Majority
Headnote
Equitable construction of an agreement as to the reconstruction of a building undm' which a canal extends — right to home the water turned out of the canal — damages arising therefrom, by whom, to be paid.The plaintiff claims to be the owner of a lot on the south side of Bridge street in East Oswego, upon which is a building called the
Tbe defendant is a corporation created by chapter 241 of tbe Laws of 1823, passed April 23, 1823. By section 5 of that act it was provided that tbe directors of tbe company “ shall have power to explore and designate tbe route of a canal or mill feeder, and a proportion of tbe waters of tbe Oswego river may be taken and conducted out of said river at or above the Oswego Rapid, so-called, at such point or place and in such manner as may be deemed proper, so that tbe water can thereby be carried down upon tbe east side and bank of said river to such point or piace as may be required by those interested therein,” tbe route designated and tbe manner of making tbe canal to be determined upon by an engineer who shall be appointed by and be under tbe direction of tbe canal commissioners. By section 6 tbe corporation bad power “ to enter upon and take possession of such improved or unimproved lands, not exceeding four rods in width, as shall be necessary for tbe making of tbe canal or mill feeder aforesaid and the works thereunto appertaining,” and provision was made for payment of damages to the owners of any property that was so taken. Upon tbe completion of tbe canal tbe company was authorized “ to sell, let or grant and convey, for a limited time, tbe use of tbe water which shall be conveyed in said canal for mills or other hydraulic purposes, to any person or persons owning and occupying lands adjoining thereto, at such price or prices as may be agreed upon by tbe parties interested.” By section 10 it was provided that, if any time thereafter it became necessary to adopt tbe said canal as a part of tbe contemplated improvement between Lake Ontario and tbe Erie canal, “ tbe canal commissioners shall at all times have full power, in behalf of tbe State, to enter upon and make all necessary alterations that by them shall be deemed advisable, to take and make use of tbe waters there
The defendant, under this act, commenced, in 1824, the construction of its canal along the easterly bank of Oswego river, but before its completion across the plaintiff’s lot, and in the same year, the State adopted and took possession of it as a part of the canal system of the State, and thereupon it became the property of the State, except the rights to surplus water as reserved in the act. The State made some alterations, and continued to use it as a canal for the passage of boats from its completion, in or a,bout the year 1825, until the completion by the State of a new and enlarged canal, in or about the year 1853, when its use as a canal was discontinued. In the meantime the defendant had made use of the surplus water, giving leases to various parties, and resumed the full control of the canal when it was abandoned by the State.
On the 25th of February, 1823, the surveyor-general of the State gave a certificate of sale to Theophilus S. Morgan of lot 19, in the village of East Oswego, block 99. The lot of plaintiff is part of lot 19. On the 22d of December, 1828, letters-patent were issued to Morgan of lot 19, which were recorded March 26,1834. Lucius B. Crocker became the owner prior to May 1, 1849, and he, at that date, conveyed to Jesse Bennett, and Bennett, on the 4th of December, 1852, conveyed to Hiram Allen. Each of their deeds contained the clause, “ subject to the rights of the Oswego Canal Company and the rights of the State.”
In 1854 Allen erected the building in question. The canal runs in a northerly direction through and across the lot and under the building, and extends nearly the entire width of the lot, the east foundation wall of the building being on the east line of the canal
In 1871 William W. Pulver, through whom plaintiff derives his .title, made an agreement with the defendant in regard to the matters here in controversy. This agreement was under seal and was duly acknowledged and recorded, and both parties now claim advantages under it. Prior to the execution of this agreement Pulver had become the owner, of the title of Allen. On the 28th of February, 1871, the canal board, by resolution, passed pursuant to chapter 267 of the Laws of 1857, determined and declared the canal lands in question abandoned, and afterwards, in the same year, and before the agreement above referred to, all the interest of the State in plaintiffs lot was quit-claimed to Pulver’s grantor, so far as it could be done consistent with the act of 1857, which provided that, when any of such abandoned canal lands were then used for a hydraulic canal, the conveyance should not prevent the future use of the land for the same purpose, but should expressly reserve the right to continue such hydraulic canal.
