Majority
Headnote
Master .and servant — discharge of servant — the master is not limited to proof of specific acts of insubordination by the servant, but may show any facts justifying his discha/i'ge — the appellate court will not consider the reasons which controlled the trial justice in allowing or disallowing amendments to a proposed case.The order last referred to in the above statement should be reversed and the entire supplement to the case, directed by this order to be printed, should be expunged from the record. With the disallowance of the proposed amendments, the controversy, with regard to their subject-matter, was ended. The appellate court has nothing to do with the reasons which actuate a judge in his allowance or disallowance of amendments to a proposed case, and such reasons cannot be considered upon the merits of an appeal from the judgment. As to the affidavits of the attorneys, they simply incumber the record. We must take the case as settled, and that only, and dispose of the appeal upon the record as thus made up. We now come to the merits of the main appeals.
The case seems to have been tried upon the theory that because the defendants, in dealing with the plaintiff, specified this latter offense as the ground of discharge, they could not afterwards justify their act by showing other misconduct. This is not the rule which governs in actions of this chai’acter. In justifying the discharge the defendants were not confined to the cause originally assigned. They could show that the discharge was justified by any sufficient cause. (Harrington v. First National Bank of Chitte nango, 1 Thompson & Cook, 361, citing Cussons v. Skinner, 11 Mees. & Wels., 161; Ridgway v. Hungerford Market Company, 3 Ad. & Ellis, 171, and Baillie v. Kell, 4 Bing. [N. C.], 661; Green v. Edgar, 21 Hun, 414 ; Wood’s Master and Servant [2d ed.], § 121.) As was said by Patteson, J., in Ridgway v. Hungerford Market Company (supra) : “ If a justifying cause exists, the master may assign it whenever the action is brought.”
The case here turned entirely upon the right to discharge the plaintiff because of his refusal to explain why he had ill treated Acton. The defendants, however, offered to prove the misconduct specified in the “ first ” and “ second ” grounds above enumerated, but their testimony on these points was ruled out and an exception ■duly taken. We think this was error. Without passing, therefore, upon the other questions presented, as to some of which we have .serious doubts, the judgment and order denying a motion for a new
Yak Brunt, P. J., and Patterson, J., concurred.
Judgment and order denying motion for new trial reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellants to abide the event. The order directing certain papers to be added to the case' and printed, reversed, with ten dollars costs and the disbursements of printing the same.