Majority
Headnote
Rapid Transit Act, chapter 4 of 1891 — as applied to New York city — discretion of the commissioners appointed by the court — effect of a deviation from a general plan to which an owner has consented — possibility of failure to complete the road— consequential damages to abutting owners — compensation for soil taken out by a tunnel — feasibility of the preyed — effect of an abandonment of one of the routes adopted by the rapid transit commissioners.This court having heretofore appointed, pursuant to the provisions of section 5 of chapter 4 of the Laws of 1891, three commissioners to determine whether the routes, presented by the rapid transit commissioners appointed pursuant to said act, ought to be constructed and operated, and said commissioners having, after a public hearing of all parties interested, made a report that certain portions of such routes ought, to be constructed and operated, this motion is now made to confirm said report.
Various parties, owners of property which it is claimed would be affected adversely by the construction of the road proposed, appeared and objected to the confirmation of said report upon various grounds. Many of these objections were considered and passed upon at the time of the original application for the appointment of commissioners by the property owners who then appeared, being, with but a single exception, different from those who appeared and objected upon this application.
It will not be necessary in the disposition of this motion to reconsider the objections now raised that were then disposed of, viz., that the plan and scheme adopted by the rapid transit commissioners were so indefinite that the property owners could not act intelligently in the giving or refusing of their consent.
Yarious other objections are now raised for the first time, although the condition of the problem remains the same as it did upon the original application.
It seems to be claimed upon the part of some of the objectors that the commissioners appointed by this court were only empowered to act upon evidence which might be produced before them in favor of, and in opposition to, the proposed scheme. We think that this is altogether too restricted a view of the powers of these commissioners, and that they had a right, independently, to examine the question for themselves, to see the situation, and to be guided In the conclusions at which they arrived, as well by their own judgment as by evidence which might be produced. before them. And this is especially the case, in view of the fact that all the evidence which could possibly be produced must necessarily be in the nature of opinions, and not the asseverations of facts within the knowledge of the witnesses. It is a well recognized fact that in
A point has been urged which was not suggested upon the previous hearing, that the act is unconstitutional because it is calculated to deprive property owners of their property without due process of law, and because the powers given by section 6 of the “Rajfid Transit Act,” to make detailed plans and specifications, and the-powers given by section 14 of the act, to alter or add to such detailed plans and specifications, are such as not only to deprive the property owner of the protection and assurance to which he was entitled under the consent originally given by himself- or by the court, but, also, to impose upon him or his property the burden of a road of a character never contemplated by, and wholly unknown to him, for which his consent had never been asked and to which his consent would never have been given.
A brief examination of the act will show that this objection cannot prevail. It is to be observed that, prior to the asking for the consent of the property owner or .of the court, a general plan of construction is all that is jrrovided for by section 4, and that after a. general plan of construction has been approved, and the route or routes determined, the commissioners were to proceed with their detailed plan of construction prior to advertising for the doing of the work. And section 14, to which attention is called, only provides for the alteration of this detailed plan, which is not to be in existence at the time the consent of the property owner or of the court is asked for; and it specifically provides that whatever alterations or deviations may be made, they shall not be inconsistent with the general plan of construction adopted under the provisions of section 4. These deviations from the detailed plan, authorized to-be made, in no way affect the general plan to which the property owner gave his consent. The details in respect to which changes are authorized came into existence subsequent to the giving of the consent, and the statute, as already observed, is careful to preserve the integrity of the general plan which was consented to.
It is true that the act provides that, in case of failure, these ■securities or money shall be paid into the treasury of the city. But it would form a fund out of which- the evils anticipated might easily be obviated.
The claim that there is nothing in the act to secure abutting ■owners against consequential damages in no way affects the validity ■of the legislation, as the law gives the property owners ample remedies for any injuries which they may suffer.
The objection that no provision is made for compensation for the soil which is taken out of the street, it seems to us, cannot prevail. If it was the case that the abutting owner had a right of property in the soil composing the street,' then no sewer could be built, no water pipe laid, no grade changed, and no pavement laid without compensating him for the soil which might be removed in the making of these improvements. Whatever portion of the streets -occupied by the soil is needed for its improvement for public use,
The questions, then, resolve themselves down to the general proposition as to the feasibility of the enterprise; and it is urged against its feasibility that it will work irreparable injury to the buildings upon either side of the street in consequence of its method of construction. It is undoubtedly true that if any other means of effecting rapid transit were possible, or as possible as by means of a tunnel, it would be preferable. But the question before this court at the present time is not whether there may not be some other method of rapid transit which would be preferable, but whether the rapid transit commissioners having determined upon this plan as, in their judgment, the best, it should be carried out. And that is the only question now before the court.
We are of opinion, upon an examination of the facts, that the success of the enterprise is not a question of engineering, but a matter of finance; that the engineering problems can be overcome without any difficulty, providing the money is behind the engineer; and that, under the plan of construction adopted by the rapid transit commissioners, most, if not all, of the objections which have been raised to the fact of the railroad being constructed in a tunnel will be obviated. In the first place, there will be no combustion in the tunnel in the production of the motive power, which is a main cause of the vitiation of the atmosphere in the tunnel. In the next place, the cars will not be lighted either by gas or oil; and hence this source of pollution will be avoided. And, furthermore, in consequence of the rapid movement of the trains, it will be impossible for the air in the tunnel to stagnate, which is another prolific source of pollution; and there seems to be no difficulty whatever in successfully coping with the problem of ventilation.
But it is urged that people will not go down-stairs to take a train in a tunnel. But they will go up-stairs to the elevated railroad, and down-stairs therefrom to as great an extent as they will be required to go if the present scheme is carried out; and the approaches to' the stations will be eminently more satisfactory in that they will be-more commodious, entirely removed from the weather, and more easily kept clean and attractive.
The board of rapid transit commissioners, upon the confirmation
Another objection is, however, urged, that by the legislature taking off a portion of the routes which had been adopted by the original rapid transit commission, the whole proceeding failed and was required to be reinstituted.
It seems to us to be perfectly clear, from the act under which these proceedings are taken, that if a variety of routes were adopted by the rapid transit commissioners, it was possible for the commissioners appointed by the court, or for the court, to reject some routes and adopt others. As long as one complete route was adopted the provisions of the act were complied with. It certainly was not within the scope of the legislative intention to make the whole scheme (where it is susceptible of being divided into integral parts) depend upon the rejection of each particular portion which might be entirely independent of the rest. In support of this view we have the authority of The Matter of the New York Elevated Railroad Company ( 70 N. Y., 327 ), in which it was held that under the old Rapid Transit Act, where different routes had been selected by the rapid transit commissioners, the commissioners appointed by the Supreme Court to determine whether the road should be built or not, might report in favor of one route and not in favor of another; and that all that was required, if there was any favorable report, was that it should be in favor of a complete road upon some route ; and that where connections were proposed with other means of transit, they might determine that some connections should be made and others should not. Applying this rule
We are, therefore, of opinion that the report should be confirmed and this work allowed to proceed.
Present — Van Brunt, P. J., O’Brien and Patterson, JJ.
Report confirmed and the work allowed to proceed.