p. 37or underlet without the written consent of the landlord, and will not use the premises for any purpose deemed extra hazardous or a nuisance, and that if default be made in any of said covenants, the landlord may re-enter and re-possess the premises. There are also covenants that in case the premises be destroyed by fire the landlord shall have the right to cancel the lease and apportion the rent, unless she elect to repair, in which case the repairs shall be made with reasonable dispatch, and during the period of repairs no rent shall accrue; also, that in case of an assessment for public improvement six per cent interest on the amount of such assessment shall be added to the rent.”
The plaintiff signed the proposed lease and procured Samuel Lichenstein and Lewis Samuels to execute and acknowledge the guaranty indorsed thereon. Thereupon the plaintiff personally mailed one of the duplicates so executed to the defendant’s wife at London for execution by her. A few days after the duplicate had been mailed the defendant told the plaintiff that he should write and advise his wife not to execute it because the plaintiff refused to lease the basement to Mr. Streuver for ten years at not less than $3,000 per year. The defendant’s wife refused to execute the lease, and December 20, 1890, this action was brought, and May 1, 1891, the plaintiff vacated the premises which had been leased to another person.
Albert Stichney, for the plaintiff.
George L. Hives, for the defendant.
This action is for the recovery of damages for the alleged breach of a contract to procure a contract to be made. It should be borne in mind that the defendant did not own the property of which the plaintiff desired a lease, but it was owned by his wife, which fact was known to the plaintiff, as appears by the third subdivision of his complaint and from his testimony. lie testified that defendant told him that his wife owned the property and that he (the plaintiff) told the defendant that he desired that the proposed lease should be executed by defendant’s wife because he did not produce a power of attorney authorizing him to execute a lease for her. It
p. 38is plain that the negotiations between the litigants were carried on with knowledge that defendant’s wife owned the property, and with the understanding that she should become the lessor, and that the defendant was acting as her adviser, or at most, as her agent. A person acting as agent is not liable for the failure of his principal to perform a contract entered into by the agent in behalf of the principal unless he acts for an undisclosed principal, or without authority, which is unknown to the other party, or unless he binds himself personally by the contract. The defendant was not acting for an undisclosed principal; he did not bind himself personally, and it was not shown that whatever he did was without authority, and it is difficult to see upon what principle he can be held liable in this action. It seems unnecessary to consider the question discussed on the argument and on the briefs, whether, under the Statute of Frauds, a valid lease, or a valid contract to give one, founded on a good consideration, arose out of the negotiations, oral and written, between the litigants, for the defendant did not assume to contract for himself, but for his wife. It seems that the defendant’s advice to his wife not to execute the lease, was based on the plaintiff’s unwillingness to make a satisfactory sublease of the basement. The letter stating the terms of the proposed lease contains the following:
“ You to make any terms you like about the upper portion of the building, but you must let me know what the rent of the basement is to be, and have it agreed on ; from what I hear I would not make his lease less than $3,000 a year.” The proposed lease provides ; “ That the tenant will not assign the lease or underlet without the written consent of the landlord.” The defendant expressed dissatisfaction with the sublease of the basement which the plaintiff proposed to give to Mr. Streuver.
The jdaiutiff’s motion for a new trial should be denied, and a judgment ordered for the defendant, with costs.
O’Brien and Parker, JJ., concurred.
Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial denied, and a judgment ordered for the defendant, with costs.