Majority
Headnote
Railroads — when excused from fencing at depots and, ym'ds —what evidence presents a question of law for the court — Laws of 1854, chap. 383, sec. 8.This action was brought under section 8 of chapter 282 of the Laws of 1854, which makes it the duty of every railroad company to erect and maintain fences on the sides of its roads, of the height and strength of a division fence; and further provides, that so long as the fences shall not be so erected and kept in good repair, the railroad corporation and its agents are made liable for damages, which may be done by the engines, or agents of the corporation, to any cattle, horses, sheep or hogs, upon the railroad. But the statute also provides that no corporation shall be required to fence the sides of its roads, except when such fence is necessary to prevent such animals from getting on the tracks, from the lands adjoining the same.
This action was brought in the year 1883, for the value of a colt found dead in a bridge crossing a creek, which was spanned by the defendant’s railroad, about five hundred feet east of the railway station of the defendant at Great Yalley, in Cattaraugus County. The allegation of the complaint was, that the colt had passed over and upon- the railroad track of the defendant for want of a cattle-guard at a roadway crossing, just east of the railway station, and through the omission of the defendant to erect a proper fence along its tracks on the south side thereof, easterly of such roadway.
The point is made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the only charge against the defendant in the complaint, was the omission to erect cattle-guards upon this highway. On inspection of that pleading, however, it will be seen that while the language of it is somewhat ambiguous, yet it is susceptible of the construction which the learned justice at the trial placed upon it. There is, therefore, in our judgment, no sufficient ground stated for the reversal of the judgment and order for want of a sufficient pleading, although the colt, it is shown, passed upon the railway track, not upon the highway, but easterly thereof, as hereinafter stated.
The defendant’s railway at Great Yalley station runs nearly parallel to the north bank of the. Alleghany river, at a distance therefrom varying from one hundred and eighty feet,.at-the bridge
The loading platform is about ninety or a hundred feet in length. The learned justice at the trial properly construed these statutes as not requiring the erection, by the defendant, of fences where the same were not necessary for the purpose of turning horses, cattle, sheep and hogs from the railway lands. But the question of the necessity of the erection of such a fence at the place where these horses were shown to have passed upon the railway lands was ubmitted to the jury.
From the necessity of business, many places adjacent to railways, such as railroad stations, shipping yards and the like, were evidently not contemplated by the legislature in the statute above mentioned, as was decided in the case of Dolan v. N. D. and C. R. R. Co. ( 120 N. Y., 571 ).
"Where the facts are undisputed, the question of erecting a fence at such points is one of law, and we think it was incumbent upon the .Circuit Court, in this instance, to decide it as a question of law, and not to have submitted it to the judgment of the jury as a question of fact. At the place where the horses passed upon the railway lands, which was within a space of five or ten feet from the east end of the loading platform, it is shown that the business of the corporation required that there should be this open space unfenced, for the purpose of serving the public conveniently in permitting the free access of shippers in approaching and departing from the loading platform with their teams. Between this platform and the railway bridge where this horse was found dead, a distance of about four hundred feet, the space, it was shown by entirely credible evidence, bad been, before and after this accident, used by the company for the storage of saw-logs. Between this storage place and the pasture on the south side of the Alleghany river, from which the horses escaped, was what would apparently be considered an
There is evidence from which we may derive the conclusion that immediately opposite the place where these horses passed upon the railway company’s lands the river was not fordable, for it is shown that the horses wandered to the west to a ford for about half a mile to a point where they escaped from the pasture The jury, therefore, as it seems to us, had no lot or part in the decision of this question, for it was not for them to speculate as to whether, if a fence had been erected to the east of the loading platform, the horses might not have gone upon the defendant’s land.
It is very doubtful whether or not, under this evidence, the colt was, in fact, struck by a locomotive. It is clear that, under this statute, if he was merely frightened by the approach of the engine, and plunged upon the bridge and there met his death without being struck by the locomotive, no recovery could be had in this action. The learned justice, in denying the motion for a new trial, admits that the animal, when found in the morning, showed no marks of a severe concussion with the locomotive, though there is a suggestion, not proof, in some of the testimony that his neck was broken. The position of the colt, which was lengthwise of the bridge, would go far to show that he had not been thrown there by the pilot of the locomotive, but that he was so caught within the timbers from a voluntary plunge. Although this is one view of the evidence, as it is spread upon the record before us, we should hardly, however, feel inclined to reverse the judgment upon this ground alone, for there was some evidence from which a deduction, not unreasonable, might be made, that, inasmuch as none of his tracks were found for a space of- about eight or ten feet west of the bridge, the colt was carried that distance by the locomotive. But for the reason that, under the evidence, there was no duty laid upon the defendant to fence the railway at the point upon which the horses passed upon its land, we think the judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted.
Dwight, P. J., and Lewis, J., concurred.
Judgment and order appealed from reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.