Majority
Headnote
Life insurance — age of the insured — weight of evidence.In the application of Catharine Mahaney for membership in the defendant, it was stated that she was born on the 10th day of November, 1834, in the county of Waterford, Ireland, and that her age at next birthday, being November 10,1885, was fifty-one years. The court charged the jury that if the age of the applicant was more than as stated, the plaintiff could not recover. The jury, therefore, in finding for plaintiff,.in effect found that the age was correctly stated. The main point presented by the appellant upon this appeal is that such finding is against the weight of evidence.
The defendant also puts in evidence another application made by Mrs. Mahaney for a pension on 26th of September, 1889. This was filed in the pension office October 3, 1889, and was signed at •Oswego in the presence of two witnesses and certified to by the county clerk of Oswego county. The deputy clerk who certified to the paper and one of the subscribing witnesses were called as witnesses at the trial and both testified that the paper was at the time read over to Mrs. Mahaney. The evidence of these witnesses was not discredited.' In this application it was recited that Mrs. Mahaney was sixty-six years old, and it stated, among other things, that Cain O. Mahaney, her husband, enlisted at Oswego on the 29th of August, 1862, and that she under the name of Catharine Dudley was married to him “ on the — day of July, 1844, by Rev. Robinson at London, England.”
The defendant also puts in evidence a transcript from the register of marriages of the parish of St. Nicholas, Deptford, of the county
To rebut this evidence, the plaintiff introduced a large number of witnesses, who had been acquainted with Mrs. Mahaney to more or less extent, and who, in most instances, placed her age at the time of her death at about fifty-six years. One of these witnesses, Mr. Cunningham, whose evidence is particularly relied on by the plaintiff, testified that he had seen Mrs. Mahaney and Cain 0. Mahaney in Bristol, England, before 1850, and that they were not married then, that he knew of. lie does not profess to give the age of either at that time, except that he says he thinks that Mrs. Mahaney was older than he was. Of himself, he says that he was born at Bristol in 1835 or 1831, and made Bristol his home until about 1850, and
There appears to be no reason why Mrs. Mahaney, at the time of making the pension applications in 1878 and in 1889, should state her age greater than she thought it was in fact, or place the date of her marriage earlier than it was according to her then understanding. She evidently had no records to guide her. There is in the case no record evidence of her birth. She was a woman of some education, as she wrote her name to the application of 1878. Both of those applications are utterly inconsistent with her age being only fifty-one in November, 1885, and the fact- that those applications, although eleven years apart, and taken under different circumstances, are substantially harmonious in the matter of age, adds materially to the weight that should be given to them in the case.
The four English records are in the same direction,, and, assuming the identity to be established, are entitled to great weight. Ordinarily identity of name is prima faeie evidence of identity of person (J ackson v. Boneham, 15 Johns. 226 ; Jaohson v. King, 5 Cow. 237 ), and a middle letter will be deemed no part of the name. (Milk v. Christie, 1 Hill, 102 ; Van Voorhis v. Budd, 39 Barb. 479 ; Arnold v. Nat., etc., Bank, 3 T. & C. 769.) Each case, however, will depend largely upon its own circumstances. In regard to the parties to the marriage record, there may be some doubt as to the identity, not only by reason of the evidence of Cunningham, but by reason of different dates being given of the marriage in the pension applications, one stating it as about in 1842 and the other as in
There is another consideration that has some bearing. There is evidence that the daughter Ellen was married at Oswego in 1862 and that she was then seventeen or eighteen years old. These facts are not disputed, and the plaintiff was apparently in a position to be able to ascertain whether they were true or not. If Ellen was then eighteen, that would place her birth in 1844, as stated in the birth record. It also appears that in a written application by plaintiff for membership in the Elour City Life Association, dated July 29, 1889, and signed by the plaintiff, the age of her mother is stated to be sixty-five. The person who took this application undertakes to say that the age of the mother was not filled in by plaintiff or from her statements, but his evidence on the subject is not very satisfactory. The plaintiff herself does not speak on the subject. She is not sworn as to the age of her mother, nor are either of her two sisters, though they appear to be accessible. No reason appears why they are not called to speak on the subject. The witnesses upon either side who express their opinion as to the age of the deceased do not appear to be her relatives.
In view of the evidence furnished by the pension applications, by the birth records, and as to the marriage and age then of the daughter Ellen and the declaration of the plaintiff, and in view of the necessarily uncertain and inconclusive character of the opinion evidence on the subject of age, we are strongly impressed with the idea that upon the case as it stands before us the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
It is suggested by the respondent that the statements of the assured were not competent evidence against the plaintiff, and that, therefore, they should not be considered on this appeal. On the contrary, we must assume that they were competent, and. if the respondent took any exception to their admission it is not now before us. (Bridgford v. Crooker, 3 T. & C. 273.) As to such evidence see Steinhausen v. M. A. Assn. ( 59 Hun, 336 ).
Although as a rule we do not disturb a verdict founded upon conflicting evidence ( 50 N. Y. St. Repr. 519 , Clemans v. The Supreme Assembly Royal Society of Good Fellows), still in a case where so much doubt exists as to the correctness of the finding as is clearly shown by the foregoing opinion, I am disposed to favor another trial when the parties may if possible present more satisfactory evidence upon the vital questions. I, therefore, vote for a new trial.
Judgment and order reversed and a new trial ordered upon the payment by the appellant of the costs of the trial, and without costs of this appeal to either party. In case such costs are not paid within twenty days, then judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- Jackson ex dem. Miner v. Boneham 15 Johns. 226 p. 16
- Jackson ex dem. Bogert v. King 5 Cow. 237 p. 16
- Van Voorhis v. Budd 39 Barb. 479 p. 16