Majority
Headnote
Public administrative officer — apa/rty damaged by the officer’s failure to exercise his discretion is entitled to relief in equity — duty of the Superintendent of Public Worlcs . to remove flush-boards from a dam.This action was commenced in January, 1889, to restrain the defendant, as a public officer and individually, from using, keeping up, permitting or suffering to be used or kept up continuously, flush-boards upon the top of the upper dam across the outlet of Owasco lake, causing the water of the lake to set back overflowing the lands of the plaintiff. Other claims for relief were stated in the complaint. The action was referred.
He found, as conclusions of law, that, at all times after the acts of 1857 and 1868, the Canal Commissioners had authority to raise the height of tiie water above'the dam by the use of flush-boards, upon the crest of the dam or otherwise, of such width as they should prescribe from time to time, and to keep them up continuously if, in the exercise of tlieir discretion, they should think it necessary or advisable to do so, subject to the right of the owners of the lands injured thereby to compensation from the State; that the authority possessed by the Canal Commissioners became vested in the defendant as Superintendent of Public Works, and that in keeping up-said flush-boards continuously the defendant acted officially as the agent of the State ; and that the plaintiff had established no cause of action, legal or equitable, against the defendant, either in his official or individual character; and that his claim for damages, if any, was against the State, and not against the defendant, and dismissed the complaint, with costs.
These facts, thus found by the learned referee, are all sustained by the evidence, with the exception of his finding that the flush-boards were kept upon the crest of the dam continuously by the direction or with the consent of the defendant. If, by that finding, it is meant that the defendant, at any time, took the matter of keeping the flush-boards on the dam, or removing them, into consideration and exercised his discretion upon the question, I do not think the finding sustained by the evidence, for I am unable to find any evidence or facts warranting such finding. There is an entire-absence of any evidence tending to show that the defendant ever-reflected upon, or exercised any discretion in the premises. The evidence'shows that from first to last he ignored the matter and refused to give the slightest attention to it. His attention was called to the-question of the flush-boards by the letter from the plaintiff dated June 5, 1885. He was informed that the plaintiff was suffering-damages by their being kept upon the dam during high water. He failing to pay any attention to the communication, another letter-was addressed to him upon the subject in October of the same year. In answer to the last letter, he writes :
‘ “ October 23, 1885.
“ D. Weight, Esq., Auburn, IT. Y.:
“ Deab Sie.— Both of jour letters, one of June 5th and the other •of October 6th, were received and placed on file.
“ Yours, very truly,
“JAMES SHANAHAN,
“Superintendent of Public Works.”
A resolution was adopted by the Senate of the State in April, 1886, requiring him to report to the Senate whether or not he claimed, and, if so, by what authority, the right or power to cause flush-boards to be placed upon the upper dam of the Owasco outlet in Oayuga county, and to what height, and for what purpose; and whether or not he had directed such flush-boards to be placed on the said dam, and to what height; and whether or not he had appointed or caused to be appointed any person to place or keep or have the management of flush-boards upon said dam, if so, who and the date of such appointment. He replied to the interrogatories as follows: “ I have not appointed or caused to be appointed any person to place or keep or have the management of flush-boards upon the upper dam of the Owasco outlet in Cayuga county, nor have I directed flush-boards to be placed on said dam. Under chapter 262 Laws of 1817, I claim authority to put on flush-boards on said ■dam in case of emergency, but have not exercised the right during my term of office.”
After the receipt of another letter from the plaintiff, calling his attention to the matter again, he wrote plaintiff that he had referred his letter to his assistant superintendent, John Stebbins, of Syracuse, and directed, that all further communications upon the subject be sent to him. After the receipt of three other letters written by the plaintiff upon this subject, he again writes : “ Matter upon which you touched in your letter yesterday is in the hands of Assistant Superintendent Stebbins, and I would prefer that you send your ■communications on this subject to him.” The plaintiff testified that lie called upon Mr. Stebbins upon the subject, and he refused to •consider the question, and, in effect, directed the plaintiff to leave his office.
Five other letters addressed to the defendant by the plaintiff upon
He refused to pay any attention to the plaintiff’s complaints. The law of 1817, to which he referred in his answer to the resolu tions of the Senate, gave to the Canal Commissioners power to take possession of and use any lands or waters in the State necessary for the construction and use of the canal, “ but doing, nevertheless, no unnecessary damage.” If the ease furnished any evidence that he had exercised his discretion and determined that the interests of the canal required that the flush-boards should remain upon the dam continuously, a different question might be presented, although it would be difficult to convince a court that he had in good faith reached any such conclusion It must be apparent to anyone who gives the subject any reflection that the flush-boards in the fall, winter and spring were not necessary for any great length of time to store the water in the lake for use in the dry season of the year. The evidence shows conclusively that they were not needed except in the dry season when the canals were in use. Keeping them on the dam during the winter and rainy seasons caused the plaintiff’s land to be submerged and saturated with water the greater part of the year, and it was thereby rendered unfit for agricultural purposes. The flush-boards were so constructed that their removal and replacement were the work of a short time and inexpensive. There can be no doubt that it was the duty of the defendant, as Superintendent of the Public Works to cause the flush-boards to be removed from the dam when not necessary for storing water. The referee correctly decided that the defendant was not bound by the action of his predecessors as to the manner of using the flush-boards or as to their height. He, as representative of the State, had control of the dam. He had authority to determine what flush-boards should be used and when they should be placed on the dam for the purpose of the canal.
Section 3 of article 5 of the Constitution provides that the Governor shall appoint a Superintendent of Public Works, who shall be
■ In this case one of the sxxpei’intendents of repairs on the canals was sxxed for damages sustained in consequence of his neglect to keep his section in repaii\
While this case has been somewhat criticised and limited by later cases, the general doctrine enxxnciated by Judge Bronson, above quoted, has not been distxxi-bed.
Judge Rapallo says, in McCarthy v. The City of Syracuse
It was the duty of the defendant, as Superintendent of Public Works, to cause the flush-boards upon this dam to be removed when, in his opinion, the interests of the canal did not require their use. It was his duty to exercise liis discretion upon that subject. The property of citizens was being injured by the neglect to remove the boards, lie persistently refused to take the matter into consideration and perform his duty in that regard. It is suggested that the, plaintiff’s remedy was the presentation of his claim for damages from time to time, to the Court of Claims.
Such a course would involve a multiplicity of actions and involve the plaintiff, and also the State, in great expense in trying the cases. A moment’s consideration and action by the defendant would have avoided and saved all such trouble and expense. If he had devoted a portion of the time that he was occupied in answering letters and inquiries propounded to him to the consideration of the question, the whole difficulty would have been remoyed. I think it was within the power'of the court to give the plaintiff relief, and while the principal claims in his complaint against the defendant were properly refused; he was, I think, entitled to -a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to cause the flush-boards to be from time to time raised so as to allow the water to flow óver the dam unobstructed during such times as, in his judgment, they were not needed thereon for the purpose of storing water for the use of the canals. Instead of the plaintiff obtaining this relief his complaint was dismissed and a judgment entered against him for $457.75 costs.
Justice demands that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Dwight, P. J., and Macombek, J., concurred.
■ Judgment appealed from reversed and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.