Hyde v. Kitchen

Tbe learned judge at Special Term found as a fact that in February, 1881, Maria Yan YIeck deposited §110 in the Manhattan Savings Institution, in trust for tbe plaintiff’s intestate, John H. Hyde, who was her brother. This finding was based upon tbe undisputed testimony that at tbe time of tbe deposit, a bank book was issued and delivered 'to Mrs. Yan YIeck, at her request, with tbe words “ Maria Yan YIeck, in trust for John H. Hyde,” written upon tbe cover, and tbe words, “ Maria Yan YIeck, for John H. Hyde,” written within tbe cover. It also appeared that tbe ledger account, which was then opened and kept by the bank, was in the name of “ Maria Yan YIeck, for John H. Hyde.” Other sums were deposited by Mrs. Yan YIeck, and interest was credited to this account, from time to time, down to January, 1892. And during all that time tbe account continued in its original form. Mrs. Yan YIeck, however, retained tbe bank book in her possession down to tbe time of her death, and tbe defendants, her executors, have bad it since.

Upon this state of facts, tbe learned judge found, as a conclusion of law, that there was an irrevocable trust in favor of John H. Hyde, and that tbe plaintiff, as bis administrator, was entitled to tbe moneys in question.

The appellants concede that if the well-known case of Martin v. Funk ( 75 N. Y. 134 ) stood alone, they would not dispute the doctrine upon which this conclusion was arrived at. But they claim that later cases modify this doctrine, and hold that an intent, contrary to that evinced by the surroundings of the original transaction, may be established by later acts and declarations of the depositor, not in any way connected with the deposit.

Mabie v. Bailey ( 95 N. Y. 206 ) and Beaver v. Beaver (117 id. 421; second appeal, 50 N. Y. St. Repr. 69 ) are cited as examples of the latter view. We have examined these cases carefully, but we ■find nothing in them to support the appellant’s contention. In Medie v. Bailey, Judge Andrews said: “ The case of Martin v. Funk ( 75 N. Y. 134 ) decided that a deposit made in the form of the deposit in this case constituted a trust and, unexplained, operated to transfer the beneficial interest in the deposit to the beneficiary named, subject to the conditions of the trust, to be implied from the. circumstances.”

It is true that the learned judge suggested that the character- of such a transaction was not conclusively established by the mere fact of the deposit “ so as to preclude evidence of contemporaneous faets and circumstances constituting res gestae to show that the. real motive of the depositor was not to create a trust.” He nowhere intimated, however, that subsequent acts and declarations, not constituting res gestae, could be resorted to, to show the depositor’s original intent. On the contrary, he held that the subsequent withdrawal of the deposits by the depositor was not legitimate evidence that he did not intend, when the deposits were made, t'o create a beneficial trust for the beneficiary named. “ It might,” he added, “ be competent eviden.ee of a change of purpose, but it throws no light on the original transaction.”

In Beaver v. Beaver there wras no declaration of trust, and the case turned upon the validity of an alleged gift. No doubt is there expressed as to the correctness of the rule laid down in Martin v. Funk. On the contrary, that case was referred to with entire acquiescence in its trust doctrine. It was said that a declaration of trust could not be implied from a mere deposit by one person in the

In the present case there was no attempt to vary the effect of the original transaction by contemporaneous facts or circumstances. The original transaction certainly constituted, under the rule so laid down in Martin v. Funk and Mabie v. Bailey, an unequivocal declaration of trust. Such was the inference prima facie, at least from the deposit in the form proved and found. (Cases already cited; and see also Smith v. Lee, 2 T. & C. 591; Weaver v. Emigrant & Savings Bank, 17 Abb. N. C. 82 ; Barker v. Harbeck, 2 N. Y. Supp. 425 .)

In the absence of any evidence of contemporaneous facts or circumstances indicating a contrary intent, that inference must hold. What the depositor may have subsequently said and done — words and acts not constituting res gestee— cannot affect the original transaction. They may show a change of purpose, but not of original intent.

The evidence which was here admitted comes within this principle, and that which was rejected was inadmissible upon the same principle.

It follows that the judgment shoxdd be affirmed, with costs.

Yan Brunt, P. J., and Follett, J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.