Majority
Headnote
Organization of a corporation — liability of eaehpan'tner for the misrepresentation and concealment of his copartners.The individual defendants, under their firm name, organized the Anglo-American Mortgage and Trust Company, and each partner is liable for the misrepresentations and concealments of the others, committed while engaged in promoting the enterprise. (Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1 ; Getty v. Devlin, Id. 403; Locke v. Stearns, 1 Met. 560 ; Rapp v. Latham, 2 B. & A. 795; 1 Lind. Part. [3d Eng. ed.] 54, 310, 329; Story Part. §§ 108, 131; Big. Law Fraud, 240, § 6.) Burnham is equally liable with his partners for their misrepresentations and concealments.
The individual defendants, under tlieir firm name, organized the corporation, fixed the amount of the capital stock and determined the time when and the terms upon which the corporation should be formed. They appointed agents to receive subscriptions for shares, fixed tlieir price and the compensation to be paid the agents. All this was done before the corporation was created; and more, they as a,
The liability of promoters is not limited to subscribers whom they personally induce to take shares, but it extends to all those who are induced by their agents to subscribe for shares, and if they make material misrepresentations to, or conceal material facts from, their agents, who, relying on the statements, induce persons to become subscribers, the promoters are liable for the damages. It is a familiar principle that what one does by his agent, he does by himself. The scheme which was organized by the defendants and carried out in part through their agents was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages, and no intervening and responsible principal standing between the plaintiff and defendants, the latter are liable to the former to the same extent as if they had personally, by false representations and concealments, induced him to become a subscriber. (Getty v. Devlin, supra.)
A purchaser of shares in an existing corporation from a stockholder has no interest in the application of the money which he pays for the shares, but it is quite different Avith one Avho agrees to subscribe for shares in a corporation to be created. The difference is well stated by Chief Justice Coleridge in Twycross v. Grant (2 C. P. Div. 483). He said : “ The value of a share in a company, however, depends not only on those circumstances which regulate the value of all salable commodities, but also on the persons by Avhom and the mode in which the capital of the company is to be dealt with. It is utterly immaterial to an ordinary purchaser to know
This brings us to the question whether the defendant did make material false statements to, and conceal material facts from, their agents, with the intent of inducing, and which actually did induce, such agents to recommend and advise the plaintiff to subscribe for shares.
The court found that Burnham, Tulleys & Co. wrote the letters and issued the circular which are set out in the statements of facts. In the letter of March 20, 1888, they wrote : “We repeat that we expect to be liberal takers of this stock, and would not dispose of any of it outside if we did not think the last-named object (a larger line of customers) would be attained.” The whole tenor of these letters is to the effect that Burnham, Tulleys & Co. were to take a large proportion of the shares to be issued, and that the corporation was to be managed by the members of the firm in the same manner that their business had been previously managed. There is no hint in the letters or circular that any of the shares were to be issued except for cash, or that any were to be issued to members of the firm for good will.
The court found: “ 10. The statement in said circular that the proposed capital is $500,000, ‘ a large part of which has been taken by ourselves,’ was untrue, and designed to mislead and deceive A. Walker & Co.
“ 12. On and after the organization of the corporation defendant Albert C. Burnham held no office of any sort in said corporation.
“ 15.. Burnham, Tulleys & Co. never disclosed to A. Walker & Co. the fact of the execution of the agreement of February 24, 1888, respecting good will stock, nor the fact that $100,000 of good will stock was to bo issued to the members of the firm upon its incorporation.
■ “ 16. From the correspondence and dealings of A. Walker & Go. and Burnham, Tulleys & Co., with respect to the incorporation, A. Walker & Co. believed and had reason to believe, that subscribers for stock, whether members of the firm or outsiders, stood on equal footing.”
The court also found that Alfred Walker & Go. had not seen the circular of April second when they effected the sale of the stock to the plaintiff and obtained his subscription, and it did not rely upon the statements contained therein in effecting the sale to the plaintiff and in taking his subscription.
But this finding does not relieve the defendants'from liability, for, under the letters which they put forth, they were bound to procure the corporation to be organized upon the basis of all subscribers paying par value in cash for the shares to be issued, which they did not do, but issued to themselves one-fifth of the entire capital for so-called good will. In addition to this, the corporation was not placed under the management of the members of the firm, nor did they become liberal takers of the • stock, as they represented they would be. Burnham took no shares except the $30,000 issued to him for good will, and never assumed the management of the affairs of the corporation.
The court was asked to find that the statements and the correspondence were designed to mislead, not only A. Walker & Co., but persons intending to become subscribers for the shares.
The court found, as above stated, that the statements and the correspondence were designed to mislead A. Walker & Co., but refused to find that they were designed to mislead subscribers, to which refusal the plaintiff excepted. This, we think, was error. If the
We think the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Yan Brunt, P. J., and Barrett, J., concurred.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appeL lant to abide the event.
Cases cited
- Chester v. Dickerson 54 N. Y. 1 p. 340
- Brewster v. Hatch 122 N. Y. 349 p. 341