This agreement bears date July 31, 1871, and after describing the defendant as party of the first part and Pulver as party of the second part, proceeded as follows:
“ Whereas the party of the first part have and own a hydraulic canal on the easterly side of the Oswego river, which crosses lot number nineteen in block ninety-nine in the fourth ward of said city: and whereas the party of the second part is the owner of a building known as Hungerford Block, which is erected over the said canal where it crosses said lot, which building is supported by stone walls on the easterly and westerly sides of said canal, and by stone piers or central walls and iron columns placed in said canal; and whereas the parties hereto desire that their respective rights be clearly and specifically defined, to the end that all contention and
■controversy may be avoided.; therefore, it is hereby mutually agreed by and between the parties hereto, their successors, heirs and assigns, that the said party of the second part is or claims to be the owner ■of the fee simple of that portion of said lot crossed by said building, and that the party of the first part has a right of easement across said lot for the purposes and uses specified in its charter, and to have and maintain its canal free from obstruction, and has the right to enter into and upon the same for the purpose of improving or repairing said canal, so as to render it most available for hydraulic purposes during its legal existence, and that the party of the second part has the right to keep and maintain the building aforesaid over the said canal, and to erect another building in its stead in case of the destruction or removal of the one now standing; and the said company consents, so far as its own rights are concerned, that the said iron columns, and any others that may be substituted to replace the piers and central walls aforesaid, may remain as supports to said building so long as it stands, and that the said piers and central walls may remain until they are replaced by iron columns, not to exceed one year from the second day of October, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one; and that whenever another building is erected in its place and stead it shall be supj)orted by a stone wall on the easterly and westerly sides of said canal and the present iron columns, and the ii'on columns replacing the central stone wall in said canal shall be removed and the building shall be supported by iron or other trusses extending from the said walls over the canal, so as to sustain and support said building ; and that the said iron trusses shall be so erected, placed and situated as to cause no material obstructions to the flow or passage of water through said canal. And the party of the second part, for himself, his heirs and assigns, covenants and agrees that they will remove all rubbish, debris and obstructions from said canal caused by the falling or burning of said building over said canal, or by any materials falling or thrown from said building without any unnecessary delay; to pay to said party of the first part the expenses of such removal if done by said company; and that they will suffer no unnecessary obstructions to be occasioned by said building except said columns, central walls and piers to remain in said canal as aforesaid.” •
After the execution "of the agreement, the matter, as between the
It was held in the court below that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain its building, “ and to support the same by the present side foundation walls and central supports, or to substitute for the latter a single row of iron columns in the center of the said canal; ” that it has the right “ to repair the same, or to substitute for said central supports a row of iron columns in the center of the said canal, and for the purpose of doing such work the plaintiff has the right, and is entitled to have the flow of water in the said canal across from the said plaintiff’s premises under said building stopped by the said defendant and the water removed from the said canal for the period of fifteen days, which time should commence upon ten days previous notice in writing from the plaintiff to the defendant; ” that the defendant, by reason of its refusal to remove the water, was liable to the plaintiff for the damages sustained by it for loss of rents from December 21, 1888, ,to the date of the report (December 28, 1889), being the sum of $1,880.
The first question to be determined arises over the claim of defendant that its lessees of water are necessary parties to the action. They are affected by the stoppage of the water, and, therefore, it is
We are of the opinion that the lessees were not necessary parties. The defendant, in a certain sense, represents them, and it has the title and control of the canal, as a whole, and any controversy as to-such control is properly with the defendant alone.
Is the plaintiff entitled to have the water turned out of the canal to enable it to make the repairs it claims the right to make ?
