Majority
Headnote
Foreclosure of a mechanic's lien — application of payments — omission to allege in the answer that an adequate remedy existed at law — waiver of a right of trial by jury,On the 21st of August, 1889, the defendant William O. Fiske, being the owner of a lot on Madison street in the city of Syracuse, made a contract with the plaintiff, by which the plaintiff agreed to perform certain kinds of work and furnish the materials therefor, in the erection of a building or block on said lot. The consideration was $6,200.16, and payments were to be made eighty-five cents on the dollar on estimates of the architect as the work progressed. James A. O’Hara owned a lot adjoining Fiske’s on .the same street, and he at the same date made a similar contract with plaintiff, the consideration being $5,498.84, and payable in the same way. These buildings, forming together a single block, were constructed pursuant to a common or single plan, the respective portions being sub
The appellants claim that this action cannot be maintained in equity to determine whether or not this money was or should be applied on Fiske’s debt, on the grounds that the appellants would thereby be deprived of the right of trial by jury, and the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.
The appellants, in their answer, do not allege that there is an adequate remedy at law, and they are not, therefore, in a position to raise the question. (Town of Mentz v. Cook, 108 N. Y. 508 .) Besides, they claim in their prayer for relief that this very question as to applicability of the payments be adjudicated upon. No question as to their right of trial by jury was raised until after the trial was entered upon and a witness for plaintiff sworn and examined.
The appellants further claim that the finding of the referee, that O’Hara intended to have his payments to the extent of $1,500 apply on Fiske’s contract, and that they were so made by O’Hara and received by plaintiff, is not sustained by the evidence.
The payments, aggregating $3,000, were five in number. There is evidence tending to show that each payment followed and was based upon an estimate of the architect made upon the work under the two contracts as a whole, and that each payment was the amount that the plaintiff was entitled to at that time on the whole work. Statements are shown to have been made by O’Hara that he intended to foot the bills himself; that he was paying the bills on the block until such time as Fiske could make a loan. Fiske appears to have made no payments before O’Hara’s death. The work upon the two parts went on together; there was but one architect, and he was employed by O’Hara. There was but one plan, and the separation of the contracts was treated as matter of form. Fiske was the nephew of O’Hara, and there is evidence that O’Hara said he was going to assist his nephew in building the block. It is not likely that O’Hara intended to pay more than was due on his own contract, and yet this apparently is what he did if the appellant’s theory is correct. The plaintiff, in receiving an amount equal to what was due on both contracts as a whole, upon an estimate on the whole, had a right to believe that he was only receiving what was due him, and that he had a right to apply, as he testifies he did apply, one-lialf on each contract. Presumptively upon the evidence the work under each contract was substantially equal.
The evidence, I think, authorizes the conclusion that O’Hara intended to have his payments apply on Fiske’s contract equally with his own, and that in effect they were so made by O’Hara and received by plaintiff. It would follow that the conclusion of the referee should not be disturbed.
Hardin, P. J., and Parker, J., concurred.
Judgment, affirmed, witn costs.
Cases cited
- Kenney v. Apgar 93 N. Y. 539 p. 430