king of England “ that he will allow the inhabitants of New Netherlands aforesaid, the enjoyment of their lands, bouweries and all their goods and rights which they possess in that country, or with the same right, privilege and freedom as the inhabitants above mentioned enjoyed previous to the aforesaid war.” (2 Colonial Documents, 545.)
The testimony being thus closed, defendant’s counsel moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds.
• 1. That plaintiff has failed to' prove facts sufficient to constitute a case.
2. That the plaintiff has failed to prove that he has or that there is appurtenant to his lot, any easement to light, air or access, or any property right in the street called Bowery; or that there is any right or easement to use the land forming the bed of that street, peculiar to himself or his lot, other than those he has a right to enjoy as one of the public.
.3. That plaintiff has failed to prove that any property of his has been taken by defendant, by the erection or maintenance of the structure of the elevated road in said street, or the operation of trains thereon, and that there is no complaint or evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant.
4. That it appears that the land forming the bed of the Bowery in front of plaintiff’s premises is owned by the State or city of New
5. That plaintiff has not alleged ownership of any land forming the bed of the street, but has alleged the existence of an easement over said land, which precludes the idea of ownership of said land; that he has failed to prove the ownership of any land in the street, as his deed, taken in connection with the actual measurement of his lot, only carries title to the easterly side of Bowery, and that merely as an owner of abutting land, plaintiff has no property in the street.
6. That it appears from the pleadings and proof that the defendant has legislative authority and municipal consent to the construction and operation of its railroad through the Bowery past plaintiff’s premises; that as no property of plaintiff has been taken and no damage been done by negligence, defendant cannot be held responsible for damage or injury (if any) inflicted upon plaintiff, incidental to the construction and operation of the road.
(Motion to dismiss complaint granted and plaintiff excepted. Plaintiff’s counsel then asked the court for permission to go to- the jury on the facts of the case, but this was refused, and the plaintiff excepted.)
The defendant’s counsel, as his proofs and motion to dismiss foreshadowed, contends that, prior to 1664, the land forming the bed of the street in front of the locus in quo was owned absolutely by the Dutch government, was subject to the laws of that government in determining the rights of abutting owners, and being thus controlled, such owners had no right to the soil of the street, highway or road, either during its use or upon its discontinuance, except the right of passage, and, therefore, presented no existing right of easement or other legal element which had been invaded or disturbed.
They fortify this position by elaborate briefs, historically and legally replete, and display great research, the result no doubt of great industry, patience and devotion. The contention against the plaintiffs is, therefore, fully and ably presented, and it may be that,
The question, however, evolved from the documents, treaties, charters and laws arrayed against the plaintiff’s right of action has been recently examined and determined against the defendant by the Superior Court of this city in the Case of Mortimer v. New York Elevated Railway Company (6 N. Y. Supplement, 808), and in which comprehensive and satisfactory opinions were delivered by Justices Truax and Freedman. The subjects embraced, indeed involved, in the ancient history of this- island and its owners, by right of discovery or conquest, are very attractive and naturally excite the desire, if not the ambition, to give them exhaustive exposition, even though it have been done by others, but, nevertheless, the attraction will be resisted, and reliance, as already suggested, be placed upon the opinions mentioned. They might be enlarged, although not improved, and the conclusions arrived at further 'sustained by discussion, but this is not deemed necessary. It is thought proper, however, to say that the right of the adjacent owner to the advantages of a highway, whilst it is continued as such, do not appear to have been questioned. The absolute ownership even of the soil, though it be vested in the sovereign power, and revert to it when the highway is closed, does not destroy the right to the enjoyment suggested of light and air and access, and particularly as the long and uninterrupted user of the street has deprived (it may be) even the legislature of the State of the power of withdrawing it from that use. On that subject the remarks of Judge Andrews, in the case of Mahady v. The Bushwick Railroad Company ( 91 N. Y., 153 ), are appropriate, namely: “ The plaintiff, though an abutting owner simply, the fee of the street being in the city, was entitled to the use of the street, and neither
The case of Dunham v. Williams ( 37 N. Y., 251 ), is not in conflict with this suggestion, for the reason that there the claim was to the center of an abandoned road-bed, a claim to the ownership thereof. The highway, it was said in that case, was ancient and was laid out when New York was a province of the States general, and subject to the dominion and laws of the Dutch government, which did not permit any person to claim a present or reversionary title to the soil, for the reason that he was not the owner of the lands through which it was laid. Nor is it in conflict with anything decided in Wetmore v. Story ( 22 Barb., 440 .)
Assuming, therefore, that the doctrines of the civil law were controlling and that the land or the soil of the highway belonged to the sovereign power and reverted to it when the highway was abandoned or closed, nevertheless, while open, the public, including, of course, the adjacent owners, were entitled to all the advantages secured by its existence. Some of these already suggested were light and air, which were recognized by the principles of the civil law as belonging so much in common to the whole society of mankind that no one person can make himself master of them, or deprive others of the use of them. (1 Strahan’s Civil Law [translated from Domat], § 115.) And, further, that rivers, the banks of rivers and highways are things public, the use of which is common to all persons according to the respective laws of comities, the sovereign power regulating the use of them. (Id, § 116.) There are things common to every one (res communes), as air, flowing water, the open sea, the sea shoi’e. These things were not appropriated even by the State. (Amos’ History of the Civil Law of Rome, 124.) The adjacent owner gives a consideration for these benefits of light, air and access in the payment of the taxes imposed upon his land, and which are employed in part, at least, in meeting the expenses of the pavement of the street in front of his land and such repairs as are needed — taxes with which it is legally and properly burdened by municipal authority conferred by legislative action.
These benefits, thus paid for, could not, under any system of
The judgment should, for these reasons, be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
Daniels, J., concurred.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.