In order to determine this question the agreement of 1811 is to-be carefully considered. .Pulver then was the owner of the fee, but subject to the rights of the defendant. The claim had apparently been made by the defendant or its lessees that the building or its supports was improperly obstructing the flow of the water. In view of this the agreement was made. It provided, among other things,, that the canal company had the right “ to have and maintain its-canal free from obstruction.” It also provided that Pulver had the-right to keep and maintain his building over the canal and to erect; another in its stead in case of the destruction or removal of the one-then standing, and that the iron columns, which were then thereupon either side of the central piers or walls, and any others that, might be substituted to replace such central piers and walls, might, remain as long as that building then there should stand, and that-such piers and central walls might remain until replaced by iron columns not to exceed one year from October 2, 18Y1. Whenever another building should be erected it shordd be supported by a stonewall on the easterly and westerly sides of the canal with iron or other trusses extending from such walls over the canal, the trusses to be so situated as to cause no material obstruction to the flow of water, and Pulver agreed for himself and assigns “ that they will suffer no unnecessary obstruction to be occasioned by said building
The central walls and piers were not removed within the year. They have been allowed to remain, in violation of the agreement, until by the action of the water they have become insecure. This was a result that might have been reasonably expected. It also appears that, in the summer- of 1888, the State of New York repaired and reconstructed the bulk-head gates leading the water into defendant’s canal, and in order to do so cut the water off entirely from defendant’s canal so that it was empty and dry for some four weeks in the summer, during which the plaintiff might have repaired the foundations of its block. No steps, however, were taken in that direction. Does the delay of the plaintiff and its predecessors, from 1871, or the failure of plaintiff to embrace the opportunity furnished in the summer of 1888, affect the right of plaintiff, if ever it had the right, to demand of defendant the removal of the water from the canal for a sufficient length of time to enable the plaintiff to make the proper change in the central supports.
In the agreement nothing is said about the manner in which the work shall be done. There is no agreement by the defendant to turn off the water. It is a matter to be determined upon equitable principles. The plaintiff has not a legal right to have it done. If there was no other way to accomplish the result, it would be
We are not disposed to interfere with this finding. It is quite clear that better work can be done in this way, and that it is better for all parties. Nor should the delay or the failure of plaintiff to do the work when the canal was empty in the summer of 1888 preclude the plaintiff from having the benefit of this assistance on the part of defendant. The delay was to a certain extent acquiesced in by defendant. We, therefore, conclude that, as matter of equitable relief, the plaintiff was entitled to have the water temporarily-removed for the purposes authorized in the agreement of 1871. Does it follow that plaintiff is also entitled to recover the damages awarded for the loss of rents ?
Concededly the plaintiff is bound by the Pulver agreement. If Pulver had performed that agreement, and removed the central wall and piers within the time specified, and substituted iron columns, there would have been no loss of rents for the cause here complained of. Had the plaintiff examined the wall in the summer of 1888, and ascertained its condition, as it perhaps should be presumed to have done, and repaired it while the water was out as the referee finds it might have done, there would have been no loss of rents. The plaintiff now seeks to charge the defendant with this loss because it did not accede to its demand in December following, while, in fact, if it had performed its own duty there would have been no occasion for the demand. If plaintiff’s loss is attributable to its own neglect, it should not recover it of defendant. In its notice, the plaintiff did not refer to the Pulver agreement or offer to perform its obligations, it claimed the right generally to repair the supports of its building, thereby inferentially claiming the right to continue its central walls, and the same claim is made in. the complaint and appears in the judgment. If in its notice it claimed more than it had a right to, the defendant was not bound to accede
Having in view the situation of both parties, the more equitable course is to allow damages to neither party. It follows that the judgment herein should be modified by providing that the plaintiff' is not entitled to maintain the present central wall or piers, but is bound to substitute therefor a row of iron columns, and that, in case another building is erected, it shall be supported in the manner specified in the Pulver agreement.
The judgment should also be modified by striking therefrom the award of damages.
As modified, the judgment should be affirmed, without costs.
Hardin, P. J., and Martin, J., concurred.
Judgment modified as stated in the opinion, and as modified affirmed, without costs to either party; judgment to be settled upon five days’ notice before Merwin, J.