Majority
Headnote
Legacies — deferred in payment until final distribution, but cha/rged on the estate generally— a new security, taken by executors and set apart to pay the legacies, does not exonerate the residue of the estate.On the 5th of June, 1867, Asel Wilcox, of Manlius, in Onondaga county, died, leaving a will and codidil which were duly proved on June 27, 1867. He left two sons, Franklin and Asel F., and three daughters. By the ninth clause of the will he gave to his grandson Asel, the son of his son Franklin, $1,000, to be paid to him upon his arrival at the age of twenty-one years, with interest from one year after his death, and he also provided that “ if he, said Franklin, shall have any other son or sons, or my son, Asel F., shall have any son or sons, lawful heirs, before a final distribution of my.property, I give and bequeath unto each such grandson the sum of one thousand dollars, to be paid him, without interest, on arriving at the age of twenty-one years.” By the tenth clause, he gave and devised all the rest and residue of his estate, real and personal, to his five children, to be divided equally between them, the daughters to have only a life estate, with remainder over to the children of each. By a prior provision he directed that his debts and the specific legacies thereinafter named should be first paid out of his personal and real estate. The executors were authorized to sell and convey any part or all of his real estate, and invest the avails on good landed security by bond and mortgage, but they should not be compelled to sell any of the real estate under five years, nor his Sodus Bay estate under ten years from his death.
The appellants upon this appeal are the five sons of Asel F. Wilcox, and the questions here relate to the remedy they have for the collection of their legacies. One was of age when this action was commenced, one has since become of age, and the others are still minors. •
On the 23d of July, 1877, a second accounting was commenced before the surrogate concerning the acts and transactions of said executor from August 8, 1873. A decree was entered on October 8,1877, stating and allowing the account to the time of such accounting. At this time there was in the hands of said executor, in cash
At the time of the second accounting there was found to be and: was in the hands, of Asel F. Wilcox, the managing executor, the-sum of $7,347.55, which was uninvested and unsecured, and was a part of the principal of the estate. On the 16th of December, 1878,. Asel F., for the purpose of securing the payment of this sum and interest, executed to all the executors, being said Asel and the-' plaintiffs, his bond, conditioned for the payment of $1,000 of the-principal to each of the grandsons entitled to a legacy of that amount or their representatives, when such legacy should be payable, the-, balance to the other parties in interest. As collateral security for three-fifths of the amount a chattel mortgage was given, and for two-fifths a real estate mortgage, which was also to be collateral to the-chattel mortgage. It is found by the Special Term that the executors ■ in taking this bond and the mortgages, “intended to and did thereby sequestrate and set apart from the principal of said estate the said, sum of $7,347.55 as a fund for the payment of the legacies ”■ to the grandsons. Asel F. was then solvent and the property covered by the mortgages was then of value sufficient to furnish ample security for the payment of the legacies. At this time there were six grandsons, or their representatives, that would in the future be entitled, to legacies. Of these grandsons one was the son of Franklin Wilcox and five were the sons of Asel F. Wilcox. Thereafter and on December 6, 1879, another son, the appellant, Willard T. Wilcox, was born to said Asel F.
Since 1879 Asel F. has been insolvent and the executors are-unable to collect, upon said bond and mortgages, sufficient to pay the legacies in full. None of the legacies to the sons of Asel have been paid, except that the defendant A. Foster Wilcox has received a part of his share.
It seems to be conceded that the power to sell real estate was, by implication, a direction to sell. If so, there was an equitable conversion of the real estate into personalty, and this is to be borne in mind in construing the will.
I do not understand that the appellants make any claim upon the securities already set apart by.the plaintiffs to the shares of the daughters above referred to. The court below, in the seventh finding of law, found, as matter of law, that they were to be treated as payments to such shares, and to belong absolutely to the daughters and the remaindermen. This finding is not excepted to. The claim, therefore, of the appellants refers to this unappropriated personal property and the undisposed of real estate. • These items are understood to be amply sufficient to .provide for the deficiency of the legacies, but not enough for that deficiency, and also to make up the daughters’ shares equal to what the sons have received.
■ It was decided by the Special Term that the grandsons in the collection of their legacies were limited to the security furnished by the bond and mortgages of December 16, 1878, and that if enough could not be realized from them to pay the legacies in full, the deficiency could not be made good out of the general estate. Whether this conclusion of the Special Term is correct is the main question here.
By the will there was no provision for setting apart a fund for the payment of these legacies. They were made a charge generally upon the estate. Iirthe first decree there was a provision that these
So that, for aught I see, the question whether the investment of December, 1878, is to have the effect that has been given to it depends upon whether the act of the executors in setting apart this fund is sufficient of itself to exonerate the balance of the estate from the charge which, coneededly, was upon it up to that time.
It is not found, nor does the evidence show, that the security taken was one in which, under the law, the executors would have had the right to invest a trust fund. That being so, the rule laid down in Leitch v. Wells ( 18 N. Y., 585 ) would be somewhat apjDlicable. It is there said that, in case a fixed sum is bequeathed to executors in trust to pay the income to one party, and at his death divide the principal among others, the executors cannot, without the consent of the beneficiary, or, in case they are infants, without an order of court, set apart and appropriate bank stocks to the satisfaction of the trust, and release the residue of the estate from its liability to perform the trust.
In 2 Williams on Executors (6 Am. ed., 1511), it is said: “ When a fund has been appropriated for the payment of an annuity given by will, a question may arise whether the legatee is to suffer the loss consequent on the partial failure of the fund. In cases where the annuity is a charge upon the whole personal estate, it seems clear that the executor cannot affect the legatee’s right to the entire annuity by any appropriation,” and many cases are referred to. If an estate shrinks, whether by devastavit of the executor or other
We are of the opinion that the executors had no right to limit the lien of the legacies, and that their act in setting apart the bonds and mortgages did not exonerate the balance of the estate, and cannot be deemed the equivalent of a payment of the legacies. It follows that the appellants are right in their position that they can reach the general fund in the hands of the executors in preference to the •claims of the residuary legatees to apply the same to equalize the residuary payments.
It was apparently claimed by the jilaintiffs at the trial that the appellant Willard T. Wilcox was not entitled to a legacy upon the ground that upon the second accounting there was a final distribution of the property, and he was not born until December 6, 1879. The Special Term held to' the contrary, and no ajjpeal is before us from that part of the judgment. It is not necessary, therefore, to consider the question.
It follows that the judgment should be modified so as to allow the appellants payment in full of their legacies from any of the testator’s estate remaining in the executors’ hands, and not covered by the seventh finding of law. The appellants should also have costs of the action and of the appeal payable iron the estate.
Hardin, P. J., and Martin, J., concurred.
Judgment modified as stated in the opinion and as modified affirmed, with costs to the appellants of the appeal and of the action, payable out of the estate. Judgment to be settled before Merwin, J.